LAWYERS OF KERALALOK LAW JOURNAL

Facts

A registered trust filed a PIL challenging the announcement of the Padma Bhushan for the 4th respondent, contending that numerous criminal cases were pending against him. The award was conferred while the petition was pending. The Union of India filed an affidavit explaining that the Padma Awards Committee looks for lifetime achievement, that recommended persons are subjected to character and antecedent verification by Central agencies, and that the reports showed allegations and proceedings but no finding of guilt, conviction or sentence by any competent court.

Issue

Whether the conferment of a Padma Bhushan can be interfered with on the ground that FIRs and criminal proceedings are pending against the recipient.

Held

1. The mere registration of an FIR, by itself, cannot constitute a relevant factor for declining to consider a candidate for the award, particularly when the candidate is otherwise found eligible on the basis of contributions to public service and social welfare. In one case the Supreme Court had stayed proceedings, and in none of the cases had trial commenced. [Para 5]
2. The Committee was entitled to take the view that unproven allegations cannot, by themselves, eclipse significant contributions or justify denial of recognition otherwise found meritorious by the competent authorities. [Para 5]
3. Under the Statutes and Rules relating to the Bharat Ratna and Padma awards, the President has the power to cancel and annul the award; the name is then erased from the Register and the decoration and Sanad must be surrendered. If the recipient is ultimately convicted, the Union of India may be required to consider annulment. [Paras 6–7]

Facts

The appellant, a stock custodian at a Maveli Store, was served a charge memo (Ext.P12) proposing action for a major penalty under Rule 147, based on an audit showing a loss of about Rs.10.71 lakh between 30.06.2019 and 18.11.2020. He replied that he was on Covid-related leave from 05.10.2020 and that the stock had been handed over to two named persons who were responsible for the loss. Without any enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority found him liable for Rs.8,09,342.73 (Ext.P15). The appellate authority confirmed this, saying no new information had been offered (Ext.P18). The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition.

Issue

Whether a finding of guilt and an order of recovery could be made on a charge memo proposing a major penalty without holding an enquiry, by treating recovery of loss as a minor penalty.

Held

1. Where the charge memo notifies the employee of a procedure that will lead to a major penalty under Rule 147, a delinquent who furnishes an explanation must be given a personal hearing followed by a proper enquiry. [Para 20]
2. Neither Rule 143 (minor penalties) nor Rule 144 (major penalties) lists recovery of loss as a penalty. The employer cannot dispense with the enquiry by characterising recovery as a minor penalty. [Paras 18–19]
3. A personal hearing does not suffice where the delinquent has raised a specific defence — that named persons, not he, caused the loss — which can be decided only in an enquiry. [Para 21]
4. An appellate authority must examine the materials incisively to see whether the delinquent’s contentions merit interference; an order merely stating that no new information was offered and concurring with the disciplinary authority falls foul of the legal requisites. [Para 22]
5. Union of India v. Indraj and Canara Bank v. Ganganarasimhaiah, which restrict writ courts from re-appreciating evidence, apply where the enquiry was validly completed; here no process worth mentioning was held, and the court examines the decision-making process. [Paras 10–12]

Facts

Local residents challenged an NOC (Ext.P14) granted by the Additional District Magistrate for a petroleum retail outlet. The Sub Collector’s report showed the dispensing unit only 26.5 metres from a school boundary, within the 30-metre CPCB norm, and the Commissioner of Police had given an adverse report on road safety (Ext.P12). After the NOC, the oil company shifted the dispensing unit under a revised plan approved by PESO, placing it more than 30 metres from the school.

Issue

Whether the NOC could stand when it was granted on a plan violating distance norms and without considering the Police report, and whether local residents are entitled to be heard on reconsideration.

Held

1. The NOC was granted on a plan placing the dispensing unit within the prohibited distance. Where the location is changed after the NOC, it is for the District Authority to consider the revised plan. [Para 7]
2. The District Authority is entitled to consider compliance with CPCB distance norms from schools, hospitals and public places while issuing an NOC under Rule 144 — following Ashwin Abraham Cherian v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd., 2026 (1) KHC 172. [Para 7]
3. Under the Proforma NOC, the District Authority is bound to consider the comments of the Police Department. If it accepts the comments, it need not discuss them; if it takes a different view, it must consider them. The Police report was not considered here. [Para 7]
4. Consent of local residents is not required and an NOC cannot be denied on their mere objection, but residents may point out the unsuitability of the site on legal grounds. Having succeeded on such grounds, they are entitled to a hearing in the reconsideration. [Para 9]

Facts

The petitioner, a former Medical Superintendent and Secretary of the Hospital Development Society at Govt. T.D. Medical College, Alappuzha, had awarded the right to run the hospital coffee shop to the 7th respondent at a monthly rent of Rs.1,99,363. No formal agreement was executed and rent fell into arrears. On a Vigilance enquiry finding that the dues could not be recovered from the occupant for want of an agreement, the Director of Medical Education ordered recovery of Rs.22,72,738 from the petitioner’s salary (Ext.P37). The petitioner contended that a concluded contract existed despite the absence of a formal agreement. The 7th respondent denied all documents except two and denied ever taking possession.

Issue

Whether the recovery from the petitioner could be quashed on the footing that a binding contract with the occupant existed, when the occupant disputes the documents relied on.

Held

1. A mere reference to a future formal contract does not prevent a binding bargain; whether it does depends on the intention of the parties. The court must see from the correspondence and conduct whether the parties were ad idem on all material terms — Kollipara Sriramulu v. T. Aswatha Narayana, 1968 KHC 425; Rickmers Verwaltung GmbH v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (1999) 1 SCC 1. [Para 8]
2. However, where the very foundation of the claim rests on documents whose execution and genuineness are seriously disputed, such disputed questions of fact require appreciation of evidence and cannot ordinarily be resolved in writ proceedings; the remedy is before a competent civil court. [Paras 9–10]

Facts

A Prevention of Corruption Act case (C.C. No.2/2016) pending before the Special Court (CBI)-II, Ernakulam was committed under Section 44(1)(c) PMLA to the PMLA Special Court at Kozhikode, to be tried with the connected money-laundering case. The CBI, supported by the Enforcement Directorate and one accused, contended that a PMLA Special Court has no jurisdiction to try a scheduled offence. Another accused supported the committal.

Issue

Whether a Special Court constituted under the PMLA, on committal of the scheduled-offence case under Section 44(1)(c), can try the scheduled offence though it is not the notified court for that offence.

Held

1. Section 44(1)(a) makes the money-laundering offence and any connected scheduled offence triable by the Special Court for the area; Section 44(1)(c) requires the court that took cognizance of the scheduled offence to commit that case to the Special Court, which then proceeds from the stage of committal. Section 71 gives the Act overriding effect. [Paras 8–11]
2. A Special Court constituted under the PMLA, on committal of a case under Section 44(1)(c), is legally competent and has jurisdiction to try the scheduled offence(s), even though it is not a notified court to try those offences. [Para 12]

Facts

The plaintiffs bought 143.31 acres for Rs.270 lakh under a sale deed (Ext.A3) that claimed marketable title to the whole property. They later found the sellers had neither title nor possession over 7½ acres included in the deed, and sued for the value of that extent (Rs.14,13,000) plus Rs.2,60,000 allegedly paid to workers on the sellers’ behalf. The sellers contended that the buyers knew of litigation over the 7½ acres and that the price had been reduced from Rs.277 lakh to Rs.270 lakh on that account. The trial court dismissed the suit.

Issue

Whether the buyers are entitled to compensation for the 7½ acres conveyed without title, and to recover the payments to workers.

Held

1. Section 55(1)(a) obliges the seller to disclose material defects in the property or title; omission is fraudulent. Section 55(2) imports an implied warranty that the seller has power to transfer the interest professed to be conveyed. The purchaser’s knowledge of a defect is neither a ‘contract to the contrary’ nor does it exclude the covenant, which can be excluded only by clear and unambiguous words. [Paras 12–13]
2. A buyer deprived of the property may sue for return of the purchase money with interest as damages; this remedy is independent of rescission, and a suit for refund on breach of warranty of title is maintainable without seeking cancellation of the sale deed. [Para 14]
3. Failure to convey the full title promised attracts compensation under Section 73 of the Contract Act; a false representation of full ownership attracts Section 55(2) TPA and Section 27 of the Specific Relief Act. [Paras 15–16]
4. The sellers’ plea that the real consideration and bargain differed from the deed is barred by Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act; there was nothing on record to show the buyers knew of the defect, and an erroneous figure in a lawyer’s notice is not proof of the consideration. [Paras 17–20]
5. The claim for payments to workers failed for want of proof that any liability of the sellers was discharged. [Para 22]

Facts

A complaint alleged that the appellant, a candidate for municipal councillor in 2015, had not disclosed in her nomination affidavit several landed properties standing in her husband’s name. The Magistrate issued summons under Section 125A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The High Court refused to quash the proceedings.

Issue

Whether a candidate must disclose properties held solely by the spouse, and whether cognizance taken under an inapplicable provision vitiates the proceedings.

Held

1. The prescribed affidavit requires details of the assets ‘of myself, my spouse and dependents’. The comma is a listing comma; ‘of’ applies to all three categories, so properties held solely by the spouse must be disclosed. [Paras 8–9]
2. The RPA defines ‘election’ as one to Parliament or a State Legislature, and the penal provisions on false declarations in the Gujarat Municipalities Act stand omitted. Since the candidate files an affidavit, the controlling provisions are those of the Indian Penal Code. [Paras 6, 12]
3. Taking cognizance under the wrong section is a curable irregularity under Section 465 CrPC where the court is competent to take cognizance of the correct offence — Pradeep S. Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka, (2021) 19 SCC 62. Cognizance is of the offence, not the offender; a false affidavit in the electoral process is an offence against society at large. [Paras 11, 13–14]

Facts

In 2022 the respondents sued for specific performance of an unregistered agreement to sell dated 21.08.1984 relating to a plot later used for a police station. The appellants’ applications under Order VII Rule 11(d) to reject the plaint as time-barred were dismissed by the trial court and the High Court.

Issue

Whether the plaint was liable to be rejected as barred by limitation on its own averments.

Held

1. Order VII Rule 11 is a filter enabling courts to terminate sham litigation at the threshold; the plaint must be read as a whole, and clever drafting cannot create an illusion of a cause of action — Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali, (2020) 7 SCC 562; Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174. [Paras 19–21]
2. The suit rested on the 1984 agreement with no explanation for not suing for more than three decades; Article 54 prescribes three years. [Para 22]
3. A 2021 High Court observation that the respondents had not filed any civil suit cannot become the basis for a fresh period of limitation; time runs from when the right to sue first accrues — Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, (2024) 15 SCC 675. [Paras 24–25]
4. A litigant who has remained silent for decades cannot file a suit as an afterthought; the suit is an abuse of process and barred by law. [Paras 26–27]

Facts

The deceased, aged 39, ran a construction business. The Tribunal took his last ITR (Rs.15 lakh) as income; the High Court took the average of the two ITRs on record (Rs.13,33,226) and reduced the award. The Court appointed Mr. J.R. Midha, Senior Advocate, and Mr. Salil Paul as amici, noting there was no uniform practice.

Issue

Whether income should be assessed on the last ITR or on the average of the previous two or three years’ ITRs.

Held

1. There is no hard-and-fast formula; ITRs, being statutory documents, are an important reference point. A distinction must be drawn between salaried and self-employed persons. [Paras 17–18]
2. Salaried: the ITR of the previous year is sufficient, since promotions may be reflected only in that year; where a promotion is not yet reflected, the promotion letter and corroborating financial statements may be referred to. [Para 18]
3. Self-employed / business: the average of the ITRs for up to the previous three years is the reference point, together with surrounding circumstances — (a) nature of the business; (b) growth pattern and impact of the death on the business; (c) potential growth; (d) negative income in initial years; (e) any other relevant factor. [Para 19]
4. The date of filing the ITR is relevant, as income may be inflated in returns filed after death or injury; such ITRs may be considered if supported by financial statements. [Para 20]
5. On the facts, annual income fixed at Rs.14,00,000; with 40% future prospects, 1/3 deduction and multiplier 15, the total compensation is Rs.1,97,81,505 (Tribunal: Rs.2,27,00,064; High Court: Rs.1,87,75,150). [Paras 21–22]

Facts

On a private complaint arising from a death in an altercation (alleged offence under Section 302 IPC), the Magistrate recorded pre-summoning evidence and committed the case to the Sessions Court, which framed charges against only one accused. In revisions, the High Court remanded the matter to the Magistrate to record pre-charge evidence under Section 244 CrPC before committal.

Issue

Whether a Magistrate must record prosecution evidence under Section 244 CrPC in a complaint case where the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Session.

Held

1. Section 244 (Chapter XIX-B, warrant cases instituted otherwise than on police report) governs cases triable by the Magistrate. Ajoy Kumar Ghose, Harinarayan G. Bajaj and Sunil Mehta, relied on by the High Court, concerned Magistrate-triable offences or other questions and are distinguishable. [Para 8]
2. Under the 1973 Code, committal inquiries were consciously abolished; at the Section 209 stage the Magistrate’s role is limited to seeing whether the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Session, and no evidence need be taken — Ashutosh Ghosh (1979) 4 SCC 381; Debendra Nath Padhi (2005) 1 SCC 568; Rattiram (2012) 4 SCC 516; Hardeep Singh (2014) 3 SCC 92. [Paras 10–12]
3. Requiring Section 244 evidence before committal would make witnesses depose to the same facts at least twice, which serves no purpose and is not the mandate of law. [Para 9]

Facts

In continuing proceedings, the Court considered affidavits of the Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh (10,939 registered vendors; 6,881 licences cancelled for non-payment; pending appeals before the appellate authority and GRDRC) and the note of the amicus curiae, Mr. Anant Vijay Palli, Senior Advocate, who argued that challans and cancellations alone did not achieve relocation or rehabilitation.

Issue

What directions are required to make vending zones functional while protecting vendors’ livelihood, and whether the 2020 notification expanding ‘Essential Service Providers’ should continue.

Held

1. Directions issued: (i) shift licensed vendors to the identified vending zones at the earliest; (ii) make zones fully operational with daily monitoring and road signage in all languages of daily use; (iii) establish and maintain public amenities; (iv) periodic print and electronic advertisements about zones and timings; (v) issue smart cards swiftly and share vendor details with the police and district administration; (vi) install CCTV within six months; (vii) consider a helpline for vendors and buyers. [Para 6]
2. Pending applications and appeals to be decided within 60 days after hearing all interested parties; fresh applications and appeals within 30 days, subject to the 2014 Act and bye-laws. [Para 6(viii)]
3. The Notification dated 17.07.2020, issued during COVID-19, expanding ‘Essential Service Providers’ (to include food vending such as tandoor and chhole bhature) and vending timings, has outlived its purpose and is quashed; the earlier notification governs. [Para 7]

Facts

In a 1989 partition suit, a compromise decree was recorded on 22.02.1994. Defendant No.5 had not signed the compromise; his counsel had endorsed ‘no objection’. In 2022 his legal representatives applied to set aside the decree as fraudulent and unsigned. The trial court allowed the application and the High Court dismissed the revision.

Issue

Whether the 1994 compromise complied with Order XXIII Rule 3, and whether the long delay barred its recall.

Held

1. Since the 1976 amendment a compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties. Counsel or an authorised representative may sign only with express authorisation or in exigent circumstances — Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India, (1992) 1 SCC 31. A lawyer has no implied authority to make a statement that surrenders the client’s substantial rights — Himalayan Coop. Group Housing Society v. Balwan Singh, (2015) 7 SCC 373. [Paras 5.2–5.5]
2. There was neither express authorisation nor exigency; the voluntariness required by Order XXIII Rule 3 was not established, so the compromise is contrary to law. [Para 5.6]
3. The only remedy against a compromise decree is a recall application; a fresh suit or appeal is not maintainable — Navratan Lal Sharma v. Radha Mohan Sharma, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3720. [Para 5.2(i)]
4. Limitation cannot be used to perpetuate a decree not in accordance with law where substantive rights are directly affected and the basic facts are disputed; on these facts the delay of about 25 years is given a go-by. Such delay will not be overlooked in every case. [Paras 6.5–6.6]

Facts

The appellant, serving life imprisonment for murder (convicted 03.01.2009), sought premature release under Haryana’s 2002 policy after 14 years of actual imprisonment. The State rejected it, applying the 2008 policy (20 years actual / 25 years total). The High Court dismissed his writ petition.

Issue

Whether the appellant’s case for remission is governed by the 2002 policy or the 2008 policy.

Held

1. The 2002 policy, like the 1993 policy, requires cases to be placed before the Governor for orders under Article 161; it is an exercise of constitutional power. The 2008 policy is statutory, with the Chief Minister deciding under Section 432 CrPC. A statutory policy cannot override an exercise of power under Article 161, so the 2008 policy’s supersession of the 2002 policy is untenable. [Paras 9, 12–13, 16]
2. State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, (2021) 9 SCC 292, holding the 2002 policy to be statutory, cannot be reconciled with the three-Judge Bench decision in State of Haryana v. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216, and is per incuriam. [Para 15]
3. Principles restated: per incuriam is an exception to stare decisis to be applied sparingly; it applies to the ratio, not obiter; it arises where a decision is irreconcilable with an earlier one of equal or larger strength or overlooks a statutory provision; the strength of the Bench, not the number of judges taking a view, is determinative. [Para 14]
4. Following Jagdish, a more liberal policy prevailing on the date of consideration must be applied; the appellant is entitled to the benefit of the 2002 policy. [Paras 10, 16]

Facts

The appellant was arrested on 13.07.2025 in a CBI cyber-fraud (‘mule account’) case. The charge-sheet was filed on 02.09.2025, within the statutory period, but the additional copies required by Section 193(8) BNSS for supply to the accused were not filed, and a copy reached him only on 23.09.2025. He sought default bail; the Special Judge and the High Court refused.

Issue

Whether filing a charge-sheet without the additional copies required by Section 193(8) BNSS entitles the accused to default bail.

Held

1. Section 187(3) BNSS is substantially identical to Section 167(2) CrPC. Section 193(8) newly requires additional copies of the police report for supply to the accused, and Section 230 fixes a 14-day timeline for supply. [Para 19]
2. Default bail is an indefeasible right under Article 21 arising from the failure to file the charge-sheet within 60/90 days; it is not release on merits, and it ceases once the charge-sheet is filed. It may be claimed orally, and courts should not be overly technical. [Para 20]
3. Non-filing of additional copies under Section 193(8) does not vitiate a charge-sheet filed in the form prescribed by Section 193(3) within time, and does not revive the right to default bail — Judgebir Singh v. NIA, (2023) 17 SCC 48; CBI v. Kapil Wadhawan, (2024) 3 SCC 734; CBI v. R.S. Pai, (2002) 5 SCC 82; Narendra Kumar Amin v. CBI, (2015) 3 SCC 417. [Paras 21–25]
4. The accused’s regular bail application must be considered on its own merits, independently of this appeal. [Para 28]