SERVICE LAW — Interim continuation beyond retirement age — Absence of supporting pleadings and documents — Supervisory jurisdiction
The State challenged the Kerala Administrative Tribunal’s interim order permitting a Professor of Government Medical College, Pariyaram, to continue provisionally in service until age 70, with salary and other benefits. The claim relied on Section 12 of the Academy of Medical Sciences and Allied Institutions (Taking over and Administration) Act, 2019 and interim orders in other cases. The original application remained pending before the Tribunal.
Held
1. Article 227 jurisdiction is supervisory and cannot be exercised as an appeal. Interference is justified for a manifest error, palpable perversity, flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, or gross failure of justice. (Paras 9–16.)
2. An application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, invokes jurisdiction akin to Article 226 in service matters. Facts and supporting evidence must be pleaded and annexed. A bare assertion based on Section 12 of the 2019 Act, without the original terms of appointment or supporting documents, did not justify the interim continuation order. (Paras 17–21.)
3. Although the State’s belated challenge after initiation of contempt proceedings could not be fully justified, the Tribunal’s manifest error required correction. The Court did not decide the salary argument based on Ram Chet Verma or the merits of the pending service claim. (Paras 21–23.)
4. The interim order dated 29 May 2026 was set aside, without prejudice to the applicant amending the pleadings and seeking fresh interim relief. Status quo regarding the Professor’s post was continued for one month to enable such applications. Salary, benefits and continuation beyond that period would depend on the Tribunal’s orders. All legal and factual contentions on the merits were left open. (Para 24 and concluding clarification.)
Petitioners: P.A. Mohammed Shah, Additional Advocate General; Government Pleader.
Respondent: C. Ajith Kumar, Advocate.
JUDGMENT
Anil K. Narendran, J.
The respondents in O.A.(EKM)No.599 of 2026, on the file of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal, Additional Bench at Ernakulam, have filed this original petition, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking an order to set aside Ext.P4 interim order dated 29.05.2026 of the Tribunal in that original application, which was one filed by the respondent herein-applicant, who is working as Professor at Government Medical College, Pariyaram, which was earlier run by Kerala Co-operative Hospital Complex and Academy of Medical Sciences, which was later taken over by the Government of Kerala, by virtue of the provisions under the Academy of Medical Sciences and Allied Institutions (Taking over and Administration) Act, 2019 (Act 13 of 2019). In O.A.(EKM)No.599 of 2026, filed invoking the provisions under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant sought the following reliefs;
“1. Call for the records leading to the case and allow the applicant to continue in service till his attainment of 70 years of age;
2. Direct the respondents to retain the applicant in service with all the service benefits available to him as applicable before the coming into force of Act 13 of 2019, including the tenure of service till the age of 70 years;
3. Pass such other order or direction which this Hon’ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper to grant in the circumstances of the case including costs of the original application.”
2. Along with the original application, the applicant produced Annexures A1 to A6. The grievance of the applicant is that the 3rd respondent Principal, Government Medical College, Pariyaram (3rd petitioner herein) informed the applicant that he will be relieved from duties on 31.05.2026. The original application, i.e., O.A.(EKM)No.599 of 2026, was filed before the Tribunal on 19.05.2026. When the same came up for admission, the learned Government Pleader was directed to get instructions. Thereafter, on 29.05.2026, when the original application came up for consideration, the Tribunal passed Ext.P4 interim order, which reads thus;
“Learned Government Pleader had submitted on 29.05.2026 that O.A.(EKM)No.383 of 2025 is already dismissed. It is now stated that the said submission was made by mistake and that the above original application is still pending. The same is recorded. Learned Counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant is due to retire on 31.05.2026 on attaining the age of 62 years, but that, in the case of similarly placed employees, this Tribunal had passed interim orders, Annexures A5 and A6, permitting the applicants to continue till the age of 70 years on a provisional basis, subject to the outcome of the original application. In view of Annexures A5 and A6 orders passed by this Tribunal, there will be an interim direction in this case also, permitting the applicant to continue on a provisional basis till the age of 70 years, subject to the outcome of this original application. Applicants in O.A.(EKM)Nos.1035 of 2022, 505 of 2023 and 275 of 2023 had earlier submitted before this Tribunal that they were permitted to continue in service beyond the age of 62 years but were not paid their wages and other benefits from the day they attained the age of 62 years. This Tribunal had passed Annexure A6 order stating that non-payment of wages to the applicants cannot be justified on the ground of difficulty in making entries in SPARKS. The direction in Annexure A6 was to make payment of the wages and other benefits due to the applicants, if necessary, by preparing manual salary bills. It is ordered that the directions contained in Annexure A6 shall apply to the applicants in this original application too.”
3. Challenging Ext.P4 interim order dated 29.05.2026 of the Tribunal in O.A.(EKM)No.599 of 2026, the petitioners- respondents are before this Court in this original petition.
4. We heard arguments of the learned Additional Advocate General for the petitioners-respondents and also the learned counsel for the respondent-applicant.
5. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the respondent-applicant would point out the conduct of the respondents in O.A.(EKM)No.599 of 2026 in raising a belated challenge against Ext.P4 interim order dated 29.05.2026 of the Tribunal, in this original petition filed on 01.10.2026, after the filing of a contempt petition by the applicant before the Tribunal alleging wilful disobedience of Ext.P4 interim order by the respondents in O.A.(EKM)No.599 of 2026.
6. On a specific query made by this Court as to the entitlement of the applicant for the continuance in service as Professor at the Government Medical College, Pariyaram, till attaining the age of 70 years, the learned counsel for the respondent-applicant would point out the provisions under Section 12 of Act 13 of 2019, and also, among other things, Annexure A6 interim order dated 20.11.2023 of the Tribunal in O.A.(EKM)Nos.1035 of 2022 and 275 and 505 of 2023.
7. The learned counsel for the respondent-applicant has relied on the decisions of the Apex Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath [(1954) 1 SCC 51], Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], Ram Chet Verma v. State of Uttar Pradesh – Civil Appeal No.618 of 2019 dated 11.01.2019 and Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, [(2022) 4 SCC 181].
8. Though the learned Additional Advocate General for the petitioners-respondents and also the learned counsel for the respondent-applicant addressed arguments touching the merits of the issues in O.A.(EKM)No.599 of 2026, we do not propose to consider those issues in this original petition, since the challenge made in this original petition is confined to Ext.P4 interim order dated 29.05.2026 of the Tribunal and the original application is still pending consideration before the Tribunal.
9. Article 227 of the Constitution of India deals with power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court. Under clause (1) of Article 227 of the Constitution, every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction.
10. In Waryam Singh [(1954) 1 SCC 51], a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that the power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is to be exercised by the High Court most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the courts subordinate to it within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors.
11. In Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil [(2010) 8 SCC 329] the Apex Court, while analysing the scope and ambit of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, held that the object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.
12. In Jai Singh v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi [(2010) 9 SCC 385], while considering the nature and scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court held that, undoubtedly the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate courts, as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority. The High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It cannot be exercised like a ‘bull in a China shop’, to correct all errors of the judgment of a court or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice.
13. In K.V.S. Ram v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation [(2015) 12 SCC 39] the Apex Court held that, in exercise of the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court can interfere with the order of the court or tribunal only when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunal and courts subordinate to it or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.
14. In Sobhana Nair K.N. v. Shaji S.G. Nair [2016 (1) KHC 1] a Division Bench of this Court held that, the law is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that in proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the lower court or tribunal and the jurisdiction of this Court is only supervisory in nature and not that of an appellate court. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 of the Constitution is called for, unless this Court finds that the lower court or tribunal has committed manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the lower court or tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law.
15. In Garment Craft [(2022) 4 SCC 181], the Apex Court held that the High Court exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution does not act as a court of first appeal to reappreciate, reweigh evidence or facts upon which determination under challenge is based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error of fact or even legal flaw when final finding is justified or can be supported. High Court is not to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion, for that of the lower court or tribunal. The jurisdiction exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant abuse, violation of fundamental principles of law or justice. Power under Article 227 is exercised sparingly in appropriate cases, when there is no evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse that no reasonable person can possibly come to such conclusion that the lower court or tribunal has come to. It is axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be exercised to ensure that there is no miscarriage of justice.
16. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, the High Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the Administrative Tribunal. The supervisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised to correct all errors in the order of the Administrative Tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. The correctional jurisdiction under Article 227 can be exercised only in a case where the order of the Administrative Tribunal has been passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice. Therefore, no interference under Article 227 is called for, unless the High Court finds that the Administrative Tribunal has committed a manifest error, or the reasoning is palpably perverse or patently unreasonable, or the decision of the Tribunal is in direct conflict with settled principles of law or where there has been gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted.
17. As already noticed hereinbefore, during the course of arguments, on a specific query made by this Court as to the entitlement of the applicant for the continuance till attaining the age of 70 years as Professor at Government Medical College, Pariyaram, the learned counsel for the applicant has referred to the provisions under Section 12 of Act 13 of 2019. A reading of the ‘facts of the case’ and ‘grounds’ of O.A.(EKM)No.599 of 2026 would show that there is total lack of pleadings in the original application on the entitlement of the applicant to continue in service till attaining the age of 70 years, other than a statement made in paragraph 5 of the facts of the case and ground B that Section 12 of Act 13 of 2019 empowers the applicant to continue in service for the same tenure, with the same remuneration, and upon the same terms and conditions on the basis of which he was originally appointed. No documents showing the terms and conditions on the basis of which the applicant was originally appointed form part of the pleadings before the Tribunal. No such documents are even referred to in the facts of the case or grounds. Though the learned counsel would point out Annexure A6 interim order dated 20.11.2023 of the Tribunal in O.A.(EKM)No.1035 of 2022 and connected matters, in the said order as well there is only a reference to Section 12 of Act 13 of 2019.
18. In Bharat Singh v. State of Haryana [(1988) 4 SCC 534] the Apex Court held that, when a point which is ostensibly a point of law is required to be substantiated by facts, the party raising the point, if he is the writ petitioner, must plead and prove such facts by evidence which must appear from the writ petition and if he is the respondent, from the counter affidavit. If the facts are not pleaded or the evidence in support of such facts is not annexed to the writ petition or to the counter affidavit, as the case may be, the Court will not entertain the point. The Apex Court held further that there is a distinction between a pleading under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and a writ petition or a counter affidavit. While in a pleading, i.e., a plaint or a written statement, the facts and not evidence are required to be pleaded, in a writ petition or in the counter affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it.
19. In Transport Commissioner, Madras-5 v. A. Radha Krishna Moorthy [(1995) 1 SCC 332], the Apex Court held that the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunals under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, is akin to that of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
20. In view of the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, in an original application filed before the Tribunal under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act or in the reply statement filed by the respondent not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it.
21. When there was total lack of pleadings in O.A.(EKM) No.599 of 2026 on the entitlement of the applicant to continue in service till attaining the age of 70 years, other than a statement made in paragraph 5 of the facts of the case and ground B, and no documents showing the terms and conditions on the basis of which the applicant was originally appointed forms part of the pleadings before the Tribunal, the Tribunal committed a manifest error in granting Ext.P4 interim order dated 29.05.2026 permitting the applicant to continue in service beyond the age of 62 years, with a further direction to the respondents (petitioners herein) to make payment of salary and other benefits to the applicant, if necessary, by preparing manual salary bills. Since the jurisdiction that is being exercised by the Tribunal, in an original application filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, is akin to the jurisdiction originally exercised by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in relation to service matters, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Bharat Singh [(1988) 4 SCC 534], when there is total lack of pleadings in O.A.(EKM)No.599 of 2026 on the entitlement of the applicant to continue in service till attaining the age of 70 years, the Tribunal ought not to have granted such an interim order. Since the conduct of the petitioners-respondents in filing this original petition challenging Ext.P4 interim order dated 29.05.2026 of the Tribunal, only after the filing of a contempt petition by the applicant alleging wilful disobedience of that interim order, cannot be fully justified, an interference on the said interim order is highly essential, in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in view of the aforesaid finding that while issuing such an interim order, the Tribunal has committed a manifest error.
22. In Ram Chet Verma v. State of Uttar Pradesh – judgment dated 11.01.2019 in Civil Appeal No.618 of 2019, a decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent- applicant, the Apex Court was considering a civil appeal arising out of the judgment dated 12.12.2017 of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) in Special Appeal No.267 of 2017, which was an intra-court appeal against the dismissal of Writ Petition No.4387 of 2004 (SS) by the judgment dated 31.03.2014 of the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench found that the petitioners-appellants did not possess the basic qualification for appointment as Assistant Teachers in the institution in question, at the time of entering service and therefore, they are not entitled to any benefit on the basis of service rendered by them on the strength of an interim order. In the judgment dated 11.01.2019, the Apex Court observed that since the appellants have served as Assistant Teachers as per the interim order, they have to be paid salary for the period they have rendered their services. Non-payment of salary for the period they have served under the interim order or otherwise would tantamount to taking begar from them, which is prohibited under Article 23 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the Apex Court ordered that the appellants shall be entitled to salary for the period they have rendered their services.
23. We do not propose to consider the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent-applicant, placing reliance on the aforesaid decision of the Apex Court, in view of the aforesaid finding that while issuing Ext.P4 interim order dated 29.05.2026 the Tribunal committed a manifest error, since there was total lack of pleadings in O.A.(EKM)No.599 of 2026 on the entitlement of the applicant to continue in service till attaining the age of 70 years.
24. In the above circumstances, this original petition is disposed of by setting aside Ext.P4 interim order dated 29.05.2026 of the Tribunal in O.A.(EKM)No.599 of 2026; however, without prejudice to the right of the respondent-applicant, if so advised, to file an application before the Tribunal to amend the pleadings in O.A.(EKM)No.599 of 2026 appropriately, and thereafter seek an appropriate interim order based on the amended pleadings. So as to enable the respondent-applicant to move such applications before the Tribunal, the status quo as on today in respect of the post of Professor at Government Medical College, Pariyaram, shall continue for a period of one month from the date of this judgment, subject to the condition that the entitlement of the respondent-applicant for payment of salary and other benefits as well as his continuance in service beyond the said period of one month shall be based on the orders to be passed by the Tribunal in the interlocutory applications to be filed in O.A.(EKM)No.599 of 2026, based on the aforesaid observations.
We make it clear that the observations, if any, contained in this judgment touching the merits of the matter pending in O.A(EKM)No.599 of 2026, are made for the limited purpose of disposal of this original petition. The legal and factual contentions raised by both sides are left open to be raised before the Tribunal at the appropriate stage.