Vinesh @ Madan Vinesh v. State of Kerala
Vinesh @ Madan Vinesh v. State of Kerala
LOK 2026 (11) Ker. 170
Equivalent citations: 2026:KER:87784
- Court
- High Court of Kerala
- Bench
- Raja Vijayaraghavan V., J.; K. V. Jayakumar, J.
- Case No.
- Crl. A. No. 1050 of 2025
- For petitioner / appellant
- Godwin Joseph, Advocates
- For respondent
- Rajeev K.K., Sr. Public Prosecutor
Headnote
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 328 (now BNSS 367), 329 (now BNSS 368), 332 (now BNSS 371) — Unsoundness of Mind — Fitness to Stand Trial — Mandatory Judicial Satisfaction — De Novo Trial — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 302 (now BNS 103)
The appellant, who had a documented history of Bipolar Affective Disorder and prior inpatient psychiatric treatment, was convicted under Section 302 (now BNS 103) IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Additional Sessions Court-IV, Thiruvananthapuram, for fatally assaulting his landlord with an iron rod on 13.12.2012 following a tenancy dispute. During the proceedings, Medical Boards examined the appellant in 2015 and 2019 and reported that he was fit to stand trial while noting that his disorder was in remission and required continued outpatient treatment. Before the trial commenced on 01.12.2021, the appellant was again taken to the Medical College Hospital on 08.03.2021 and Ext.X1 records reflected inpatient admission at the Mental Health Centre in 2021, yet the trial court proceeded without obtaining a fresh medical assessment, examining the doctors, or recording an independent judicial finding on his capacity to make his defence. On appeal, reports obtained in September 2026 showed that the appellant was stable on medication, had undergone over eleven years of actual incarceration, and that his mother undertook to ensure continued treatment and care upon release.
Held
- Eyewitnesses (PWs 2, 3, 4, and 9) naturally present at the scene consistently established that the appellant inflicted the fatal head injuries on the deceased on 13.12.2012, and neither the delay in registering the FIR nor the autopsy doctor's estimate on the age of injuries displaced the homicidal nature of death; however, the alleged recovery of MO1 iron pipe under Section 27 (now BSA 23) of the Evidence Act was unreliable since PWs 1 and 4 had seen the weapon at the police station prior to the purported recovery. (Paras 16–17, 23, 25)
- Sections 328 (now BNSS 367), 329 (now BNSS 368), and 332 CrPC cast a mandatory duty on the Court to independently scrutinize medical and other materials and record a specific finding that an accused with a history of mental illness is capable of understanding the proceedings and making his defence, and that statutory obligation cannot be shifted onto a legal aid defence. (Paras 47–53)
- Proceeding with the trial on the basis of 2015 and 2019 medical reports without a fresh medical evaluation after the appellant's subsequent hospitalisation in 2021, without examining the doctor, and without recording independent judicial satisfaction under Section 332 (now BNSS 371) CrPC caused serious prejudice and vitiated the trial. (Paras 54–56)
- Although a vitiated trial may ordinarily warrant a retrial, a de novo trial is an exceptional last resort; having regard to over eleven years of actual incarceration, the appellant's psychiatric condition, his indigent family background, and his mother's undertaking to ensure continued medication, a retrial would not serve the ends of justice. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, the conviction and sentence in S.C. No. 431 of 2013 were set aside, and the appellant was acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith. (Paras 64–68)
JUDGMENT
The appellant, a 38-year-old man with a history of mental illness, was residing with his parents in a rented house bearing No. VP III/533 at Vilavoorkal Village. The said house had been taken on lease from Sri Krishnankutty, the deceased in the instant case. According to the prosecution, the appellant was a habitual alcoholic who used to quarrel with his parents and cause damage to the rented house. Sri Krishnankutty, who was residing in an adjacent building, along with Smt. Lakshmi and Sudha and their families, used to warn the appellant and his family members and request them to vacate the house. The prosecution alleges that the appellant harboured animosity towards Krishnankutty on account of his persistent demands to vacate the house.
2. It is alleged that, on 13.12.2012, at about 05:30 p.m., the appellant came to the common courtyard of the house and confronted Krishnankutty. After questioning and confronting him, the appellant allegedly took out an iron rod and struck Krishnankutty on either side of his forehead and on his cheek. According to the prosecution, though Krishnankutty was immediately taken to the hospital and underwent treatment for about ten days, he succumbed to his injuries on 22.12.2012 at about 11:45 a.m. while undergoing treatment at the Medical College Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram.
3. On 18.12.2012, PW1, the son of Krishnankutty, approached the police and lodged Ext.P1 First Information Statement. Based on the same, PW15, the Grade Sub-Inspector of Police, Malayinkeezhu Police Station, registered Ext.P13 FIR in Crime No.989 of 2012 under Sections 324 (now BNS 118(1)) and 307 (now BNS 109) of the IPC. On 19.12.2012, the investigation was taken over by PW18, Nazarudheen, the Circle Inspector in charge of Kattakada Police Station. On the same day, at 03:00 p.m., he visited the scene of occurrence and prepared Ext.P3 scene mahazar. The bloodstains found at and around the scene of occurrence were collected and seized. He also seized MO4 cloth and MO5 sand, among other articles, during the preparation of the scene mahazar. Though the time of occurrence was initially mentioned as 06:30 p.m. in the FIR, it was revealed during the course of investigation that the incident had taken place at 05:30 p.m. Accordingly, Ext.P18 report was submitted before the jurisdictional court.
4. On 20.12.2012, the accused was found at Thachottukavu Junction and was arrested as per Ext.P19 arrest memo. Pursuant to the disclosure statement made by the accused, MO1 iron pipe was recovered in the presence of witnesses. Ext.P5(a) is the disclosure statement made by the accused. Thereafter, the clothes, including the jeans and shirt, worn by the accused at the time of his arrest, were seized as per Ext.P16 mahazar. Immediately after the arrest, a report furnishing the name and address of the accused was forwarded to the jurisdictional court. It is further stated that the Investigating Officer conducted an inquest over the dead body on 22.12.2012. Thereafter, Ext.P24 report incorporating Section 302 (now BNS 103) of the IPC was submitted before the jurisdictional court. The investigation was subsequently taken over by PW17, the Circle Inspector of Police, on 30.12.2012. On 04.01.2013, at about 02:40 p.m., he visited the scene of occurrence and prepared a mahazar in respect of the house of the deceased. A piece of wooden log, MO7, was produced before Court as per Ext.P14 property list. He stated that Lakshmi and Sudha were residing in Krishnankutty’s house, which was situated at a distance of about seven metres from the house occupied by the accused. On the same day, at about 03:30 p.m., the lease deed evidencing the tenancy of the house by the accused and his family members was seized as per Ext.P8. It was further revealed during the course of investigation that the accused was involved in Poojapura Crime No.118 of 2009; Malayankeezhu Crime Nos.19 of 2009, 279 of 2009 and 559 of 2010; besides a case pending as C.C.No. 341 of 2006 and Crime No. 193 of 2011 under Section 107 (now BNSS 126) CrPC. On completion of the investigation, the final report was laid before the jurisdictional court.
5. After complying with the requisite formalities, the case was committed to the Court of Session. After hearing the prosecution and the accused, the charge was framed and read over to the accused, who pleaded not guilty. To prove its case, the prosecution examined 19 witnesses and marked Exts.P1 to P25 through them. Material Objects 1 to 7 were also produced and identified. After the closure of the prosecution evidence, the incriminating circumstances appearing against the accused were put to him under Section 313(1)(b) (now BNSS 351) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As there was no scope for an acquittal at that stage, the accused was called upon to enter on his defence. No witness was examined on his behalf. The treatment records relating to his mental illness of the appellant/ accused were marked as Ext.X1.
6. The learned Sessions Judge, after evaluating the evidence of PW13, the Assistant Professor who conducted the postmortem examination and issued the postmortem certificate, concluded that the death of Krishnankutty was due to head injury and that the injuries sustained by him were sufficient in the ordinary course to cause his death. The learned Sessions Judge also held that MO1 iron pipe, which was recovered at the instance of the accused, was capable of causing the injuries found on the body of the deceased.
7. The learned Sessions Judge further relied on the evidence of PW19, the doctor who examined Krishnankutty when he was brought to the Medical College Hospital on 13.12.2012 and issued Ext.P25 wound certificate. It was held that the prosecution had established that Krishnankutty sustained injuries on 13.12.2012 at about 06:50 p.m. and that his death on 22.12.2012 was homicidal and not accidental.
8. The learned Sessions Judge also placed considerable reliance on the evidence of PWs 2, 3 and 9, the eyewitnesses, and concluded that the prosecution had established that it was the appellant who had attacked Krishnankutty with MO1 weapon on 13.12.2012, and had inflicted the injuries that ultimately led to his death on 22.12.2012. The court found that the said witnesses had withstood the test of cross-examination and that the defence had failed to discredit their testimony. Reliance was also placed on the evidence of PW4, a neighbour, which was found to corroborate the testimony of PWs 2, 3 and 9.
9. Accordingly, the appellant was found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 (now BNS 103) of the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of ₹1,00,000/-. The said finding of guilt, conviction and sentence are under challenge in this appeal.
10. Sri Godwin, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, advanced the following submissions.
a) The entire trial stood vitiated for non-compliance with the provisions of Sections 329 (now BNSS 368) to 332 (now BNSS 371) of the CrPC. According to the learned counsel, a mere perusal of Ext.X1 would reveal that the appellant had been admitted to the Mental Health Centre, Peroorkkada, Thiruvananthapuram, from 16.04.2021 to 01.05.2021, with a diagnosis of Bipolar I Disorder with mania with psychotic features.
b) The learned counsel contended that the learned Sessions Judge had merely relied on the report of a Medical Board to assess the appellant’s fitness to stand trial. The records further revealed that the appellant had undergone inpatient treatment at the Mental Health Centre from 06.01.2012 to 25.01.2012, even prior to his arrest in the present case.
c) The learned counsel referred to the proceedings sheet and specifically to the orders dated 22.11.2014, 01.12.2014, 24.03.2015, 22.05.2015, 05.06.2015, 17.08.2017, 30.08.2017, 14.06.2018, 18.06.2018, 07.09.2019, 22.10.2019, 13.12.2019 and 02.11.2019, to substantiate his contention that the appellant had been consistently undergoing treatment for mental illness at the Mental Health Centre, Thiruvananthapuram, during the relevant periods.
d) The learned counsel submitted that the learned Sessions Judge had placed considerable reliance on the report of the Medical Board, which was received in court and referred to in the order dated 02.11.2019, to conclude that the appellant was fit to undergo trial. The learned counsel pointed out that, apart from accepting the opinion expressed by the doctors, the learned Sessions Judge had neither considered the necessity of appointing a counsel for the appellant nor independently applied his judicial mind to assess the appellant’s ability to understand the proceedings and make his defence. According to the learned counsel, such an exercise was mandatory, as held by this Court in Mariyappan v. State of Kerala1.
e) The learned counsel further pointed out that, immediately prior to the trial, which was scheduled to commence on 23.07.2021, the proceedings sheet revealed that the appellant had again been admitted as an inpatient at the Mental Health Centre from 16.04.2021 to 01.05.2021 for bipolar mood disorder. According to the learned counsel, this subsequent admission to the Mental Health Centre occurred long after the Medical Board had submitted its report. In such circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge was mandatorily required to follow the procedure contemplated under the CrPC and reassess the appellant’s fitness to stand trial.
f) It was contended that the trial had commenced without following the procedure prescribed under Sections 329 (now BNSS 368) to 332 (now BNSS 371) of the CrPC and without recording an independent finding as to the appellant’s fitness to stand trial, thereby causing serious prejudice to him. The learned counsel also highlighted the failure of the learned Sessions Judge to pass a reasoned order, based on due application of judicial mind, while assessing the appellant’s ability to stand trial. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel relied on the principles laid down in Dr.Jai Shankar (Lunatic) Through Vijay Shankar v. State of H.P.2; State v. Baby3; Aji @ Ajith Kumar v. State of Kerala4; Prakash Nayi v. State of Goa5; and Mariyappan (supra). It was argued that the expression ‘considers’ used in Section 332 (now BNSS 371) of the CrPC requires the court not merely to examine the medical certificate but also the doctor, if necessary. It was only upon such due application of judicial mind that the court could arrive at a conclusion as to whether the accused was capable of making his defence.
g) The learned counsel would then contend that the prosecution had failed to establish that the injuries allegedly inflicted by the appellant on 13.12.2012 were the direct and sole cause of the death of the victim on 22.12.2012. According to the learned counsel, the deceased had survived for nine days and, for reasons best known to the Investigating Officer, the entire treatment records pertaining to the deceased had been suppressed. It was only when pointed questions were put to PW18, the Investigating Officer, during cross-examination that the doctor, who had not even been cited as a witness in the charge sheet, was summoned and examined as PW19 and the treatment records were produced before the court.
h) The learned counsel contended that an adverse inference ought to be drawn against the prosecution under Section 114(g) (now BSA 119) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, for withholding the treatment records. In support of the said contention, reliance was placed on the principles laid down in Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh6.
i) The learned counsel also placed considerable reliance on the evidence of PW13, the doctor who conducted the autopsy. It was contended that PW13 had categorically stated that the injuries which led to the death of the deceased were approximately three to five days old. According to the learned counsel, the postmortem examination was conducted on 23.12.2012 and, if the evidence of PW13 were accepted, the fatal injuries could have been inflicted only during the period between 17.12.2012 and 19.12.2012.
j) The learned counsel also invited the attention of this Court to Ext.P25 wound certificate and contended that, when Krishnankutty was examined on 13.12.2012, his Glasgow Coma Scale score was E4, M6 and V5, indicating that he was fully conscious, opened his eyes spontaneously, obeyed commands and was fully oriented. It was further pointed out that his vital signs were stable.
k) According to the learned counsel, Ext.P25 wound certificate records only two lacerated wounds on the forehead of Krishnankutty. When this aspect is considered along with the postmortem certificate, it would be evident that the injuries which ultimately led to his death were not present on his body when he was admitted to the Medical College Hospital on 13.12.2012. The learned counsel contended that this circumstance, coupled with the suppression of the treatment records, cast serious doubt on the prosecution case.
l) The learned counsel would then point out that there was an inordinate delay in registering the FIR. According to him, the alleged occurrence took place on 13.12.2012 at about 05:30 p.m., whereas the FIR was registered only on 18.12.2012 at 02:00 p.m. PW4, the neighbour and relative of the deceased, who had allegedly taken the victim to the hospital, had deposed before the court that he had informed the police about the incident on 13.12.2012 itself and had also seen police personnel arriving at the scene of occurrence. According to the learned counsel, if this version is accepted, it would indicate that the true facts relating to the occurrence had not been placed before this Court.
m) The learned counsel also challenged the recovery of the weapon allegedly made at the instance of the accused. According to the prosecution, MO1 was seized on 20.12.2012 pursuant to the disclosure statement made by the appellant, as recorded in Ext.P5(a). However, the evidence of PW4 would categorically reveal that he had seen MO1 at the police station. PW4 had also stated that he had no occasion to visit the police station after 13.12.2012. According to the learned counsel, this unchallenged testimony of a witness relied on by the prosecution itself would undermine the prosecution case and cast serious doubt on the alleged recovery of the weapon.
n) The learned counsel finally contended that, even if the entire prosecution case were accepted, the offence under Section 302 (now BNS 103) of the IPC would not be attracted.
11. The learned Senior Public Prosecutor stoutly opposed the submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. The following submissions were made:
a) The evidence of PWs 2, 4 and 9 had been subjected to searching cross-examination, during which they had stood their ground and reiterated that they had witnessed the incident. They had also given a detailed account of the events that had transpired. It was further submitted that there was absolutely no reason to doubt the credibility of these witnesses, whose presence at the scene of occurrence was natural, as they were admittedly residing in close proximity thereto.
b) It was further submitted that the alleged mental illness of the appellant had not been established in accordance with law. Though sufficient opportunity had been afforded to the appellant to examine the doctor who had treated him, no steps had been taken to summon the doctor and prove Ext.X1 in accordance with law.
c) The learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that the learned Sessions Judge, with a view to ensuring compliance with the relevant provisions of the CrPC, had directed the constitution of a Medical Board, and a team of doctors had assessed the appellant’s competency and fitness to stand trial. In such circumstances, the contention that the appellant was unfit to stand trial and that serious prejudice had been caused to him were liable to be rejected.
d) The learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the contention that the recovery of MO1 weapon was shrouded in secrecy was untenable. Immediately after the arrest of the appellant, the weapon had been recovered pursuant to the disclosure statement made by him.
e) The learned Public Prosecutor also pointed out that the injured was a man in his fifties and that the appellant had inflicted fatal injuries on his skull using MO1 weapon. He was admitted to the Medical College Hospital on 13.12.2012 and continued to undergo treatment there until his death on 22.12.2012. In the circumstances, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, based on the postmortem certificate, that the injuries must have been inflicted between 17.12.2012 and 19.12.2012 could not be accepted. The learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that the contention that the injuries inflicted by the appellant would not attract the offence under Section 302 (now BNS 103) of the IPC was equally untenable.
12. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced and perused the entire records.
13. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the death of Krishnankutty was homicidal. We find that the alleged incident took place on 13.12.2012 at about 05:30 p.m. Immediately after sustaining the injuries, the victim was taken to the Medical College Hospital, where he was examined by PW19. In his evidence, the doctor stated that he had examined the injured at 06:50 p.m. on 13.12.2012 and noted the injuries, namely: (1) a lacerated wound measuring 8 x 0.5 x 0.5 cm on the right side of the forehead, extending up to the hairline; (2) a lacerated wound measuring 6 x 0.5 x 0.5 cm on the left side of the forehead.
14. We find from the treatment records that the deceased had slipped into a coma and that the police could not record his statement. His son, who was examined as PW1, was by his side. It was only on 18.12.2012 that his son lodged a statement, based on which the FIR was registered. Ultimately, the injured succumbed to his injuries on 22.12.2012.
15. We have perused the postmortem report prepared by PW13. The doctor had noted as many as 12 injuries on the body of the deceased, including contusions, fracture fragments, lacerated wounds and abrasions. PW13 had also opined that the death of Krishnankutty was due to head injury.
16. The contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is that, in view of the opinion expressed by PW13 that the fatal injuries were three to five days old, the incident that took place on 13.12.2012 could not have been the proximate cause of death. The learned counsel also submitted that the long delay in recording the FIS will throw serious doubts on the case of the prosecution. We are unable to accept the above contentions. Of course there has been a delay in setting the law in motion. It has come out that immediately after the incident the police were intimated, however, for reasons best known, the information was not recorded and a crime was not registered. However, from the evidence of PW19, we find that Krishnankutty was admitted in the Medical College Hospital at 6.50 pm on 13.12.2012 with injuries on his forehead and other parts of the head. The defence has no case that, after 13.12.2012, the injured Krishnankutty was shifted out of the Medical College Hospital. From the evidence of the doctors, as well as that of PW1, we find that, owing to the seriousness of the injuries and the fracture sustained, Krishnankutty remained in a coma until his death on 22.12.2012. In the light of these circumstances, the mere opinion that the injury which led to his death might have been sustained three to five days prior to his death cannot be treated as conclusive. No other serious contention has been raised with regard to the injuries sustained by Krishnankutty on 13.12.2012.
17. Having considered the entire evidence, including that of the doctor who issued the wound certificate, the doctor who conducted the autopsy and the evidence of PW1, we are of the view that the prosecution has established that the death of Krishnankutty was homicidal. We find no reason to hold otherwise.
18. The next question is whether the injuries were inflicted by the appellant. To establish this aspect, the prosecution has examined several witnesses and we shall briefly refer to their evidence.
19. PW2, Smt. Sudha, stated that she, along with her husband and children, was residing in the house owned by Krishnankutty as a tenant. She further stated that Lakshmi was also residing in the same house. According to her, Krishnankutty owned another house situated adjacent to the said house, in which the appellant and his parents were residing. She stated that the incident took place at about 05:30 p.m. on 13.12.2012. According to her, the appellant and his father used to consume alcohol and frequently quarrel with each other. The appellant also used to kick the doors and cause damage to the house. Krishnankutty used to tell her and her husband that, despite his repeated requests, the appellant and his family had not vacated the house. She further stated that, on the previous day of the incident, she heard a loud altercation between Vinesh and Krishnankutty in the courtyard. She saw the appellant threatening Krishnankutty and asking him whether he believed that he could continue to reside peacefully in the house after having evicted the appellant and his family. Thereafter, Krishnankutty went inside the house. According to PW2, on the following day, while Krishnankutty, Nesan, Lakshmi and PW2 were conversing, they saw Vinesh approaching them. Krishnankutty then went to close the hen coop. Shortly thereafter, they heard the sounds of an altercation. She and Lakshmi rushed towards the place from where the noise emanated. She stated that she saw Vinesh holding an iron rod and, after asking Krishnankutty as to whether he expected to reside there peacefully, and thereafter the appellant struck Krishnankutty on his head three times with the iron rod. On sustaining the blows, Krishnankutty fell to the ground. Sudha and Lakshmi rushed towards him and found him unconscious, with blood flowing from his forehead. They immediately informed Nesan. Vijayan and two others rushed to the spot and, on seeing them, the appellant fled from the spot with the iron rod. She stated that somebody summoned an ambulance and the injured was shifted to the hospital. She identified MO1 pipe and also MO2 pants and MO3 shirt worn by the accused at the time of the occurrence. She also identified the accused, who was standing on the dock. In cross-examination, it was brought out that she had been staying in Krishnankutty’s house for over three years. She stated that she used to hear the appellant quarrelling with his family members. According to her, the distance from the house in which she was staying to the house of the accused was about 8 meters. She asserted that she had witnessed the infliction of injuries by the accused on Krishnankutty.
20. PW3 is one Thankamani, who was the nephew of the deceased. He stated that he was residing about 150 meters away from the house of the deceased. He stated that the incident took place at 5:30 p.m. on 13.12.2012. According to him, Vinesh and his father used to fight constantly, and Vinesh, in a fit of anger, used to kick the door of the house and cause damage. Krishnankutty used to tell him that he wanted Vinesh and his family members to vacate from the house. On 13.12.2012, after closing a loan, the witness went to meet Krishnankutty with the receipt. When he reached in front of the house, he heard Krishnankutty and Vinesh engaged in a wordy altercation. He stated that Vinesh took an iron pipe and, after exhorting that he does not deserve to live any longer, inflicted a blow on the head. Krishnankutty fell down, and he, along with Sudha and Lakshmi, went to his rescue. After inflicting the injuries, Vinesh took the iron rod and left the place. On hearing the cries, the neighbours assembled and an ambulance was summoned. Krishnankutty was shifted to the hospital. The witness identified the accused and the clothes worn by him, and also the MO1 iron pipe allegedly used by the accused to inflict the blow. PW3 was also cross-examined in extenso. He stated that the accused and the deceased were having the wordy altercation in front of the hen coop. He added that the blows inflicted by the accused landed on the head of the deceased.
21. PW4 is a neighbour of Krishnankutty. He stated that he was residing about 50 meters away from Krishnankutty’s house. According to him, Sudha and Lakshmi were living with their respective families, along with Krishnankutty and in the adjacent house, the appellant and his family members were residing. He stated that at 5:30 p.m. on 13.12.2012, he saw Krishnankutty, Sudha, Lakshmi and Nesan, having a conversation in front of the house of Krishnankutty. At that time, he noticed Vinesh walking towards Krishnankutty’s house. After some time, he heard the cries of Sudha. He, along with his wife, went to Krishnankutty’s house and found Vinesh leaving the spot with an iron pipe. Krishnankutty was found lying on the ground and he was bleeding. He also spoke about shifting Krishnankutty to the hospital. He also identified the accused and the clothes worn by him. Though he was cross-examined in detail, the defence was not able to shake his testimony.
22. PW9, another occurrence witness, stated that on 13.12.2012, at about 5.30 p.m., she was collecting wooden logs from a rubber plantation adjacent to the house of Krishnankutty. While she was doing so, she heard loud noises emanating from the courtyard of Krishnankutty’s house. On looking towards the courtyard, she saw the accused shouting something at Krishnankutty. Shortly thereafter, she saw the accused strike Krishnankutty on the head with an iron pipe, following which he fell to the ground. Immediately, she heard a woman crying from the courtyard. PW9 thereupon ran to her house and informed her husband about the incident. When they reached Krishnankutty’s house, she saw him lying on the ground, with blood oozing from his forehead. She also saw PW2 Sudha, PW3, PW4 and several others gathered there. She was also subjected to detailed cross-examination on all aspects but the defence was not able to shake her testimony.
23. We find no reason to disbelieve the testimony of PWs 2, 3, 4 and 9. They have explained their presence at the scene of crime which appears to us to be natural and their version of the events leaves no room for doubt regarding their credibility. In that view of the matter, we hold that the prosecution has established that it was the appellant who had inflicted the blows on the head of Krishnankutty, which ultimately led to his death.
24. Another circumstance connecting the accused with the crime is the recovery of MO1 iron pipe. The Investigating Officer, who was examined as PW18, stated that it was recovered pursuant to Exhibit P5(a) disclosure statement made by the accused. MO1 was recovered from a property situated opposite the CSI Church. On the strength of the disclosure statement and as led by the accused they reached the compound of the said property, where the accused took out MO1 iron pipe from among the weeds, dry leaves and other dumped waste materials and handed it over to PW18 in the presence of PW8 and another witness. PW8 has admitted that he saw the accused take MO1 iron pipe from among the weeds, dry leaves and dumped waste materials in the property situated opposite the CSI Church and hand it over to PW18. He has also admitted his signature in Ext. P5 seizure mahazar.
25. Sri Godwin, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that no reliance could be placed on the recovery of MO1, as there were material discrepancies affecting the credibility of the recovery. We find that the learned counsel has been able to bring out certain serious discrepancies. According to the prosecution, the weapon was recovered on 20.12.2012, as evidenced by Ext.P5. However, during the cross-examination of PW4, it was brought out that he had seen the weapon at the police station on 13.12.2012. He further stated that he had no occasion to visit the police station after 13.12.2012. PW1 had also stated that he had seen MO1 at the police station on 19.12.2012. The prosecution has not made any attempt to explain these statements. If the weapon was already in the custody of the police before the preparation of Exhibit P5, and had been seen by the witnesses even before 20.12.2012, the alleged recovery loses its significance. As held by the Apex Court in Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat7, where the materials on record disclose that the fact sought to be discovered was already known to the police and no new fact was discovered in consequence of the information furnished by the accused, no reliance can be placed on the evidence of recovery.
26. We shall now deal with the contention advanced by Sri Godwin that the appellant was denied a fair trial on account of the failure of the trial court to scrupulously follow the procedure prescribed under Chapter XXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), which deals with the procedure to be followed when an accused is suspected to be of unsound mind. According to the learned counsel, though the appellant had a documented history of mental illness and had undergone treatment at the Mental Health Centre, Thiruvananthapuram, the trial court proceeded with the trial without independently satisfying itself that he was mentally fit to stand trial and capable of making his defence.
27. Before examining the contention, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of Chapter XXV of the CrPC. Sections 328 (now BNSS 367) and 329 (now BNSS 368) prescribe the procedure to be followed when an accused is suspected to be of unsound mind, respectively, during an inquiry and at the stage of trial. Section 332 (now BNSS 371) further deals with the procedure to be followed when an accused, who was earlier found incapable of making his defence, subsequently appears before the Court.
28. Section 328, which deals with the procedure in a case where the accused is suspected to be of unsound mind during an inquiry, reads as follows:
Section 328. Procedure in case of accused being lunatic:
(1) When a Magistrate holding an inquiry has reason to believe that the person against whom the inquiry is being held is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, the Magistrate shall inquire into the fact of such unsoundness of mind, and shall cause such person to be examined by the civil surgeon of the district or such other medical officer as the State Government may direct, and thereupon shall examine such surgeon or other officer as a witness and shall reduce the examination to writing. (emphasis supplied)
(1A) If the civil surgeon finds the accused to be of unsound mind, he shall refer such person to a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist for care, treatment and prognosis of the condition and the psychiatrist or clinical psychologist, as the case may be, shall inform the Magistrate whether the accused is suffering from unsoundness of mind or mental retardation:
Provided that if the accused is aggrieved by the information given by the psychiatric or clinical psychologist, as the case may be, to the Magistrate, he may prefer an appeal before the Medical Board which shall consist of–
(a) head of psychiatry unit in the nearest Government hospital; and
(b) a faculty member in psychiatry in the nearest medical college.
(2) Pending such examination and inquiry, the Magistrate may deal with such person in accordance with the provisions of Section 330.
(3) If such Magistrate is informed that the person referred to in sub-section (1A) is a person of unsound mind, the Magistrate shall further determine whether the unsoundness of mind renders the accused incapable of entering defence and if the accused is found so incapable, the Magistrate shall record a finding to that effect, and shall examine the record of evidence produced by the prosecution and after hearing the advocate of the accused but without questioning the accused, if he finds that no prima facie case is made out against the accused, he shall, instead of postponing the enquiry, discharge the accused and deal with him in the manner provided under Section 330:
Provided that if the Magistrate finds that a prima facie case is made out against the accused in respect of whom a finding of unsoundness of mind is arrived at, he shall postpone the proceeding for such period, as in the opinion of the psychiatrist or clinical psychologist, is required for the treatment of the accused, and order the accused to be dealt with as provided under Section 330.
(4) If such Magistrate is informed that the person referred to in sub-section (1A) is a person with mental retardation, the Magistrate shall further determine whether the mental retardation renders the accused incapable of entering defence, and if the accused is found so incapable, the Magistrate shall order closure of the inquiry and deal with the accused in the manner provided under Section 330.
29. Section 329 deals with the procedure to be followed when a person of unsound mind is tried before a Magistrate or a Court of Session. The relevant provision reads as follows:
Section 329. Procedure in case of person of unsound mind tried before Court.
(1) If at the trial of any person before a Magistrate or Court of Session, it appears to the Magistrate or Court that such person is of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, the Magistrate or Court shall, in the first instance, try the fact of such unsoundness and incapacity, and if the Magistrate or Court, after considering such medical and other evidence as may be produced before him or it, is satisfied of the fact, he or it shall record a finding to that effect and shall postpone further proceedings in the case. (emphasis supplied)
[(1A) If during trial, the Magistrate or Court of Sessions finds the accused to be of unsound mind, he or it shall refer such person to a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist for care and treatment, and the psychiatrist or clinical psychologist, as the case may be shall report to the Magistrate or Court whether the accused is suffering from unsoundness of mind:
Provided that if the accused is aggrieved by the information given by the psychiatric or clinical psychologist, as the case may be, to the Magistrate, he may prefer an appeal before the Medical Board which shall consist of–
(a) head of psychiatry unit in the nearest Government hospital; and
(b) a faculty member in psychiatry in the nearest medical college.
(2) If such Magistrate or Court is informed that the person referred to in sub-section (1A) is a person of unsound mind, the Magistrate or Court shall further determine whether unsoundness of mind renders the accused incapable of entering defence and if the accused is found so incapable, the Magistrate or Court shall record a finding to that effect and shall examine the record of evidence produced by the prosecution and after hearing the advocate of the accused but without questioning the accused, if the Magistrate or Court finds that no prima facie case is made out against the accused, he or it shall, instead of postponing the trial, discharge the accused and deal with him in the manner provided under Section 330:
Provided that if the Magistrate or Court finds that a prima facie case is made out against the accused in respect of whom a finding of unsoundness of mind is arrived at, he shall postpone the trial for such period, as in the opinion of the psychiatrist or clinical psychologist, is required for the treatment of the accused.
(3) If the Magistrate or Court finds that a prima facie case is made out against the accused and he is incapable of entering defence by reason of mental retardation, he or it shall not hold the trial and order the accused to be dealt with in accordance with Section 330.
30. Section 332 deals with the procedure to be followed when an accused is appearing before Magistrate or Court. The relevant provision reads as follows:
Section 332. Procedure on accused appearing before Magistrate or Court.
(1) If, when the accused appears or is again brought before the Magistrate or Court, as the case may be, the Magistrate or Court considers him capable of making his defence, the inquiry or trial shall proceed.
(2) If the Magistrate or Court considers the accused to be still incapable of making his defence, the Magistrate or Court shall act according to the provisions or Section 328 or Section 329, as the case may be, and if the accused is found to be of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, shall deal with such accused in accordance with the provisions of Section 330.
31. The object of these provisions is to ensure that a person who is incapable of understanding the proceedings or of making his defence on account of unsoundness of mind is not subjected to a trial without the Court first determining his mental capacity. The responsibility to make such an assessment rests with the Court. It is not dependent upon the accused raising a specific plea or making a formal application.
32. In the present case, the appellant’s medical history, the proceedings before the trial court and the various directions issued from time to time assume considerable significance. A chronological examination of these materials would provide a clear picture of the appellant’s mental condition and the manner in which the trial court dealt with the issue.
33. We find that the legal aid lawyer, who was defending the accused, had filed an application before the learned Sessions Judge requesting the court to call for the medical records of the accused. It is stated specifically in the application that the accused had undergone treatment for mental ailment at the Mental Hospital. The discharge summary issued by the Mental Health Centre, Thiruvananthapuram, on 26.11.2014, reveals that the appellant had been admitted to the institution from 06.01.2012 to 25.01.2012. He was diagnosed with Bipolar Affective Disorder (BPAD) and PF (Psychotic Features). The incident in the present case is alleged to have taken place on 13.12.2012. Thus, the medical records disclose that the appellant had a history of mental illness even prior to the occurrence.
34. The Superintendent of the Special Sub Jail, Thiruvananthapuram, issued a letter dated 11.12.2014 to the Additional Sessions Court-I, enclosing the treatment records of the appellant. Those records disclosed that he had been undergoing treatment at the Mental Health Centre, Thiruvananthapuram, from 14.08.2013 to 10.12.2014.
35. Thereafter, by order dated 24.03.2015, the learned Sessions Judge directed that the appellant be produced for medical examination at the Mental Health Centre, Thiruvananthapuram, to ascertain his mental condition and determine whether he was fit to stand trial. The Medical Board examined him and submitted a report dated 22.05.2015. The relevant portion of the report reads as follows:
Episodic mental illness of 4-5 years duration with past hospitalization here. Abuse of alcohol, cannabis and IV drugs in the past.
Past legal issues with jail sentences.
During current observation –
Patient co-operative, conscious, well oriented with good rapport, normal talk, anxious mood and has auditory hallucinations. His higher mental functions are intact except impaired test judgment. He is able to understand legal procedures, can make his defense in court and able to appreciate the possible penalties.
Conclusion :
He is diagnosed with Bipolar Mood Disorder – partial Remission Poly substance abuse.
He is fit to stand trial at present.
36. On receipt of the report, the trial court recorded that the appellant was fit to stand trial and capable of making his defence. The Court also directed that summons be issued to Dr. T. Sagar, Consultant in Psychiatry and a member of the Medical Board. However, the records do not disclose that the said doctor was examined by the Court or that any further judicial assessment of the appellant’s mental condition was undertaken at that stage.
37. We find that the defence counsel persisted and filed yet another application as Cr.M.P. No 1702/2017 on 17.08.2017, purportedly under Section 329 (now BNSS 368) of the CrPC requesting that the accused be examined to ascertain his fitness to stand trial. By order dated 30.8.2017, the application was allowed and the appellant was referred for examination by the Medical Board of the Government Hospital. On 25.09.2017, the Superintendent of the Jail addressed a communication to the Sessions Judge stating that the appellant required examination at the Psychiatry Outpatient Department and that admission and observation for a period of ten days were anticipated to assess his mental condition. In the subsequent proceedings, the learned Sessions Judge, by order dated 10.10.2017, directed that a Medical Board be constituted to examine the appellant and ascertain whether he was fit to stand trial. The Court also issued further directions from time to time, including on 30.08.2017, 14.06.2018, 30.08.2018, 07.09.2019, 16.09.2019 and 17.09.2019, for medical examination and assessment of his mental condition.
38. In the meantime, the counsel appearing for the appellant relinquished his Vakkalath and the Court appointed a legal aid counsel to defend him.
39. It was only on 22.10.2019 that a further report of the Medical Board was received. The report reads as follows:
“We may inform the Hon’ble Court that we have examined Sri. Vineesh @ Madan Vineesh (SC 431/13) who is under treatment for Bipolar Affective Disorder in remission and Poly Substance Abuse. We found that he is able to comprehend and communicate properly. His mental status examination revealed intact primary mental functions and judgement and no psychotic symptoms. He is able to understand the nature of the charges against him and able to take part in court proceedings. Hence we opine that he is fit to stand trial and can be discharged and taken back to jail at the earliest. However he requires continued treatment on an outpatient basis.”
40. The trial court, on receipt of the said report, recorded that the appellant was fit to stand trial. The report, however, also specifically noted that he was undergoing treatment for Bipolar Affective Disorder in remission and poly substance abuse and required continued outpatient treatment.
41. The subsequent proceedings are equally relevant. On 08.03.2021, the appellant could not be produced before the Court, as he had been taken to the Medical College Hospital. The proceedings further disclose that, on 06.07.2021, the Court directed that a reminder be issued for a report from the Mental Health Centre. Thereafter, on 16.01.2024 and 22.01.2024, the defence sought to obtain further medical records from the Mental Health Centre. On 08.02.2024, after the records were produced, the defence sought time to examine the doctor who had treated the appellant. On 15.02.2024, the defence again sought time to furnish the details of the doctor for the purpose of issuing summons. However, on 14.03.2024, the summons issued to the defence witness was returned unserved with an endorsement that the doctor had been transferred from the hospital and that his present whereabouts were not known. Thereafter, the defence evidence was closed and the case was posted for hearing.
42. It is in the backdrop of these proceedings that the observations made by the trial court in its judgment regarding the appellant’s mental condition have to be examined. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:
“5. The accused had raised a plea of mental illness. My learned predecessor in office had called for report from doctor regarding the mental condition and fitness of the accused to stand the trial. The doctors after thoroughly assessing the mental conditions of the accused had issued a certificate dated 22/10/2019 that the accused is fit to stand trial. It is only after receiving such a certificate that the trial in this case started.”
43. The trial court thereafter considered the defence plea of unsoundness of mind while answering Point No.3. The relevant findings in paragraph 35 of the judgment read as follows:
35. Point No. 3: It is settled that the accused need not raise specifically a plea of general exceptions. It can be brought out in cross-examination. However, in the instant case, the defence has taken a plea that the accused had mental illness and had underwent treatment before the Mental Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram. In order to prove this aspect, Ext. X1 case records of the accused from the Mental Hospital was marked. But the defence in spite of taking various steps have failed to procure the presence of any doctors who had treated him in order to testify before the court as to what was the nature of his illness. On perusal of Ext. X1 case records, it is seen that the accused had issues like insomnia, destruction, argumentative, drug abuse. The trial in this case was started after obtaining certificate from the doctor concerned that the accused is fit to stand trial. During the course of trial, the accused did not show any symptoms of mental illness. He was regularly being produced before the court from jail. He has always behaved well in the court keeping the decorum of the court. In the absence of evidence from the doctors who have treated him, it cannot be said that the accused suffered from mental insanity or had unsoundness of mind at the time of commission of the offence. Thus, this point is found in favour of the prosecution.”
44. A perusal of the records reveals that the trial court, which commenced the trial on 01.12.2021, relied upon the medical assessments and reports obtained by its predecessor, particularly the report dated 22.10.2019, to conclude that the appellant was fit to stand trial. The crucial question, however, is whether the trial court independently considered the appellant’s mental condition at the relevant stage and recorded the requisite satisfaction that he was capable of making his defence.
45. The medical reports of 2015 and 2019 undoubtedly contain an opinion that the appellant was fit to stand trial at the time of those examinations. But the records also disclose that he continued to be under treatment for a serious mental health condition. More importantly, the appellant was taken to the Medical College Hospital on 08.03.2021, a circumstance which was brought to the notice of the Court. Despite this, there is no indication that a fresh medical assessment was obtained thereafter to ascertain whether his mental condition had remained stable and whether he continued to be capable of understanding the proceedings and making his defence when the trial commenced on 01.12.2021.
46. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the mere availability of medical certificates expressing an opinion that the appellant was fit to stand trial could not dispense with the statutory obligation of the Court to independently assess his capacity to make his defence. It was further submitted that the doctors who had examined and treated the appellant were not examined by the Court and that the procedure contemplated under Sections 328 (now BNSS 367), 329 (now BNSS 368) and 332 (now BNSS 371) of the CrPC was not followed.
47. The submission requires consideration in the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Prakash Nayi (supra). The Apex Court observed as follows:
Chapter XXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 “15. Chapter XXV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter “CrPC”), though procedural in nature, also becomes substantive when it deals with an accused person of unsound mind. A well-laid procedure is contemplated under Sections 328 (now BNSS 367) to 339 (now BNSS 378) CrPC. There is not even a need for an application under Section 329 (now BNSS 368) CrPC in finding out as to whether an accused would be sound enough to stand a trial, rather it is the mandatory duty of the court. Under Section 330, the court can even go to the extent of discharging such a person if his inability to stand trial continues with a rigid chance of improvement. As per Section 334 (now BNSS 373) CrPC, the judgment of the court shall include a specific finding that the act was committed due to unsoundness of mind, though it was actually done. The reason is simple as there cannot be an acquittal on the ground of unsoundness of mind unless the act is actually done.
16. The whole idea under the provisions discussed is to facilitate a person of unsound mind to stand trial, not only because of his reasoning capacity, but also to treat him as the one who is having a disability. The role of the court is to find the remedial measures and do complete justice.”
17. The aforesaid observations make it clear that the provisions contained in Chapter XXV are not mere procedural formalities. They impose a mandatory obligation on the Court to ensure that an accused who is alleged to be of unsound mind is capable of understanding the proceedings and making his defence before being subjected to trial. The obligation is that of the Court itself and cannot be shifted to the accused.
18. In this context, Section 332 (now BNSS 371) of the CrPC assumes particular relevance. It deals with the procedure to be followed when an accused, who was earlier found incapable of making his defence, subsequently appears or is brought before the Court. The provision reads as follows:
“332. Procedure on accused appearing before Magistrate or Court.– (1) If, when the accused appears or is again brought before the Magistrate or Court, as the case may be, the Magistrate or Court considers him capable of making his defence, the inquiry or trial shall proceed.
(2) If the Magistrate or Court considers the accused to be still incapable of making his defence, the Magistrate or Court shall act according to the provisions of Section 328 or Section 329, as the case may be, and if the accused is found to be of unsound mind and consequently incapable of making his defence, shall deal with such accused in accordance with the provisions of Section 330.”
48. The language of Section 332 is significant. The provision requires the Court to consider whether the accused is capable of making his defence before proceeding with the inquiry or trial. Such consideration cannot be reduced to a mere reference to an earlier medical certificate. It requires the Court to apply its judicial mind to the medical material available, the circumstances brought to its notice and the conduct and condition of the accused. Only upon arriving at the requisite satisfaction can the Court proceed with the trial.
49. This Court had occasion to consider a similar issue in Mariyappan (supra). The relevant observations are extracted below:
“44. The word ‘considers’ appearing in S.332 (now BNSS 371) of the CrPC empowers the Court not only to examine the Medical Certificate and also the doctor, if necessary, but, also should consider other factors and the accused should also be interrogated by the Court and only after due application of mind the Court should come to the conclusion that accused is capable of making of his defence. This exercise should be strictly carried out because it relates to the defence of the accused which is his valuable right and also relates to personal liberty of the accused. The aim and object of the provisions as to accused persons of unsound mind found in Chapter XXV of the Code is that the accused who is of unsound mind should not be put to trial because he is unable to defend himself and, therefore, there must be a specific order of the Court recording a finding that insanity of the accused has been ceased and he is in fit mental condition to defend himself. The Magistrate or court cannot mechanically or blindly rely on a medical certificate issued by a psychiatrist as if it is the end of the matter. Judicial satisfaction must be recorded after independent scrutiny of the facts and circumstances to ensure that the rights of the accused are fully safeguarded. If the accused is put to trial without arriving at the above independent satisfaction and by recording a finding to that effect, the trial itself will be vitiated.”
50. The principle emerging from the above decision is that a medical certificate, though relevant and important, does not by itself conclude the issue. The Court must independently consider whether the accused is capable of making his defence. Depending on the circumstances, such an assessment may require examination of the doctor, consideration of other relevant materials and interaction with the accused. The Court must record its satisfaction in clear terms before proceeding with the trial.
51. When the aforesaid principles are applied to the facts of the present case, certain serious deficiencies become apparent. The appellant had a documented history of mental illness and had undergone treatment even before the incident. The medical records further disclosed continued psychiatric treatment during his incarceration. The Medical Board’s report dated 22.05.2015 recorded that he was suffering from Bipolar Mood Disorder in partial remission and had auditory hallucinations, besides noting impaired test judgment. The subsequent report dated 22.10.2019 also recorded that he was under treatment for Bipolar Affective Disorder in remission and Poly Substance Abuse and required continued outpatient treatment. More significantly, the proceedings dated 08.03.2021 disclosed that the appellant had been taken to the Medical College Hospital. This circumstance ought to have prompted the trial court to ascertain whether there had been any deterioration or change in his mental condition. However, no subsequent medical report appears to have been obtained to determine whether he remained fit to stand trial when the trial commenced in 2024. It is also significant that the trial court, while referring to the earlier medical reports, did not record a specific finding that the appellant’s mental condition was such that he was capable of understanding the proceedings and making his defence at the time of trial. The judgment merely states that the trial commenced after obtaining a certificate from the doctor concerned and that the appellant did not exhibit any symptoms of mental illness during the trial. His regular production before the Court and his conduct in maintaining the decorum of the Court were also relied upon. Such observations, by themselves, cannot substitute the judicial assessment mandated under the provisions of Chapter XXV.
52. The trial court also appears to have placed considerable reliance on the failure of the defence to secure the presence of the doctors who had treated the appellant. However, the obligation to ascertain the appellant’s capacity to make his defence is a statutory duty cast upon the Court. This obligation assumes particular significance in the present case, where the appellant was represented by a legal aid counsel and had limited financial means. The responsibility of ensuring compliance with the statutory safeguards cannot be shifted to the defence or made contingent upon its ability to secure the attendance of the treating doctors. The failure of the defence to procure their presence, particularly when the summons was returned unserved with the endorsement that the doctor had been transferred and his present whereabouts were not known, could not absolve the Court of its duty to undertake an independent assessment of the appellant’s mental capacity.
53. The issue is not merely whether the appellant was suffering from a mental illness at the time of the occurrence or whether he was entitled to claim the benefit of a general exception. The immediate and distinct question is whether he was mentally capable of understanding the proceedings and making his defence when he was subjected to trial. These are separate matters, requiring consideration at different stages and under the relevant statutory provisions. The trial court’s discussion in paragraph 35, which principally addressed the failure of the defence to establish the nature of the appellant’s illness and his mental condition at the time of the occurrence, does not answer the anterior question as to his fitness to stand trial.
54. On a comprehensive consideration of the proceedings before the trial court, the medical records, the directions issued from time to time and the statutory safeguards contained in Chapter XXV of the CrPC, we are unable to conclude that the procedure prescribed by law was duly followed. The earlier medical reports, particularly those of 2015 and 2019, could not, without further consideration, form the sole basis for concluding that the appellant was fit to stand trial in 2024. The subsequent event of 08.03.2021, when the appellant had been taken to the Medical College Hospital, assumed particular significance and warranted a fresh assessment of his mental condition. No such assessment is evident from the records.
55. The failure to examine the doctor who had assessed the appellant, the absence of a fresh medical evaluation after the subsequent hospitalisation and, above all, the failure of the trial court to record its independent satisfaction regarding the appellant’s capacity to make his defence have cumulatively resulted in serious prejudice to the appellant. The trial court could not have proceeded merely on the basis of medical certificates obtained several years earlier, without undertaking the judicial scrutiny required under Section 332 (now BNSS 371) of the CrPC.
56. In the circumstances, we find that the trial court failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Sections 328 (now BNSS 367), 329 (now BNSS 368) and 332 (now BNSS 371) of the CrPC. The safeguards embodied in Chapter XXV of the CrPC are intended to protect the valuable right of an accused to participate meaningfully in the proceedings and to defend himself. A failure to adhere to those safeguards strikes at the fairness of the trial itself. Following the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Prakash Nayi (supra) and by this Court in Mariyappan (supra), we hold that the procedure prescribed under Chapter XXV of the CrPC was not followed in its letter and spirit. The trial, therefore, stands vitiated.
57. Now, the question is whether a retrial is warranted. We find that the incident took place on 13.12.2012. The appellant was arrested on 20.12.2012 itself. He has been undergoing incarceration or has been admitted in the Mental Health Hospital Thiruvananthapuram all through. The trial commenced on 01.12.2021 and the judgment was pronounced on 13.06.2024. In other words, the appellant has either been in jail or the Mental Health Center for over 14 years as of date.
58. When the matter had come up for consideration on 04.08.2026 and before hearing in this matter had commenced, this Court had passed the following order:
“2. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial stands vitiated on account of the non-compliance with the mandatory procedure prescribed under Section 332 (now BNSS 371) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is further submitted that the alleged incident occurred on 13.12.2012, whereas the trial commenced only on 01.12.2021 and culminated in the judgment dated 13.06.2024. According to the learned counsel, the appellant remained in continuous judicial custody throughout this period and was defended only through a legal aid counsel. It is further submitted that the appellant continues to suffer from mental illness and that, as on date, he has undergone incarceration for a period exceeding eleven years.
3. Having regard to the submissions advanced and the nature of the contentions raised, we deem it appropriate to ascertain the present mental and physical condition of the appellant. Accordingly, we direct the learned Public Prosecutor to obtain a report from the Medical Officer concerned, through the Superintendent of the Prison, regarding the appellant’s present mental as well as physical condition. The learned Public Prosecutor shall also ensure that a report is obtained from the Probation Officer attached to the Prison indicating, inter alia, whether the appellant’s family members have been visiting him during his incarceration, the nature and frequency of such visits, whether they continue to remain in contact with him, and any other relevant information concerning his family and social circumstances.”
59. In the report filed by the Joint Superintendent, Central Prison and Correctional Home, Poojappura, it was reported as under:
“He has undergone actual imprisonment of 11 years, 09 months and 19 Days as on 11.09.2026, including set off period.
On receiving the letter cited first above, the prisoner was referred to Mental Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram, on 29.08.2026. A report was received from Mental Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram as per reference cited second above. (report is attached herewith as Annexure A) Regarding his family and social background and also the relationship between family members and the accused, a report was received as per reference cited third above. (report is attached herewith as Annexure B) Moreover, the contact and visiting details of the Prisoner with his relatives were collected from the Welfare Officer of this Prison. The details received from the Welfare Officer are attached herewith as Annexure C and Annexure D.”
60. The probation officer was also directed to file a report. The report reads as under:
2. Family and Social Background
The prisoner, Vineesh (39), is the younger of the two children of Shri Jaya Mohan (67) and Smt. Rama (60), natives of Kulathinkara Puthen Veedu Kakkottukonam, Puthenkadavu: Road, Thirumala Village, P.O. Poojappura in Kattakkada Taluk, Thiruvananthapuram District. His father is engaged in daily wage labour. His mother is engaged as a homemaid.
The prisoner’s only sibling is his elder sister, Smt. Shalini (41), who has 100% hearing and speech impairment. She is married and resides with her family at Mudavoorpara, Balaramapuram. Her husband, Shri Rajesh, also has hearing and speech impairment. It was informed that Rajesh is employed at a press for persons with disabilities functioning at Pappanamcode, Thiruvananthapuram. The prisoner’s sister is unemployed. They have a 14-year-old daughter. The prisoner is unmarried.
The prisoner belongs to a financially disadvantaged Hindu Nadar family. The prisoner and his parents do not own any land or house at present. It was informed that the house at the permanent address mentioned above had been sold by the prisoner’s parents at the time of his sister’s marriage. It was also reported that the prisoner’s parents are not presently residing at the address mentioned as his current address. The family belongs to the Below Poverty Line (BPL) category. The family holds an AAY ration card bearing No. 1102018385.
3. Personal History
The prisoner studied up to the 10th standard at Thirumala Government High School but did not successfully complete the 10th standard examination. Thereafter, he started working as a helper under his father, who was engaged in masonry work.
According to his parents, the prisoner sustained a head injury in an accident in 2005, following which he began to exhibit symptoms of mental illness. His parents reported that he subsequently developed symptoms such as sleeplessness, changes in daily routine, refusal to take food, excessive laughter, etc., and following that treatment for his mental health condition was then sought at the Mental health Centre, Peroorkkada. His mother reported that when he takes his medication regularly, he returns to a normal state, whereas the symptoms reappear when medication is discontinued. His parents also reported that the prisoner had a habit of consuming alcohol and using other intoxicating substances. They further stated that, due to excessive substance use and association with undesirable companions, he had been involved in various other cases even before his incarceration in the present case.
The prisoner is presently undergoing imprisonment for life with rigorous imprisonment in connection with the murder of one Krishnankutty, the owner of Udaya Bhavan, Kavalootukonam, Vilavurkkal Village, Thiruvananthapuram, where the prisoner and his family had been residing as tenants. The case was registered as Crime No. 989/2012 at Malayinkeezhu Police Station and was tried as SC. No. 431/2013 before the Hon’ble Additional District and Sessions Court, Thiruvananthapuram.
4. Relationship Maintained by Family Members with the Prisoner
It was informed that the prisoner’s mother has been regularly visiting him in prison once every month without fail since his incarceration. She maintains a close relationship with her son. However, the prisoner’s father has not visited him in prison so far. He reportedly stated that he was not in a mental state to visit his son in prison. At the request of the prisoner, his sister and niece visited him once, as informed by his mother. The prisoner’s paternal aunt, Smt. Thankamani, also visits him once in six months along with his mother. The prisoner’s mother visits him on the eve of important occasions such as Onam and Vishu. During such visits, she purchases and provides him with the articles he requires from the prison canteen. As the prisoner is unable to work and earn an income while in prison, his mother sends an amount of Rs 1,200/- every month to meet his special needs. She informed that, as the prisoner experiences increased appetite due to the medication taken for his mental health condition, the amount is mainly used for purchasing food items available at the prison canteen. The prisoner’s mother also informed that he speaks to her over the telephone on a daily basis or at least once in two days. The parents reported that the prisoner was not released on bail considering his mental health condition, the loss of their residence following the incident related to the case, and the existence of other criminal cases against him. His parents do not have any adverse feelings towards the prisoner. They expressed their willingness to receive and accommodate him if he is released. Since his parents are presently residing in his paternal aunt’s house, they informed that, if the prisoner is released, they are willing to find a rented house and live with him. As the prisoner is undergoing treatment for a mental health condition and is dependent on medication, his mother assured that she is willing to take responsibility for his care and ensure that his treatment and medication are continued without interruption.
61. The Consultant in Psychiatry, Mental Health Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram, has reported as follows in his report dated 02.09.2026:
“I respectfully submit before the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala that Sri. Vinesh @ Madan Vinesh is a known case of Bipolar Disorder and is currently under treatment for the same.
His current mental status examination reveals that his speech is coherent and relevant. His mood is euthymic. At present, there are no delusions or hallucinations. His judgment and insight are intact. He is also physically fit at present.
Based on his current clinical condition and mental status examination, he is presently stable and fit from a psychiatric and physical standpoint.
62. The mother of the appellant has also filed an affidavit, wherein she has stated as under:
“6. It is duly submitted that the I, mother of the Petitioner, has been regularly visiting him in prison once in every month, without fail since his incarceration and maintains a strong, close relationship with the Appellant/ Accused. I also make it a point to visit him on every Onam and Vishu, other than my monthly visits , and also purchases articles required by him from prison canteen in accordance with due procedure.
7. I am also sending him Rs.1200/- per month for meeting his special needs as well. The Appellant also calls me regularly almost on a daily basis from jail.
8. It is humbly submitted that I am currently working as housekeeper at Panniyodu, Veeranaku Village, Kattakkada Taluk, Thiruvananthapuram District. I am having adequate income to take care of my family and the entire expenses.
9. It is duly submitted that myself and my husband (father of the Appellant) is now staying at the house of my sister-in-law. Smt. Thankamani at Mulayara, Thiruvananthapuram. I and my husband are ready and willing to take a rented home and also undertakes to ensure his proper medication and treatment.
10. It is duly submitted that myself and my husband (father of the Appellant) does not have any adverse feeling against the Appellant. In fact, they are ready and willing to receive and accommodate him, in event of his release. It is submitted that we are now staying at the house of my sister-in-law Smt. Thankamani at Mulayara, Thiruvananthapuram. We are ready and willing to take a rented home and also undertakes to ensure his proper medication and treatment, without interruption.
63. The reports obtained pursuant to the directions of this Court, read along with the affidavit filed by the appellant’s mother, disclose that the appellant continues to be a person requiring psychiatric care and treatment. At the same time, the present medical assessment indicates that his condition is stable and that he is presently fit from a psychiatric and physical standpoint. The probation report also brings out the difficult financial and social circumstances of his family. His parents belong to a financially disadvantaged family, do not own a house or land and are presently residing with a relative. His sister and her husband are both persons with hearing and speech impairments. The affidavit of his mother, however, indicates that she has maintained regular contact with the appellant throughout his incarceration and is willing to receive him and make arrangements for his continued treatment and medication.
64. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhooraji and Others8, while considering the circumstances in which a de novo trial could be ordered on account of procedural irregularities resulting in serious prejudice to the accused and a consequent failure of justice, the Apex Court observed as follows:
8………A de novo trial should be the last resort and that too only when such a course becomes so desperately indispensable. It should be limited to the extreme exigency to avert “a failure of justice”. Any omission or even the illegality in the procedure which does not affect the core of the case is not a ground for ordering a de novo trial. This is because the appellate court has plenary powers for reevaluating and reappraising the evidence and even to take additional evidence by the appellate court itself or to direct such additional evidence to be collected by the trial court. But to replay the whole laborious exercise after erasing the bulky records relating to the earlier proceedings, by bringing down all the persons to the court once again for repeating the whole depositions would be a sheer waste of time, energy and costs unless there is miscarriage of justice otherwise. Hence the said course can be resorted to when it becomes unpreventable for the purpose of averting “a failure of justice”. The superior court which orders a de novo trial cannot afford to overlook the realities and the serious impact on the pending cases in trial courts which are crammed with dockets, and how much that order would inflict hardship on many innocent persons who once took all the trouble to reach the court and deposed their versions in the very same case. To them and the public the re-enactment of the whole labour might give the impression that law is more pedantic than pragmatic. Law is not an instrument to be used for inflicting sufferings on the people but for the process of justice dispensation.”
65. The principle laid down by the Apex Court is that a de novo trial is not to be ordered as a matter of course whenever a procedural irregularity or illegality is noticed. It is an exceptional measure, to be resorted to only when indispensable to avert a failure of justice. The appellate court must, therefore, examine whether the defect has affected the fairness of the trial and whether the ends of justice can be secured by any less onerous course, having regard to its powers to reappraise the evidence and, where necessary, to receive additional evidence.
66. In the case at hand, the failure to follow the mandatory safeguards under Chapter XXV of the CrPC is not a mere technical irregularity. The safeguards concern the capacity of the appellant to understand the proceedings and make his defence, and therefore go to the very fairness of the trial. The prejudice is compounded by the fact that the appellant has already undergone more than eleven years of incarceration, has a documented history of psychiatric illness and belongs to a financially disadvantaged family. A retrial would require the appellant, who has already spent a substantial part of his life in custody, to undergo the entire process afresh. The fact that the appellant was defended by a legal aid counsel cannot be lost sight of. Having regard to these circumstances, and bearing in mind the principle laid down in Bhooraji (supra), we are of the view that ordering a retrial would not serve the ends of justice. On the contrary, it would impose further hardship on the appellant without curing the prejudice already occasioned by the failure to follow the mandatory procedure. We are, therefore, not inclined to order a de novo trial.
67. The affidavit filed by the mother assumes significance in this regard. She has expressed her willingness to receive the appellant and to make arrangements for his continued medication and treatment. Her statement that she has maintained regular contact with him during his incarceration also indicates the existence of a family support system, notwithstanding the family’s limited financial resources. The mother of the appellant, through the learned counsel, has also undertaken to take care of him, ensure that he is provided with the prescribed medication and prevent him from causing any injury to himself or to any other person.
68. Having regard to the appellant’s prolonged incarceration, his medical condition, the circumstances of his family and the fact that the trial itself stands vitiated, we are of the considered view that ordering a retrial would not serve the ends of justice. The appeal is, therefore, liable to be allowed.
In the result, this appeal is allowed. The finding of guilt, conviction and sentence passed against the appellant in S.C.No. 431 of 2013 on the files of Additional Sessions Court-IV Thiruvananthapuram, is set aside and he is acquitted of all charges. He shall be released forthwith, if his continued incarceration is not required in connection with any other case.
1 (2025) 4 KHC 501
2 1973 SCC (Cril) 145
3 1981 KHC 13
4 2013 (1) KLJ 320
5 (2023) 5 SCC 673
6 (2015) 7 SCC 178
7 (2024) 9 SCC 546
8 2001 INSC 393
Printed from lawlibrary.online · https://lawlibrary.online/judgment/vinesh-madan-vinesh-v-state-of-kerala/
