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Bombay Telephone Canteen Employees’ Association, Prabhadevi v. Union of India & Anr.

Bombay Telephone Canteen Employees’ Association, Prabhadevi v. Union of India & Anr.

LOK Law Journal

LOK 1997 (7) SC 914

Equivalent citations: 1997 (6) SCC 723 : 1997 (2) LLJ 647 : AIR 1997 SC 2817 : 1997 (2) CLR 218

Court
Supreme Court of India
Bench
K. Ramaswamy, D. P. Wadhwa, J.
Decided on
Case No.
Special Leave Petition (C) No. 11954 of 1997 [CC - 3633/97]
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Print

Provisions referred

Cases referred 17

  1. Physical Research Laboratory v. K.G. Sharma LOK 1997 (4) SC 85 Referred (Para 1)
  2. Sub- Divisional Inspector of Posts Vaikkam & Ors. v. Theyyam Joseph LOK 1995 (12) SC 62 : (1996) 2 SCC 293 Referred (Para 1)
  3. Act. So, in Chief Conservator of Forests & Anr. v. Jagannath Maruti Kandhara LOK 1995 (12) SC 62 : (1996) 2 SCC 293 Referred (Para 1)
  4. Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd, & Anr. v. Brojonath Ganguli & Anr. (1986) 3 SCR 156 Referred (Para 1)
  5. U.P. Warehousing Corporation & Anr. v. Narain Vajpayee LOK 1980 (1) SC 166 : (1980) 3 SCC 459 Referred (Para 1)
  6. R.D. Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India & Ors. (1979) 1 SCR 1042 Referred (Para 1)
  7. Sewerage Board, etc. v. R. Rajappa & Ors. LOK 1978 (2) SC 2110 : (1978) 3 SCR 207 Referred (Para 1)
  8. Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Anr. LOK 1975 (2) SC 212 : (1975) 3 SCR 619 Referred (Para 1)
  9. Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. The State of Bihar & Ors. LOK 1969 (3) SC 121 : (1969) 3 SCR 995 Referred (Para 1)
  10. Tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanual LOK 1969 (2) SC 191 : (1969) 3 SCR 773 Referred (Para 1)
  11. Rajasthan State Electricity Jaipur v. Mohan Lal & Ors. LOK 1967 (4) SC 32 : (1967) 3 SCR 377 Referred (Para 1)
  12. Nagpur v. Its Employees LOK 1960 (2) SC 101 : (1960) 2 SCR 942 Referred (Para 1)
  13. Praga v. Tools Corporation Referred (Para 1)
  14. Ajay Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors. Referred (Para 1)
  15. D.T.C. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress & Ors. Referred (Para 1)
  16. Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager Referred (Para 1)
  17. Air India Statutory Corporation etc. v. United Labour Union & Ors. Referred (Para 1)

Referred in 1

  1. Coir Board, Ernakulam Cochin v. Indira Devi LOK 1992 (3) SC 41 Referred (Para 1)

Judgment

K. RAMASWAMYY. J.

This special leave petition has come up directly, from the award of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.2, Bombay, made on August 9, 1996 in Reference No.CGIT- 2/26/91.

Delay condoned.

The admitted position is that the petitioner Association, representing five dismissed employees, had sought reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, the `Act') to the Tribunal. The dispute arose on account of termination by the respondent-Management of the services of the said employe on April 28, 1989; It was alleged that the termination was without any notice and payment of retrenchment compensation under Section 25-f. The reference came to be made on April 19, 1991. The Tribunal has held, that the telephone Nigam Limited, Bombay is not an 'industry'. It, therefore, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute. Prabhadevi Exchange had a total strength of 3000 employees of the Tele-communication Department, working in three shifts. As per the Administrative Instructions issued by the Government, for the first shift there should be a '3A' type canteen, for the second shift 'A' type canteen and for the third shift there should be `C' type canteen. It was averred that for Type `3A' canteen, there should be 57 employees, but only 24 employees were working on April 27.4.1989. The claim of the petitioner is that the dismissed employees had joined the service in 1987. They are claiming wages as per the directions of this Court, i.e., as per the Fourth Pay Commission's recommendations. Since they were insisting upon payment of the wages, it is alleged, the services of five employees were terminated without giving any notice or giving any retrenchment compensation as enjoined by Section 25-F of the Act. Therefore, they sought reinstatement into service with full back wages and with continuity of service. The respondents, on the other hand. contended that the employees working in the canteen are not 'workmen' within the definition of Section 2(s) of the Act nor is the respondent an `industry' under Section 2(j). They are "treated as holding civil posts in the Central Government". They were paid monthly salaries devised by the Canteen Committee depending upon the increases in the cost of living etc. The provisions of Chapter VI-B of the Act are inapplicable to them. The Tribunal noted the findings as under:

Prabhadevi Telephone Exchange employed about 4000 employees which is required under the provisions of Administrative Instructions to have one departmental canteen. In `A' type canteen, 19 employees are required per shift. It works from 5 a.m. to 12 midnight. In three shifts, there at the relevant time are 24 employees including the concerned five workmen. In view of a judgment of this Court, non-statutory canteen employees are entitled to the benefits of the recommendations of Third and Fourth Pay Commissions. The Director of Canteen accordingly directed the Department concerned to pay the canteen employees wages as per the recommendations of the Pay Commission. Departmental Canteen, it is contended by the management, is not an `industry' as per the Memorandum dated January 12, 1982 of the Director (Welfare), Indian Posts and Telegraphs Department.

Relying upon the judgment of this Court in Sub- Divisional Inspector of Posts Vaikkam & Ors. vs. Theyyam Joseph [(1996) 2 SCC 293], the Tribunal has held that departmental canteen is not an `industry'. However, on merits, it has held that termination of the services of the five employees is bad in law. Calling the decision in question, the above special leave petition has been directly filed under Article 136, contending that the ratio in Theyyam Joseph's case contrary to the judgment of this Court in Bangalore water-supply & Sewerage Board, etc. vs. R. Rajappa & Ors. [(1978) 3 SCR 207]. The judgment, therefore, in Joseph's case is not correct in law. When its correctness was questioned in another case, notice was issued. It is, therefore, contended that the ratio of the Constitution Bench judgment of seven Judges in Bangalore Water Supply Case applies to the facts herein. The judgement in Josph's case, was rendered without reference to the former and hence the matter needs fresh examination. The question is whether the view taken is correct in law? This Court is aware of the decision in Bangalore Water Supply case in which this Court had held the test to determine whether an establishment is an `industry' within the meaning of the Act. Therein, the employees of the appellant Board were fined for misconduct and the fine was recovered from them. They filed an application under Section 33 C(2) of the Act? The question was whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2) of the Act? The High Court had held it to be an industry and, therefore, the application was maintainable. On appeal, this Court laid down the tests as under:

"The term "analogous to the trade

of business" could not cut down the

scope of the term "industry". The

said words can reasonably mean only

activity which results in goods

made and manufactured or service

rendered which are capable of being

converted into saleable ones. They

must be capable of entering the

word of "res commercium", although

they may be kept out of the market

for some reason. It is not the

motive of an activity in making

goods or running a service but the

possibility of making them

marketable if one who makes goods

or renders service so desires, that

should determine whether the

activity lies within the domain or

circle of industry. But even this

may not be always a satisfactory

test. By this test the type of

services which are rendered purely

for the satisfaction of spiritual

or psychological urges of persons

rendering those services would be

excluded. Whenever an industrial

dispute would arise between either

employers and their workmen or

between workmen and workmen, it

should be considered an area within

the sphere of "industry' but not

otherwise. In other words, the

nature of the activity will be

determined by the conditions which

give rise to the livelihood of the

occurrence of such disputes and

their actual occurrence in the

sphere.

The term "sovereign should be

reserved technically and more

correctly for the sphere of

ultimate decisions. Sovereignty

operates on a sovereign place of

its own. Only those services which

are governed by separate rules and

constitutional provisions such as

Articles 310 and 311 should,

strictly speaking be excluded from

the sphere of industry by a

necessary implication.

The special excludes the

applicability of the general.

Certain public utility services

which are carried out by

governmental agencies or

Corporations are treated by the Act

itself as within the sphere of

industry. If express rules under

other enactments govern the

relationship between the State as

an employer and its servants as

employees, it may be contended on

the strength of such provisions

that a particular set of employees

are outside the scope of the

Industrial Disputes Act.

The State today increasingly

undertakes commercial functions and

economic activities and services as

part of its duties in a welfare

state. Hence to artificially

exclude state-run industry from the

sphere of the Act, unless the

statutory provisions expressly or

by necessary implication have that

effect, would not be correct.

Section 2(j) of the Industrial

Disputes Act (1947) which defines

"industry" contains words of wide

import, as wide as the Legislature

could have possibly made them. The

problem of what limitations could

and should be reasonably read in

interpreting the wide words used in

Section 2(j) is far too policy

oriented to be satisfactorily

settled by judicial decisions. The

Parliament must step in the

legislate in a manner which will

leave no doubt as to its intention.

That alone can afford a

satisfactory solution to the

question which has agitated and

perplexed the judiciary at all

levels.

Hospital Mazdoor Sabha was

correctly decided in so far as it

held that the JJ Group of hospitals

was an industry but the same cannot

be said in regard to the view of

the Court that certain activities

ought to be treated as falling

outside the definition clause.

There is no justification for

excepting the categories of public

utility activities undertaken by

the Government in the exercise of

its inalienable functions under the

constitution, call it regal or

sovereign or by any other name,

from the definition of "industry".

If it be true hat one must have

regard to the nature of the

activity and not to who engages in

it, it is beside the point to

enquire whether the activity is

undertaken by the State, and

further, if so, whether it is

undertaken in fulfilment of the

State's constitutional obligations

or in discharge of its

constitutional functions. In fact,

to concede the benefit of an

exception to the State's activities

which are in the nature of

sovereign functions is really to

have regard not s much to the

nature of the activity as to the

consideration who engages in that

activity: for, sovereign function

can only be discharged by the State

and not by a private person. If the

State's inalienable functions are

excepted from the sweep of the

definition contained in section

2(j), one shall, have unwittingly

rejected the fundamental test that

it is the nature of the activity

which ought to determine whether

the activity is an industry.

Indeed, in this respect, it should

make no difference whether on the

one hand, an activity is undertaken

by a corporate body in the

discharge of its statutory

functions or, on the other. by the

State itself in the exercise of its

inalienable functions. If the water

supply and sewerage schemes of fire

fighting . establishments run by a

Municipality can be industries, so

ought to be the manufacture of

coins and currency, arms and

ammunition and the winning of oil

and uranium. The fact that these

latter kinds of activities are, or

Can only be, undertaken by the

State does not furnish any answer

to the question whether these

activities are industries. When

undertaken by a private individual

they are industries, therefore,

when undertaken by the State, they

are industries. The nature of the

activity is the determining factor

and that does not change according

to who undertakes it. Items 8, 11,

12, 17 and 18 of the First Schedule

read with Section, 2(n)(vi) of the

Industrial Disputes Act render

support to this view. These

provisions which were described in

Hospital Mazdoor Sabha as 'very

significant, at lease show that,

conceivably, a Defence

Establishment, Mint or a Security

Press can be an industry even

though these activities are, ought

to be and can only be undertaken by

the State in the discharge of its

constitutional obligations or

functions. The State does not trade

when it prints a currency note or

strikes a coin. And yet,

considering the nature of the

activity, it is engaged in an

industry when it does so.

A systematic activity which is

organised or arranged in a manner

in which the trade or business is

generally organised or arranged

would be an industry despite the

fact that it proceeds from

charitable motives. It is in the

nature of the activity that one has

o consider and it is upon the

application of that test that the

State's inalienable functions fall

within the definition of industry.

The very same principles must yield

the result that just as the

consideration as to who conducts

the activity, is irrelevant for

determining whether the activity is

an industry so is the fact that the

activity is charitable in nature or

is undertaken with a charitable

motive. The status or capacity

corporate or constitutional, of the

employer would have, if at all,

closer nexus, than his motive on

the question whether the activity

is an industry. The motive which

propels the activity is yet another

step removed and ex hypothesis can

have no relevant on the question as

to what is the nature of the

activity. It is never true to say

that the nature of the activities

is charitable. The subjective

motive force of an activity can be

charity but for the purpose of

deciding whether an activity is an

industry one has to look at the

process involved in the activity,

objectively. The jural foundation

of any attempt to except charitable

enterprises from the scope of the

definition can only be that such

enterprises are not undertaken for

profit. out then, that clearly, is

to introduce the profit concept by

a side wind, a concept which has

been rejected consistently over the

years. If any principle can be said

to be settled law in this vexed

field it is this ; the twin

consideration of profit motive and

capital investment it irrelevant

for determining whether an

activity is an industry. Therefore

activities which are dominated by

charitable motives either in the

sense that the profit, which they

yield are diverted to charitable

purposes are not beyond the ; pale

of the definition of section 2(j).

It is much beside the point to

inquire who is the employer as it

to inquire, why is the activity

undertaken and what the employer

does with the profits, if any,

By this test a Solicitor's

establishment would be an industry.

A Solicitor is undoubtedly does not

carry on a trade or business when

he acts for his client or advises

him or pleads for him, If and when

pleading is permissible to him. He

pursues a profession which is

variously and justifiably described

as learned, liberal or noble. But

it is difficult to infer from the

language of the definition in

section 2(j) that the Legislature

could not have intended to bring

in a liberal profession like that

of an Attorney within the ambit of

the definition of 'industry '.

In Hospital Mazdoor Sabha the Court

while evolving a working principle

stated that an industrial activity.

generally involved, inter alia, the

cooperation of the employer and the

employees, That the production of

goods or the rendering of material

services to the community must be

the direct and + proximate result

of such cooperation is a further

extension of that principle and it

is broadly, by the application

thereof that a Solicitors

establishment is held not to

attract the definition clause.

These refinements are, with

respect not warranted by the words

of the definition, apart from the

consideration that in practice they

make the application of the

definition to Concrete Case;

dependent upon a factual assessment

so highly subjective as to, lead to

confusion and uncertainty in the

understanding of the true legal

position. Granting that the

language of the definition is so

wide that some limitation ought to

be read into it, one must stop at a

point beyond which the definition

will skid into a domain too

rarefied to be realistic. Whether

the cooperation between the

employer and the employee is the

proximate cause of the ultimate

product and bears direct with it is

a test which is almost impossible

of application with any degree of

assurance or certitude. It will be

as much true to say that the

solicitor's Assistant, Managing

Clerk, Librarian and the Typist do

not directly contribute to the

intellectual and product which is a

creation of his personal

professional skill, as that,

without their active assistance and

cooperation it will be impossible

for him to function effectively.

The unhappy state of affairs in

which the law is marooned will

continue to baffle the skilled

professional and his employees

alike as also the Judge who has to

perform the unenviable task of

sitting in judgment over the

directness of the cooperation

between the employer and the

employee, until such time as the

legislature decides to manifest its

intention by the use of clear and

indubious language. Beside the fact

that this Court has so held in

National Union of Commercial

Employees the legislature will find

a plausible case for exempting the

learned and liberal professions of

Lawyers, Solicitors, Doctors,

Engineers, Chartered Accountants

and the like from the operation of

industrial laws. But until that

happens, in the present state of

the law it difficult by judicial

interpretation to create exemptions

in favour of any particular class.

The case of the clubs on the

present definition is weaker

still. The definition squarely

covers them and there is no

justification for amending the law

so as to exclude them from the

operation of the industrial laws.

The fact that the running of clubs

is not a calling of the club or its

managing committee, that the club

has no existence apart from its

members that it exists for its

members though occasionally

strangers take the benefit of its

services and that even after the

admission of guests, the club

remains a members' self-serving

institution does not touch the core

of the problem.

(1) `Industry' as defined in Sec.

2(j) and explained in Banerji's

case has a wide import.

1. (a) Where (i) systematic

activity, (ii) organised by

cooperation between employer and

employee (the direct and

substantial element is chimerical);

(iii) for the production and/or

distribution of goods and services

calculated to satisfy human wants

and wishes (not spiritual or

religious, but inclusive of

material things or services geared

to celestial bliss e.g. making on a

large scale prasad or food), prima

facie there is an `industry' in

that enterprise.

(b) Absence of profit motive or

gainful objective is irrelevant, be

the venture in the public, joint,

private or other sector.

(c) The true focus is functional

and the decisive test is the nature

of the activity with special

emphasis on the employer-employee

relations.

(d) If the organisation is a trade

or business it does not cease to be

one because of philanthropy

animating the undertaking.

II. Although section 2(j) uses

words of the widest amplitude in

its two limbs, their meaning cannot

be magnified to overreach itself.

(a) `Undertaking' must suffer a

contextual and associational

shrinkage as explained in Banerji

and in this judgment; so also ,

service, calling and the like. This

yields the interference that all

organised activity possessing the

triple elements in I (supra),

although not trade or business, may

still be 'industry' provided the

nature' of the activity, viz, the

employer- employee basis bears

resemblance to what we find in

trade or business. This take into

the fold of 'industry'

undertakings, calling and services,

adventures' analogous to the

carrying on of trade or business'.

All features, other than the

methodology of carrying on the

activity viz. in organizing the

cooperation between employer and ;

employee, may be dissimilar. It

does not, matter, if on the

employment terms there is analogy.

III. Application of these

guidelines should not stop short of

their logical reach by invocation

of creeds, cults or inner sense of

incongruity or outer sense of

motivation for or resultant of the

economic operations. The ideology

of the Act being industrial peace,

regulation and resolution of

industrial disputes. between

employer and workmen, the range of

this statutory ideology must inform

the reach of the statutory

definition. Nothing less, nothing

more.

(a) The consequences are (i)

professions, (ii) clubs (iii)

educational institutions (iv)

cooperatives, (v) research

institutes (vi) charitable projects

and (vii) other kindred adventures,

if they fulfil the triple tests

listed in (supra), cannot be

exempted from the scope of section

2(j)

(b) A restricted category of

professions, clubs, cooperatives

and even gurukulas an little

research labs. may qualify for

exemption if, in simple ventures,

substantially and going by the

dominant nature criterion,

substantively no employees are

entertained but in minimal matters,

marginal employees are hired

without destroying the non employee

character of the unit.

(c) If, in a pious or altruistic

mission, many employ themselves,

free or for small honoraria or like

return, mainly drawn by sharing in

the purpose or cause, such as

lawyers volunteering to run a free

legal services clinic or doctors

serving in their spare hours in a

free medical centre on asramites

working at the bidding of the

holiness, divinity or like central

personality, and the services are

supplied free or at nominal cost

and those who serve are not engaged

for remuneration or on the basis of

master and servant relationship,

then the institution is not an

industry even if stray servants,

manual or technical, are hired.

Such eleemosynary or like

undertakings alone are exempt-not

other generosity, compassion,

developmental passion or project.

IV. The dominant nature test:

(a) Where a complex of activities,

some of which qualify for

exemption, others not, involves

employees on the total undertaking,

some of whom are not `workmen' as

in the University of Delhi case or

some departments are not productive

of goods and services if isolated,

even then, the predominant nature

of the services and the integrated

nature of the departments as

explained in the Corporation of

Nagpur, will be the true test. The

whole undertaking will be

'industry' although ; those who are

not 'workmen' by definition may not

benefit by the status.

(b) Notwithstanding the previous

clauses sovereign functions,

strictly understood, (alone),

qualify for exemption, not the

welfare activities of economic

adventures undertaken by Government

or statutory bodies.

(c) Even in departments discharging

sovereign functions if there are

units which are industries and they

are substantially severable, then

they can be considered to come

within sec. 2(j).

(d) Constitutionally and

competently enacted legislative

provisions may well remove from the

scope of the Act categories which

otherwise may be covered thereby."

It is not necessary to refer to the dissenting judgments Beg, C.J in his concurring judgment, at page 221, placitum E to G, has held thus:

"I would also like to make a few

observations about the so called

"sovereign" functions which have

been placed outside the field of

industry. I do not feel happy about

the use of the term "sovereign"

here. I think that the term

`sovereign' should be reserved,

technically and more correctly, for

the sphere of ultimate decisions.

Sovereignty operates on a sovereign

plane of its own as I suggested in

Keshavananda Bharati's case

supported by a quotation from

Ernest Barker's "Social and

Political Theory". Again the term a

"Regal", from which the term

"sovereign" functions appears to

be derived, seems to be a misfit

in a Republic where the citizen

shares the political sovereignty in

which he has even a legal share,

however small in as much as he

exercises the right to vote. What

is meant by the use of the term

"sovereign", in relation to the

activities of the State, is more

accurately brought out by using the

term "governmental" functions

although there are difficulties

here also in as much as the

Government has entered largely now

fields of industry. Therefore, only

those services which are governed

by separate rules and

constitutional provisions, such as

Article 310 and 311 should,

strictly speaking, be excluded from

the sphere of industry by necessary

implication."

In State of Bombay & ors, vs. The Hospital Mazdoor sabha & ors. [(1960) 2 SCR 866], this Court had given wider interpretation to the word "industry", with a view to achieve the scope and object of the Act, so as to make the remedy available to the workmen. Similarly, in The Corporation of the city of Nagpur vs. Its Employees [(1960) 2 SCR 942] this Court had pointed out that the definition of the word `industry' is very comprehensive. It is in two parts. It is not necessary that an activity of the Corporation must share the common characteristics of an industry before it can come within the statutory definition. The words of Section 2(14) of the City of Nagpur Corporation Act which is equivalent to Section 2(j) of the Act, are clear and unambiguous. The wide definition, however, cannot include the regal, primary and inalienable functions of the State, though statutorily delegated to a Corporation and the ambit of such functions cannot be extended so as to include the welfare activities of a modern State, and must be confined to legislative power, administration of law and judicial power. "The real test as to whether a service undertaken by a Corporation is an industry must be whether that service, if performed by an individual or a private person, would be an industry. Monetary consideration cannot be an essential characteristic of an industry in a modern State. It was, therefore, incorrect to say that only such activities as were analogous to trade or business could come within Section 2(14) of the Act". "When a service rendered by a Corporation as an industry, the employees of the departments connected with the service, whether financial, administrative or executive, would be entitled to the benefits of the Act".

In 1960's and 1970's, there was parallel stream of thinking being developed by this Court to engulf the service conditions of the employees of a Corporation either registered under the Companies Act or under the Societies Act or under a statute, vis-a-vis the Government employees. In Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. [(1969) 3 SCR 995], this Court held that the Government Company is distinct from Government. In Praga vs. Tools Corporation vs. C.V. Imanual [(1969) 3 SCR 773], the employees were held not entitled to availed the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Sukhdev Singh & Ors. vs. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi & Anr. [(1975) 3 SCR 619], a break-through was effected by a Constitution Bench in considering whether the Oil and Natural Commission, the Industrial Financial Corporation or the Life Insurance Corporation is an `authority' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and whether the employees working in the Corporation are entitled to the protection of judicial review under Article 14. It was answered it favour of the employees. In separate but concurrent judgment, Mathew, J. laid the foundation demolishing the autonomous status and non-amenability to judicial review of the actions of corporate sector and held that when a Corporation was created by a statute, its rules or instructions partake the statutory character like a subordinate legislation. Therefore, they are to act consistently with the Rules or Regulations made under the Act or by the statutory authority.

The power of statutory authority is controlled and restricted by the statute which created r them and the rules and regulations framed thereunder. Any action of such bodies in excess of their power or in violation of restrictions placed on that power is ultra vires. Thus, the corporate veil given in Praga Tools case was torn apart and their actions were made amenable to judicial review. In Ajay Hasia etc. vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors. etc. [(1981) 2 SCR 79], another Constitution Bench had held that having regard to the Memorandum of Association and the Rules of the Society, the respondent-College was a State within the meaning of Article 12. The composition of the Society is dominated by the representatives appointed by the Central Government and the Governments of Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh with the approval of the Central Government. Accordingly, it was held to be an instrumentality of the State. In R.D. Shetty vs. The International Airport Authority of India & Ors. [(1979) 1 SCR 1042] and U.P. Warehousing Corporation & Anr. vs. Narain Vajpayee [(1980) 3 SCC 459] this Court laid the test to determine as to when a Corporation can be said to be instrumentality or agency of the Government. The test of deep and permissive control was laid down thereunder. It was held that the statutory authorities are amenable to writ jurisdiction being an instrumentality or an authority under the State within the meaning or Article 12 of the Constitution. It was further held that the Corporation may be an authority and, therefore, a State within the meaning of Article 12. Yet, it may not be elevated to the position of State for the purpose of Articles 309, 310 and 311 which find place in Part XIV. For the purpose of Part III it has separate jurisdictional entity, though it would not be so for the purpose of Part XIV or another provisions of the Constitution. In U.P. Warehousing corporation case, the respondent, on the basis of the complaints after preliminary enquiry, was charged with certain allegations and his explanation was sought and to indicate his evidence, if any. He had expressed his intention to cross-examine certain witnesses as also to examine some others in defence. Without taking any action on the respondent's request, the appellant passed an order dismissing him from service w.e.f. the date of his suspension. In the writ petition filed by him the High Court quashed the order and directed his reinstatement with full back-wages. This Court, on these facts, had held that "in cases where there is an element of public employment and service or support by statute or something in the nature of an office or a status, which is capable of protection, then irrespective of the terminology used, and even though in some inter parties aspects the relationship may be called that of master and servant, there may be essential procedural requirement to be observed on grounds of natural justice". The Warehousing Corporation was held to be an authority and the dismissal, without conducting an enquiry and without an opportunity to lead evidences for the proposed punishment given to the respondent, was bad in law. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed and the judgment of the High Court was upheld. Chinappa Reddy, J. in his concurring judgment had held that there is hardly any distinction, on the principle, between a person directly under the employment of the Government and a person under the. employment of an agency or instrumentality of the Government or a Corporation set up under a statute or incorporated but wholly owned by the Government. Therefore, there is no good reason, why, if Government is bound to observe the equality clauses of the Constitution in the matter of employment and in its dealings with the employees, the Corporations should not be equally bound. Some elements of public employment is all that is necessary. to take the employee beyond the reach of the rule which denies him access to a court to enforce a contract of employment and denies him the protection of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Rajasthan State Electricity Jaipur vs. Mohan Lal & Ors. [(1967) 3 SCR 377] is also a case of the Rajasthan State Electricity Board questioning whether it is an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution. It was held by a Constitution Bench that it is an authority under Article 12 or instrumentality of the State. In D.T.C. vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress & Ors. [1991 Supp.(l) 600], the question arose whether D.T.C. is an instrumentality under the State and whether it is entitled to dismiss the employee by issuing one month notice or pay in lieu thereof in terms of Regulation 9 of the Regulations. A Constitution Bench, per majority had held that it is a State within the meaning of article 12 of the Constitution. It has no power to dismiss an employee with one month's notice or salary in lieu thereof, In Moti Ram Deka vs. General Manager, NEF [(1964) 5 SCC 683], another Constitution Bench had held that the service of an employee of the Railway establishment cannot be dispensed with except in accordance with the procedures established and unless the essential steps of procedural fairness are adhered to. Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd, & Anr. vs. Brojonath Ganguli & Anr. [(1986) 3 SCR 156], a Bench of two Judges of this Court reiterated the same view giving extended interpretation and making available the constitutional remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Air India Statutory Corporation etc. vs. United Labour Union & Ors. etc.[1996 (9) SCALE 70], the Air India statutory Corporation, on abolition of the contract labour, had not absorbed employees working on contract labour basis after contract labour system was abolished. They filed the writ petition in the High Court. The High Court gave the directions to absorb them on regular basis. On appeal, this Court considered the entire case law and laid down the following principles in para 26 thus:

"(1) The constitution of the

Corporation or instrumentality or

agency or Corporation aggregate or

Corporation sole is not of sole

material relevance to decide

whether it is by or under the

control of the appropriate

Government under the Act.

(2) If it is a statutory

Corporation, it is an

instrumentality or agency of the

State. If it is a company owned

wholly or partially by a share

capital. floated from public

exchequer, it gives indicia that it

is controlled by or under the

authority of the appropriate

Government.

(3) In commercial activities

carried on by a Corporation

established by or under the control

of the appropriate Government

having protection under Articles 14

and 19(2), it is an instrumentality

or agency of the State.

(4) The State is a service

Corporation. It acts through its

instrumentalities, agencies or

persons – natural or judicial.

(5) The governing power, wherever

located, must be subject to the

fundamental constitutional

limitations and abide by the

principles laid in the Directive

Principles.

(6) The framework of service

regulations made in the

appropriate rules of regulations

should be consistent with and

subject to the same public law

principles and limitations.

(7) Though the instrumentality,

agency or person conducts

commercial activities according to

business principles and are

separately accountable under their

appropriate bye-laws or Memorandum

of Association, they become the arm

of the Government.

(8) The existence of deep and

pervasive State control depends

upon the facts and circumstances in

a given situation and circumstances

in a given situation and in the

altered situation it is not the

sole criterion to decide whether

the agency or instrumentality or

persons is, by or under the control

of the appropriate Government.

(9) Functions of an

instrumentality, agency or persons

are of public importance following

public interest element.

(10) The instrumentality, agency or

person must have an element of

authority or ability to effect the

relations with its employees or

public by virtue of power vested in

it by law, memorandum of

association or bye-laws or articles

of association.

(11) The instrumentality, agency or

person renders an element of public

service and is accountable to

health and strength of the workers,

men and women, adequate means of

livelihood, the security for

payment of living wages, reasonable

conditions of work, decent standard

of life and opportunity to enjoy

full leisure and social and

cultural activities to the workmen.

(12) Every action of the public

authority, agency or

instrumentality or the person

acting in public interest or any

act that gives rise to public

element should be guided by public

interest in exercise of public

power or action hedged with public

element and is open to challenge.

It must meet the test of

reasonableness, fairness and

justness.

(13) If the exercise of the power

is arbitrary, unjust and unfair,

the public authority,

instrumentality, agency or the

person acting in public interest,

though in the field of private law,

is not free to prescribe any

unconstitutional conditions or

limitations in their actions.

It was directed that since the workman were employed by the contractor, on abolition of the contract labour system, the appellant-Corporation being an instrumentality even in the private field of contract, was bound by the essential principles justice, equity and fair procedure and equality. In Bangalore Water Supply Board case, the Board was held to be an `industry and the action was amenable to adjudication under the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act.

It is, therefore clear that there have been two streams of thinking simultaneously in the process of development to give protection to the employees of the Corporation. Its actions are controlled as an instrumentality of the State and the rules are made amenable to judicial review. Where there exists no statutory or analogous rules/instructions, the provisions of the Act get attracted. The employees are entitle to avail constitutional remedy under Article 226 or 32 or 136, as the case may be. The remedy of judicial review to every citizen or every person has expressly been provided in the Constitution. It is a fundamental right of every citizen. In the absence of statutory/administrative instruction in operation, the remedy of reference under Section 10 of the Act is available. Therefore, two streams, namely, remedy under the Act by way of reference and remedy of judicial redressal by way of proceedings under Article 226 or a petition filed before the Administrative Tribunal to the aggrieved persons are co-existing. If the doctrine laid in Bangalore Water Supply Board case is strictly applied, the consequence is catastrophic and would give a carte blanche power with laissez fair legitimacy which was burried fathom deep under the lethal blow of Article 14 of the Constitution which assures to every person just, fair and reasonable procedure before terminating the service of an employee. Instead, it gives the management/employer the power to dismiss the employee/workman with one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof, and/or payment of retrenchment compensation under the Act. The security of tenure would be in great jeopardy. The employee would be at the beck and call of the employer always keeping his order of employment in a grave uncertainty and in a fluid state like demorcus's sword hangs over the neck. On the other hand if the interpretation of providing efficacious remedy under Article 226 gives protection to the workmen/employee the speedy remedy under Article 226/Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act. They would protect the employee/workman from arbitrary action of the employer subserving the constitutional scheme and philosophy. The Court would, therefore, strike a balance between the competing rights of the individual and the state/agency or instrumentality and decide the validity of action taken by the Management. Necessarily, if the service conditions stand attracted, all the conditions laid therein would become applicable to the employees with a fixity of tenure and guarantee of service, subject to disciplinary action. His removal should be in accordance with the just and fair procedure envisaged under the Rules or application of the principles of natural justice, as the case may be, in which event the security of the tenure of the employee is assured and the whim and fancy and vagory of the employer would be detered and if unfair and unjust action is found established it would be declared as an arbitrary, unjust or unfair procedure. On the other hand, if the finding is that there exist no statutory rules or certified standing orders exist or they are not either made or are inapplicable, the remedy of reference under section 10 of the Act would always be available and availed of as it is an industry and indicia laid in Bangalore Water Supply Board case gets attracted.

From this perspective, this Court had approached the problem in T. Joseph's case. T Joseph's case was a case relating to the departmental employee whose services was dispensed with. Considering the rules in operation in that behalf, it was held that the telephone department is not an industry. The appointment orders were given under the rules. In that behalf, it was held that India is a Sovereign, Socialist, Secular Democratic Republic. It has to establish an egalitarian social order under the rule of law. The welfare measures partake the character of sovereign functions and the traditional duty to maintain law and order is no longer the concept of the State, Directive Principles of the State Policy enjoin the State to undertake diverse duties envisaged under Part IV of the Constitution. One of the duties of the State is to provide tale-communication services to the general public an amenity; so, it is an essential part of the sovereign functions of the State as a welfare States In Physical Research Laboratory vs. K.G. Sharma [CA No. 2663/97] decided on April 8, 1997, the question was whether the appellant who conducted research in a scientific laboratory was a 'workman' and the institution an `industry', Since the service conditions regulate conditions of employment, the Tribunal was devoid of jurisdiction to entertain the application under the Act for deciding the dispute. following the judgment in T. Joseph's case and distinguishing a judgment of three Judge bench, it was held that research institute was a State within the meaning of Article 12. It is not an industry attracting the provisions of the Act. So, in Chief Conservator of Forests & Anr. vs. Jagannath Maruti Kandhara [(1996) 2 SCC 293], this Court referred with approval the Bangalore Water Supply Board case. In K.G. Sharma's case, the industrial Tribunal had observed that the Physical Research Laboratory is an industry but this Court reversed lt. The Telecommunication Department is not an industry and the Rules governing the conditions of service of the employees stand attracted and there by the remedy under Article 226 would be available. To that area, the Act does not stand attracted. The respondents admit that the dismissed workmen who were holding civil post, by necessary implication, were excluded as workmen under Section 2(s). Even though the activities of the Corporation partake the character of a private enterprise, since the workmen engage themselves in rendering services, It is not an industry. If there exists no statutory rules binding standing orders, necessarily, the reference under Section 10(1) would be valid and the Tribunal has jurisdiction to go into or the employee may avail of judicial review or common law review.

On an overall view, we hold that the employees working in the statutory canteen, in view of the admission made in the counter-affidavit that they are holding civil posts and are being paid monthly salary and are employees, the necessary conclusion would be that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute on a reference under Section 10(1) of the Act. On the other hand, the remedy to approach the constitutional court under Article 226 is available. Equally, the remedy under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act is available. But, generally, the practice which has grown is to direct the citizen to avail, in the first instance, the remedy under Article 226 or under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunal Act and then avail the right under Article 136 of the Constitution by special leave to this court etc. Thus, in view of the admission made by the respondents in their counter-affidavit that the workmen of the appellant-Association are holding civil posts and are being paid monthly wages and benefits and are considered to be employees, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal stands excluded. It is open to the aggrieved party to approach appropriate authority in accordance with law. In that view, the finding of the Tribunal in the impugned judgment is legal and warrants no interference. It is open to the respondents to avail of such remedy as is available to a regular employee including the right to approach the Central Administrative Tribunal or the High Court or this Court thereafter for redressal of legal injury.

The Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed.

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