Cantonment Board v. Mohanlal
Cantonment Board v. Mohanlal
LOK 1996 (1) SC 23
Equivalent citations: AIR 1996 SC 1586 : 1996 (1) AD(SC) 436 : 1996 (1) CCC 106 : 1996 (1) JT 77 : 1997 (1) RCJ 600 : 1996 (2) RCR 328 : 1996 (1) Supreme 369 : 1996 (1) Scale 153 : 1996 (2) SCC 23 : 1996 SCC (2) 23 JT 1996 (1) 77
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- K. Ramaswamy, J.; G.B. Pattanaik, J.
- Case No.
- Civil Appeal No. 1470 of 1981
Provisions referred
- Section 85, Cantonment Act, 1924
Order
This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 2090/75 passed on November 5, 1979, filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The admitted facts are that the appellant had issued a notice on March 27, 1993 under Section 85 of the Cantonment Act, 1924 (for short, `the Act') to the respondent for demolition of the construction made in the property now in controversy. The Ist respondent had received the notice on May 2, 1973, but he carried out further construction. However, notice under Section 256 was issued on January 3, 1974 and second notice ultimately was issued for demolition on September 13, 1974 under Section
185. The Ist respondent had submitted his reply on October 30, 1974. The area committee on December 7, 1974, passed resolution after considering the representation made by the Ist respondent to give 15 days time for compliance of the notice dated March 27, 1973 and September 13, 1974 and in case he does not comply with the same it further resolved to have the structure demolished through the agency of the Board. Calling this action in question the respondent had filed the above writ petition in the High Court. The Division Bench has held that though Section 185 read with 5th Schedule does not contemplate any enquiry being conducted or reasons to be recorded, principles of natural justice require that necessary notice and opportunity of hearing be given and after consideration of the representation speaking order is required to be passed. Since the speaking order had not been passed the action of the respondent was in violation of the law.
The only question in this case is whether the view taken by the High Court is good in law. It is seen that the respondent in his reply had admitted that they constructed, as pointed out by the Cantonment Board in its notice dated September 13, 1974, and the previous notice. But he stated that he had done it bona fide and as he would not demolish it but requested the authority to reconsider the matter and withdraw the notice. In other words, he admitted that he had carried on illegal construction without compliance with law. So the question is whether enquiry in that behalf is required to be conducted. We are of the considered view that the High Court was not right in its conclusion that an independent enquiry requires to be held after the notice was issued and the reply thereof was given by the respondent.
It is seen that the Cantonment Board is an elected body represented by people themselves. When opportunity was given putting on notice of illegal construction made by the respondent, reply thereof was given. The Board had considered the representation and was not inclined to accede to the request made by the respondent. Accordingly, the resolution passed by the Cantonment Board cannot be faulted as violative of the principles of natural justice.
However, Shri Lekhi, learned counsel appearing for the appellants stated that the action taken by the respondent can be candoned provided he complies with the law. In view of the stand taken by the appellants, it would be open to the respondent to make a representation to the Board which would forward the same to General Officer Commanding in Chief at Sagar who would pass an appropriate order according to law.
The appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.
Separate opinion
Leave granted. Heard counsel on both sides.
The fact are that pursuant to the policy dated September 12, 1983, industrial units based on various forest produce i.e. Khair Wood were allowed to be set up in the State. an association of the industries. The Government gave relaxation on February 25, 1984 giving liberty to the Director of Industries to encourage small scale industries on the ground that those who would not operate their industries from the forest wood may be considered for the licence and that they would purchase `khair wood from outside the State. The respondent No.4 had given provisional registration of his proposed S.I. units for a period of one year on February 11, 1986.
The Government thereafter introduced complete ben on registration from December 11, 1986. The appellant Association had applied for cancellation or relaxation of the ban imposed including the 4th respondent but the Director refused to the same. Consequently, the appellant filed a writ petition in the high Court. The Division Bench of the High Court of Allahabad in order dated May 3, 1991 in Writ Petition holding that the matter doing one of policy taken by the Government at the highest that the matter being one of policy taken by the Government at the highest level, the Court was not inclined to examine the correctness of the policy. Accordingly it declined to pass any direction as sought for.
It is contended rot the appellant that the Government having allowed other units to obtain Khair wood from the Government quota, denial of the same to S.S.I. units registered under provisional registration would be discriminatory violative of Art 14 of the Constitution. Having given our anxious consideration to the conventional of the counsel and the argument of Shri Mehta learned counsel for the 4th respondent, we are of the view that it is not a fit case for our interference. If is seen, as stated in the counter filed in this Court, that the Government had constituted a committee to which the Secretary Forest was the Chair-person. It had met on December 13, 1990 and had decided that small scale units registered prior to December 11, 1986 were entitled to be considered for allotment and any unit registered thereafter would be allowed to operate only subject to their obtaining required wood from outside the State. It is seen that in view of non-availability of the forest produce in the State of U.P. the Government constituted a committee and the Secretary Forest Department was its Chair-person. They had gone into the question of availability and allotment of Khair wood in the State. They have imposed a cut off date, i.e., December 11, 1986 and allotment would be made, subject to the availability of forest produce, to those industries established prior to the aforesaid date. It is true, as stated in the order passed by the Director, that S.I. units registered after September 12, 1983, were allowed registration by proceedings dated February 25, 1984 with a condition that they will not apply for U.P. forest wood, and they would get it from outside the State. Even in respect of such industries it was also further stated that though the Director of Industries granted provisional registration. It would only be until or before December 11, 1986. In other words, complete ban on registration of S.I. units was imposed on or after December 11, 1986 for allotment of the forest produced required for industries.
Under these circumstances, it being a policy decision we do not think that it would be a case for our interference. The High Court has rightly declined to exercise its powers.
The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Separate opinion
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1577 OF 1995.
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.15440 of 1994)
O R D E R
Though notice was served on the respondents, none appeared either in person or through counsel.
Leave granted in both the special leave petitions. C.A. No.1576 of 1996 @SLP [C] No.5321/94
The only controversy is whether the High Court was right in its impugned order in CWJC No.25/92 made on March 11, 1993 to direct the appellants to implement the list prepared by the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau at Dalontgunj to appoint respondents in this case. There appears to be two procedures prevailing in the State of Bihar, namely, Deputy Commissioner or District Magistrate to prepare list of eligible candidates according to the procedure provided for appointment of Class III and Class IV employees to the vacancies existing in the District. Equally, instructions were given for the Department of the Mines and Geology which is now annexed as Annexure 2 in the paper book. It would indicate in para 3 there in that a committee consisting of (i) Deputy Director (Geology) -Chairman, (ii) Assistant Director (Geology) of the Circle – Member, (iii) District Welfare Officer of the District where the circle office is located – Member, (iv) One officer of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes – Member, were required to select candidates for appointment as Class III & Class IV employees of the appellants-Department. Instead of acting on it, the appellate Court directed to appoint the candidates found in the list sent by the District Magistrate. The question is whether the Department is bound by the directions and appoint candidate from the list prepared by the Deputy Commissioner or the District Magistrate, as the case may be? If it is so held, the needs of each Department of Government, when required to select candidates and to prepare the select list after following the selection procedure and recruitment of Class III and Class IV employees would be frustrated and the prescribed procedure would be rendered surpluses and otios. Our answer is yes. The Department was to constitute a committee for selection of such candidates and to make appointment of the selected candidates selected by the committee. Thus we can visaulise that, as regards the Department of Mines and Geology, they are regulated by yet another prescribed procedure than was done by the district authorities to select the candidates as per requirement of the Department. Deputy Commission or District Magistrate, though is competent to prepare list after due selection, it would be for the Department to select and appoint according to rules. We are of further view that acceptance of list of candidates sent by District Magistrate would frustrate the regulations and acts counter productive to step up appointment of persons not either qualified or eligible for the posts of the other Department. It would not be a recruitment Board constituted for all the Departments. Under these circumstances, the High Court was wholly unjustified in issuing direction to follow the list prepared by the Deputy Commissioner. The said directions are set aside.
It would be open to the appellants to select such candidates according to rules. It would call the names from employment exchange and also by publication in newspaper and to select the eligible and fit candidates for 8 vacancies available in the Department or any post available as on today. It should be done after publication of an advertisement in that behalf calling for application and also calling names from employment exchange. The Committee should consider their cases and select the candidates according to rules and then appointment order shall be made thereafter.
C.A. No.——–of 1996 @ SLP [C] NO.15440 of 1994
This appeal relates to the appoint of Class III and Class IV employees in Labour and Employment Department. For the same reasons as given above, the directions issued by the High Court were wholly unjustified in law and are set aside.
In the result, both the appeals are allowed. No costs.
Separate opinion
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1579 OF 1996
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.12432 of 1995)
O R D E R
Leave granted.
We have heard the counsel on both sides. These appeals by special leave arise from the judgments of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in CWJC Nos.7049/93 and 1801/90 made respectively on August 19, 1994 and December 6, 1994. The question is vexed inter se seniority of the appellant and the respondent-employees in these cases. The appellant was admittedly appointed on temporary basis in March 1966 and thereafter he was drafted as a Commissioned Officer and served in the Army in defence of the country in national emergency. After discharge from the Army, he was appointed on regular basis on September 6, 1966. The respondent-employees came to be appointed initially on September 29, 1964 on temporary basis and were then appointed on regular basis as Civil Assistant Surgeon w.e.f. July 15, 1974. The question is whether the appellant is entitled to his seniority w.e.f. September 6, 1966 and thereby would become senior to the respondent-employees though they were initially appointed on temporary basis w.e.f. September 29, 1964. Circular dated September 20, 1965 issued by the Government with regard to the entitlement of the Army Officers is found in Annexure VI. The relevant part reads thus:
"Besides the facilities in the Army, all
temporary officers are allowed lien in
service in accordance with Govt, order
No.7892(B) dated 10.12.62. It has
further been accepted by Government that
of the existing permanent vacancies
would be reserved for the temporary
assistant surgeons who volunteers to
join the Army and they would be on
probation with effect from the date on
which they join the Army service and on
completion of two years of satisfactory
service, they will be confirmed in the
State Medical Service."
As a consequence of the above circular, on appointment to the post and on completion of the probation for a period of two years, the candidate would be confirmed in the cadre as Civil Assistant Surgeon in the Bihar State Medical Service. It is settled law that on completion of the satisfactory probation, his confirmation would date back to the date of his initial appointment. Admittedly, he was regularly appointed on September 6, 1966. Consequently, he was regularly appointed as Civil Assistant Surgeon w.e.f. September 6, 1966.
It is true that the respondent-employees came to be appointed pursuant to the recommendations dated April 17, 1964 made by the Bihar State Public Service Commission and were appointed on September 29, 1964. But all the appointments are only to temporary posts though they were selected by the Bihar Public Service Commission on regular basis. They were admittedly confirmed w.e.f. July 15, 1974. Under these circumstances, the regular service for the purpose of seniority as regards the respondents would commence only from July 15, 1974, of course, for other benefits, their appointments would date back to the date of their initial temporary appointment. Consequently, the appellant becomes senior to them. Resultantly, he is entitled to all the consequential benefits except back wages.
The appeals are accordingly allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside. No costs.
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