Delhi Development Authority v. Skipper Construction

1. The facts leading to contempt proceedings are as under: On 8.10.1980, an auction was held by the Delhi Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as the DDA ) of the Commercial Tower Plot, Jhandewalan, Block E, New Delhi ad measuring about 2540 sq. mtrs. The first respondent. Ws. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Skipper)was the highest bidder, its bid being Rs. 9.82 crores. As per the conditions of the auction, Skipper deposited 25% of the bid amount. The said bid was confirm the DDA on 14.10.1980. Skipper was called upon to make the balance of payment of 75% of the bid amount within 90 days as per the conditions of the auction.

2. The Government of India issued directions to the DDA to accept the request of Skipper and to grant an indulgence to it and directed the DDA to reschedule the recovery of 75% of the bid amount with interest from the Skipper. Consequent to this, DDA called upon the Skipper to enter into fresh agreement, license agreement and furnish bank guaranties in compliance with the directions of the Central Government.

3. On 11.8.1987, Skipper entered in a license agreement, paid 50% of the original bid and secured payment of the balance 50 % of the bid and interest at the rate of 18% per annum thereon by submitting bank guarantees for Rs.9.82 crores, in terms 'of which a sum of approximately 1.944 crores was required to be paid as each instalment. A total of 5 instalments was payable every six months., the first being due on 15.9.1987 and the last on or about 15.9.1989.

4. Against the first instalment of Rs.1.944 crores falling due on 15.9.1987, DDA recovered about Rs. 88.76 lacs by encashment of the bank guarantee on 7.12.1987. Thereafter the first respondent did not pay in terms of the agreement.

5. On 4.10.1988, the Lt Governor issued a direction at the request of Skipper, deferring recovery from Skipper of the 2^nd instalment as per the agreement dated 11.8.1987 till one month after the sanctioning of the building plans.

6. In August, 1987, the first respondent filed writ petition in the High Court of Delhi, being CWP No. 2371 of '1989. The principal relief sought in the writ petition related to sanctioning of building plans and permission for construction. An interim order was passed directing the Skipper to furnish fresh bank guarantee since the bank guarantee furnished earlier had lapsed. The DDA did not encash the fresh bank granite which was detective. Time and again the DDA represented to the Court that the monies were outstanding from the Skipper and no indulgence ought to be shown to them till the payments were made. The question of payment of the outstanding amount of over Rs. 8 crores under the principal sum itself was deferred from time to time.

7. On 16.2.1990, Lt. Governor revoked the order dated 4.10.1988 deferring the payment of instalments. As a result the entire sum became payable in one lump sum. However, this order of the Lt. Governor was stayed by the Court. Thus v it became necessary f or the DDA to grant conditional and provincial sanction to plans of the building subject to the payment of monies due to the DDA.

S. On 19.3.1990, an interim order was passed by the Delhi High Court by which Skipper was permitted to commence construction without first depositing the dues of the DDA. Against this order an appeal was prefer-red. The Division Bench directed tie payment of a token sum of Rs. 5 lacs which was offered by the Skipper as a gesture of goodwill within 2 days; a sum Rs. 15 lacs within 15 days and 1.944 crores within one month to the, DDA. It was further directed that the quantum of monies and the mode of payment will be decided at the time of final disposal of the writ petition.

9. Even this order was not complied with. Notwithstanding this, the Skipper approached the Court once again for exten-sion of time to make payment and for direction to construct. The Court extended the time by one month on 16.4.1990, af-fording liberty to the DDA to encash the bank guarantee. The bank guarantee could not be encashed because it was conditional. By then the entire monies had fallen due. Those amounts had not been paid. The 1990 against the interim orders dated 19.3.1990 and 16.4.1990 passed by the High Court of Delhi. By an order dated 3.5.1990 this Court stayed further construction and made it conditional upon payment of Rs. 1.944 crores.

10. Suit No. 1 1875 of 1990 was filed by the Skipper for a direction that the DDA ought not to insist upon payment by cash or draft and ought to be directed to encash bank guarantee. The learned Vacation Judge issued orders directing the DDA to invoke the bank guarantee. However, the suit was ultimately dismissed.

11. On 21.12.1990, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dismissed C.W.P. No.2371 of 1989 directing Skipper to pay to the DDA by cash or demand draft a sum of Rs.8,12,68,789/- within 30 days; to stop construction till payment is made; and in the event of non-payment by the skipper, DDA would be entitled to enter upon the property and forfeit the monies received by the DDA.

12. On 14.1.1991, detailed reasons for its operative order come to be rendered by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court with further direction giving effect to clause 15 of the license agreement dated 11.18,1987 that in the event of non-compliance of the payment by the Skipper the property shall stand vested in the DDA, free from all encumbrances, in addition to the forfeiture of the monies.

13. Against the dismissal of CWP No. 2371 of 1989 Skipper filed SLP (C) No. 186 of 1991 before this Court.

14. On 29.1.1991, a Division Bench on which one of us, P.B. Sawant, J., was a party). It inter alia reads as under:

"(i) That the petitioners herein shall deposit

a sum of Rs.2.5. crores (Rupees two crores and

fifthly lacs only) in cash/ bank draft with

the Delhi Development Authority within one

month from today and the petitioners will

further deposit similar amount by cash/bank

draft by 8^th April, 1991.

(ii) That the petitioners shall be permitted

to resume the construction of the building in

question only after making the first deposit

as stated in clause (i) above. DDA filed SLP

(C) Nos, 6338-6339 of this Court passed an

interim order (in

(iii) That if the petitioners fail to deposit

the amounts as aforesaid, the Delhi

Development Authority will be free to act. in

accordance with the impugned order dated 21^st

December, 1990 of High Court

in CWP No. 2371 of 1980.

(iv) -Mat the petitioners shall not induct any

person in the building or create any right in

favour of any third party.

(v) -Mat the matter be listed for further

orders before this Court on 9^th April, 1991."

15. On 4.2.1991, in violation of the agreement and in gross contempt of the above order, the Skipper issued advertise-ment in the leading newspapers seeking to create 3^rd party rights.

16. On 25.1.1993, SLP(C) No. 186 of 1991 was dismissed by this Court. By virtue of the above order, the DDA on, 10.2. 1993 re-entered and took physical possession of the said property, free from all encumbrances; monies paid by the Skipper were forfeited.

17. Notwithstanding all these, Skipper filed yet another suit on the original side of the High Court of Delhi, being Suit No. 770 of 1993 for the reliefs of-.

(i) permanent induction restraining the DDA from interfering with the title and possession of the property; (ii) for mandatory injuction directing the DDA to recompute the principal amount and interest payable by Skipper; (iii) for a declaration that the present calculations are wrong;

(iv) for a declaration that re-entry/ re-possession and determination of the rights of Skipper are bad in law and nonest;

(v) for a declaration that all dues have, been paid by Skipper to the DDA; and (Vi) a declaration that clause 15 of the License Agreement dated 1 1. 8. 1987 is non-est and bad in law.

18. On service of notice, DDA filed application, I.A. No.8500 of 1993 in Suit No. 770 of 1993, for rejection of the plaint as all the issues raised by Skipper were resjudicata and even otherwise the plaint was barred by law. The said application is pending disposal.

19. On 8.11.93, DDA issued notices for auction of the said property. The 2^nd respondent sought to implead itself in the suit and on 1.12.1993 filed an application for stay of auction which was opposed by the DDA.

20. On 9.12.1993, a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court allowed the auction to proceed with and restrained the DDA from accepting or confirming the bid at the auction scheduled for 10. 12.1993. Aggrieved by this order DDA filed SLP(C) No. 21000 of 1993 against the interim order of the Delhi High Court.

21. I.A. 3 of 1994 is an application for intervention filedon behalf of DDA. While disposing of SLP(C) No.21000 of 1993 and the said I.A. No.3 of the 1994 we issued notice on 29.11.94 by exercise of our Suo Moto powers directing Tejwant Singh and Mrs. Surinder Kaur to show cause as to why they should not be punished for contempt of court for their following acts;

"(a) Instituting suit being Suit No.770 of

1993 inthe Delhi High Court in respect of the

same subject matter after this Court confirmed

the orders of the said High Court dated

21. 12.1990 and 14.1.199 1, by its order date d

23. 1.1993.

(b) Entering into agreement for and handing

over possession of and receiving monies and

creating interests in the premises in the

building under construction in the suit

property, viz., the Commercial Tower Plot,

jhandewalan, Block C, New Delhi, admeasuring

about 2540 sq. mtrs. with constructions

thereon which are already made, in defiance of

the order of this Court passed on 29^th

January, 1991 Notice returnable on 3^rd

January, 1993".

22. In response to this notice, Tejwant Singh Contemner No.1, filed an affidavit expressing unconditional and unqualified apology. After so expressing, he sets out several facts to offer an explanation and not a justification for the steps which were, taken by him. According to him, the purpose of filing Suit No. 770 of 1993 in the Delhi High Court was to make payment of reasonable amount. Although the prayers give an impression that there could be no bar in filing of a suit in civil court, he would add that the intention of the deponent was not to indulge in litigation which was already concluded by the Supreme Court. 'The intention was to see that as far as the quantum of interest was concerned that can be scaled down and the DDA could be persuaded to realise reasonable interest instead of exorbitant interest.

23. The deponent, on legal advice and in order to protect the property by making the payments in instalments, instructed his counsel to file suit in the High Court of Delhi for mandatory injunctions and declarations. An application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of Civil Procedure Code was also filed in the suit under the bone fide belief that the same could be filed under law in order to ensure that during the pendency of the suit also efforts should continuously be made to settle the matter amicably. The Deponent instructed the counsel to make averment that the company is ready and willing to make the payment. The counsel has categorically stated in the application that the company is ready and willing to pay the amount to DDA as demanded by them in instalments.

24. The company also wrote a letter dated 10^th July, 1993 to all its valued customers apprising them about the dispute with DDA. In the letter also the company made it amply clear that the matter can be resolved amicably and for that purpose funds are required. It was requested that the valued customers shall make the payment of amounts due against them. The bank draft/cash order be sent to the com-pany in the name of DDA. The company wanted to hand over the drafts to DDA.

25. On this explanation, it is urged that there is no intentional or deliberate flouting of the order dated 29. 1. 1991 passed by this Court.

26. The order of 29.1.1991 was passed after the counsel for Delhi Development Authority expressed an apprehension that the answering respondent would sell away or otherwise dispose of the plot to a third party and abscond. The answering respondent-deponent was personally present in' the Court on 29.1.1991. On that date, permission to construct had been with them barely for less than a year (w.e.f 19.3.1990) from this Court. It was in that context that the injunction was interpreted. He did not create any third party right himself. However, he noticed that in respect of one Khosla, the papers annexed to I.A. No.3 show that his son had signed some documents evidencing induction of Khosla. He says that there is no other case in relation to which any such impropriety has been committed.

27. Surinder Kaur, wife of Tejwant Singh, Contemner No.2, would urge that she has nothing to do with the day to day running of the company nor has she ever acted or represented anywhere in regard thereto. She has not signed any paper or document in relation to the transactions connected with the present proceedings.

28. An Additional Affidavit was filed on 27.1.1995 by Tejwant Singh, Contemner No.1. Paragraph 3 of the said addi-tional affidavit states:

"with respect to the act of entering into

agreements for and handing over possession of

and receiving monies and creating interests

in the premises in the building under

construction in the suit property viz., the

commercial Tower Plot, Jhandewalan, Block E,

New Delhi, admeasuring about 2540 sq. meters

with constructions thereon which are already

made in defiance of the order of Hon'ble

Supreme Court passed on 29.1.1991 it is

respectfully necessary at this stage to

explain the context in which the order dated

29. 1.1991 was passed, understood and acted

upon by the answering respondent. The

answering respondent is explaining the

collective contemporaneous under standing of

both the parties and respectfully submit to

this Hon'ble Court that

there was no intentional or deliberate

flouting of the order. The order of

29. 1.1991 was passed after the counsel for

Delhi Development Authority expressed an

apprehension that the answering respondent

would sell away or otherwise dispose of the

plot to a third party and abscond. The

answering respondent/ deponent was personally

present in the court on 29.1.1991. On that

date permission to construct had been with

them barely for less than a year (w.e.f.

19. 3.1990) from the Hon'ble Delhi High Court.

As on 29.1.1991, the construction on the plot

has barely commended and only a part of the

basement had been done. No building was in

existence. To preclude the answering

respondent from in any manner giving away

physical possession of either the plot or the

proposed building (yet to come up) the order

of

29. 1.1991 was passed.

It is most respectfully submitted that at no

time during the proceedings, was any reference

made or intended to prohibit or in any manner

fetter the booking of space in the building or

collecting money in respect thereof The fact

was that this was the common collective and

collided understanding of all the parties

including the Delhi Development Authority is

evident from the fact that the bookings were

done before January, 1991 and after January,

1991 to the knowledge of everyone without any

objection, protest and demur. Indeed in the

numerous court proceedings in different courts

including the Hon'ble Supreme Court after 1991

not the slightest grievance was made and no

contempt petition was ever moved by Delhi

Development Authority (till the present last

round of proceedings). indeed, it is most

respectfully submitted that had answering

respondent known or remotely contemplated that

even booking sought to be fettered, it would

have either moved the Hon'ble Court for

clarification or would have immediately

desisted."

28A. Paragraph (k) reads thus:

"After 29.1.1991 the company entered into

agreement with various persons/parties. The

copies of the agreements entered into with

them are annexed herewith and are collectively

marked as Annexures 'A' and 'B'. It is

pertinent to

mention that the company openly advertised in

the Newspapers and the next day DDA also

advertised, in the Newspapers about the

Court's order dated 29.1.1991. it is only

after seeing both the advertisements the

speculative buyers came forward to book the

flats and each and every person who entered

into the agreements with the company were

fully aware of the pendency of the litigation

and hence no third party rights were created."

29. W. G. Ramaswamy, learned senior counsel for the contemners submits, before filing Suit No. 770 of 1993, the contemners took legal advice. It was opined that the Civil Writ Petition No. 2371 of 1989 filed before the High Court was not a substitute for suit. The fact that writ petition was dismissed and the SLP thereon was also dismissed will not take away the right to file an independent suit. It was only because of that the contemners filed the suit. There was no deliberate intention to obstruct the course of justice. May be, the contemners were misguided. Whatever might have been the conduct of the contemners they had offered unqualified apology in both the affidavits.

30. Actually, the contemners do not want the learned counsel to advance arguments in defence of their conduct. They we only kneeling before the court and praying for mercy.

31. As regards the alleged flouting of the order dated 29.1.1991, three questions would arise:

(1) whether there is disobedience of the order dated 29.1.1991.

(2) If it is answered in the affirmative, whether the disobedience in wilful?

(3) If wilful, what is the consequence?

32. In his, submission, legal advice is a factor to decide whether a disobedience is wilful or not. He is prepared to disclose even the name of the senior counsel who had given the opinion. As a matter of fact, in Hoshiar Singh v. Gurbachan Singh AIR 1962 SC 1089 this Court found fault with the contemners therein for not disclosing the name of the counsel who gave the legal opinion. It could never have been the intention of the contemners to openly flout the order dated 29.10.1991. By entering into agreements contemners were not creating rights in favour of third parties. The speculative purchasers being fully aware of the legal proceedings yet chose to purchase the property which agreements, if ultimately, did not fructify into sale, they would be entitled to only refund. Before 29.1.1991 1,000 agreements were entered into and after 29.1.1991 1,750 agreements were entered into. Out of these 1,750 agreements, the agreements in respect of 835 cases were executed while in the case of remaining 915, the agreements have not been executed. Ibis is the factual position. Since the DDA did not take out the contempt application, the contemners were lulled into the belief that what they were doing was right. Further, the exact scope of the order that the contemners should not even enter into contract was not understood by the contemners properly Creation of right could only mean, in the context, an obligation to refund.

33. The notice for contempt has been issued practically after nearly three years. If such a notice had been issued by the High Court he could have pleaded limitation contained under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 197 1, as a defence. However, as regards exercise of suo Moto powers of this court under Ar-ticle 129 of the Constitution of India the contemners are not raising any such plea.

34. Mr. Arun Jaitley, learned counsel for the DDA would submit that the filing of suit No. 770/93 is nothing but an abuse of process of court. The matter had reached finality by orders of this Court. Yet to say the suit was filed to protect the rights of the contemners is ingenious. By filing a suit (No.770 of 1993) and obstructing the course of justice after this Court dismissed SLP(C) No. 1 86 of 199 1, is a clear case of criminal contempt as laid down in Advocate-General, State of Bihar v. M/s-Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries 1980 (3) SCC 311 at 315. This Court had come down heavily upon persons who indulge in obstructionist methods to defeat or delay justice as laid down in Bloom Himmatlal Desai 1994(6) SCC 322 at page 327.

35. In this case, there is a deliberate disobedience of the order dated 29.1.1991. The agreement dated 11^th August, 1987 between contemners and DDA clearly postulates that legal possession and ownership shall remain with the licenser until full payment of the bid amount along with interest payable thereon has been made by the licensee. Therefore, the creation of rights in favour of third parties was never contemplated and there was no scope for misunderstanding the order dated 29.1.1991. During the state of C.W.P. No. 2371 of 1989 before the High Court the contemners came forward with a plea that there were 870 buyers of flats but this figure goes on increasing from time to time.

36. Ultimately, at the stage, of Suit No. 770 of 1993 the number of buyers came to 2,700. In the agreements entered into after the order dated 29.1.1991 there is a clear recital that possession is delivered. If this cannot amount to creating rights in favour of third parties nothing else would.

37. We will now proceed to consider the merits of the above contentions.

38. The contempt proceedings in this case have been initiated under Article 129 of the Constitution of India. The said Article reads as follows:

"Supreme Court to be a court of record. The

Supreme Court shall be a court of record and

shall have all powers of such a court

including the power to punish for contempt of

itself"

39. This Court in Shri. C.K. Daphary vs. Shri. O.P. Gupta 1971 (1) SCC 626 pointed out that it cannot be disputed that in a case of contempt of Supreme Court, the Court can issue notice suo moto.

40. About the nature of power, this Court referring to the Privy Council ruling in Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v.The Chief Justice and Judges of the Pepsu High Court 1954 SCR at page 461, held:

"Finally, in Parashurain Detaram v. Emperor,

AIR 1945 PC 134 at 136 the Privy Council said

that "this summary power of punishing for

contempt …. is a power which a court must of

necessity possess."

41. In this case, as the notice dated 29.11.1994 indicates, it consists of :

(1) Civil Contempt and (2) Criminal Contempt.

Civil contempt is defined under Section 2(b) of the Act. Thus, any wilful disobedience to the order of the Court to do or abstain from doing any act is prima facie a civil contempt. Civil contempt arises where power of the Court is invoked and exercised to enforce obedience to orders of the court.

42. On the contrary, criminal contempts are criminal in nature. It may include out rages on the Judges in open Court, defiant disobedience to the Judges in Court, libels on Judges or courts or interfering with the courts of justice or any act which tends to prejudice the courts of justice.

43. Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred toas the Act) posits criminal contempt to mean:

Publication (a) by words spoken or written;

(b) or written or by sings;

(c) or by visible act whatsoever which-

(d) or any other act whatsoever which-

(i) (a) scandalizes or tends to scandalise, (b) or loweres or tends to lower the authority of any court'or (ii) prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) (a) interferes or tends to interfere with, (b) or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner.

44. It can be categorically stated that the power as a court of record to punish for contempt is beyond dispute.

45. In dealing with the scope of the said Section this Court observed in Rachapudi Subba Rao v. advocate General Andhra Pradesh 1981 (2) SCC 577 at 583 as follows ;

"It is noteworthy,that in teh categorisation

of contempt in three sub-clauses (1) to (iii)

only category (ii)refers to judicial

proceeding. Scandalising of court in its

administrative capacity will also be covered

by sub-clauses (1) and (iii) The phrase

"administration of justice" in sub-clause

(iii) is far wider in scope than "course of

any judicial proceedings". The last words "in

any other manner" of sub-clause (iii) further

extended its ambit and give it a residuary

character. Although sub-clauses (1) and (iii)

discribe three distinct species of "criminal

contempt." Interference or tendency to

interfere with any judicial proceeding or

administration of justice is a common element

of sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) This element is

not criminal contempt of the kind falling

under sub-clause (i)".

is clear that on 25-1.1993, SLP (C) No. 1 86 of 1991 was dismissed thereby confirming the judgment of the Delhi High Court rendered in CPW No. 2371 of 1989 dated 14.1.1991 reported in Skipper Construction Co.(P) Ltd. & Anr. vs. D.A. & Ors. 43 (1991) Delhi Law Times 636. Thereafter, Suit No. 770 of 1993 was filed practically for the same relief which formed the subject matter of the earlier writ peti-tion, CWP No. 2371 of 1989.

48. After the dismissal of SLP(C) 186 of 1991, the DDA re-entered and took physical possession of the property on 10.2.1993, free from all encumbrances, forfeiting the monies paid by the contemners. Yet prayer No. 1 in the suit is for injunction restraining the DDA from interfering with title and possession.

49. Under the terms of the license deed dated 11^th August, 1987 entered into between DDA (the licensor) and the contemners (licensee), it was clearly stipulated at paragraphs 1 and 2 as under:

1. That the licensee shall have license to

enter upon the plot described hereinabove for

a period of two and half years from the date

of execution of this licence only for purposes

of starting construction of the building in

accordance with the sanctioned building plans.

2. That the licencee shall not be deemed to

have any right, title or interest in the said

plot nor shall he have any right to grant such

a a right in favour of any persons. Legal

possession and ownership of the said plot

shall remain with the licensor until fill

payment of the bid amount alongwith interest

payable thereon has been made by de licensee.

50. Of course, in this case, possession was handed over to the contemners when they had not even cleared the first instalment. That itself has been criticised by us and relegated to an enquiry. But, in this case, after disposal of SLP(C) 186 of 1991 when DDA has taken physical possession of the plot, to file a suit and pray for injunction, as stated above, would clearly constitute criminal contempt. Similarly, the other prayers are aimed at attacking directly or indirectly the adverse finding rendered by +he High Court in CWP No.2371 of 1989. The High Court, in no uncertain terms, held at paragraph 26 of its judgment reported in 43 (1991) Delhi Law Times 636 as under:

"We, therefore, reject all submissions made on

behalf of the petitioners and hold that the

D.D.A. is entitled to recover the entire

amount of Rs.8,12,68,789/- as on 1.7.1990 in

lump sum in cash or through bank draft. The

decision of the Supreme Court in Dunlop

(supra) entitles the D.D.A. to insist upon

cash payment and to reject the bank guarantee.

Since there is a deliberate breach of the

obligations under the Licence Deed and the

Agreement dated 11.8.1987 by the petitioners

legal consequences. as mentioned in term 15 of

the Licence Deed, spring into action."

51. Yet, the prayers, above stated, are made in the suit. The only semblance of defence that is put forth is the suit came to be filed armed with the legal advice. We are afraid such a plea is worthless. As stated above, in the case of a criminal contempt, the intention or motive is irrelevant. Therefore, even assuming bona fide the contemners thought they could file the suit because it was "legally opined" that the was not a substitute, the so-called bona fides are totally irrelevant.

52. The filing of the suit No. 770 of 1993 is nothing but a wilful action on the part of the contemners to underline the dignity of this Court and the majesty of law. The conduct of the contemners tends to bring the authority and administration of law into disrespect or even disregard. It equally tends to interfere with or prejudice the litigants during the litigation. Abuse of the process of court calculated to hamper the due course of judicial proceeding or the orderly administration of justice is a contempt of court. In Advocate General, State of Bihar v. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries 1980(3) SCC 311 at page 315, this court observed;

"while we are conscious that every abuse of

the process of court may not necessarily

amount to contempt to court , abuse of the

process of the court calculated to hamper the

due course of a judicial proceeding or the

orderly administration of justice, we must

say, is a contempt of court. It may be that

certain minor abuses of the process of the

court may be suitably dealt with as between

the parties, by striking out pleadings under

the provisions of order 6, rule 16 or in some

other manner. But, on the other hand, it may

be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course

of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of

the judicial process and which thus extends

its pernicious influence beyond the parties to

the action and effects the interest of the

public in the administration of justice."

53. Again as stated by Sir John Donaldson in Attorney General v. Newspaper Publishing PIc, C.J. Miller Contempt of court 1989 Clarendon Press, Oxford:

'

"An action for contempt of court arose:

'where the conduct complained of is

specifically intended to impede or prejudice

the administration of justice. Such

an intent cannot be expressly or admitted, but

can be inferred from all the circumstances

including the foreseeability of the

consequences of the conduct.'

54. At this stage, it is worthwhile for us to quote Lord Hardwicke, L.C., St.James's Evening Post (1742) 2Atk.409 at P.47 1:

"There cannot be anything of greater

consequence than to keep the streams of

justice clear and pure, that parties may

proceed with safety both to themselves and

their characters."

55. Thus, we are clearly of the opinion that the contemners arc guilty of criminal contempt as defined under Section 2(c) of the Act.

56. Now we come to other part of contempt as to whether there has been a disobedience of our order dated 29.1.91. That order in clause (iv) specifically stated (it is worthwhile repetition):

"'That the petitioners shall not induct any

person in the building or create any right in

favour of any third party."

57. The contemners had caused the advertisement dated 4.2.91 as follows:

"SKIPPER

GROUP OF COMPANIES

(ANNOUNCES)

ISSUE of Commercial Flats for retired/

Retiring Personnel/Professionals/Self

employed & other persons in our

BAU MAKHAN SINGH HOUSE

JHANDEWALAN TOWER, JHANDEWALAN EXTN.

at highly concessional rates

It is once in a lifetime

opportunity to own a commercial property of

your own in "Bau Makhan Singh House"

A Prime project in the middle of

high business environment. The location of

tower is as rare as the offer itself.

(SALIENT FEATURES

* Ultra modern multi commercial complex

(Shopping cum office complex)

* Ground to 3^rd Floor centrally

airconditioned with escalators.

* Excellent quality of

construction,

* Interest free payment schedule

linked with construction.

* Excellent investment returns.)"

58. The object of this is nothing more than to create rights in favour of third parties. It is somewhat surprising that the contemners' ingenuity grows by the passage of time. As rightly contended by Mr. Arun Jaitley at the time when the writ petition came to be filed before the High Court, as the High Court had noted in the above extract, the booking for only 870 flats but later it gets increased and today, that figure has swollen to 2,570. As Mr. G. Ramaswamy admits there are agreements entered into even after the order of 29.1.91 as evidenced by the state-ment in sub-paragraph (k) of the additional affidavit extracted above. A curious argument was put forth that by mere entering into agreement no interest is created in the immovable property. Of course, this stems from Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. But, does not the agreement holder have a right to get another document, namely the sale deed? Equally, does he not have a right to enforce the agreement and seek specific performance thereof? It is preposterous came forward to speculative purchase the property and their right is only to refund as per the terms of the agreement. For a moment, we are not on the nature of rights of the unintending purchasers. The question is whether the said clause (iv) of the order dated 29.1.91 has been flouted? This is of a case of a stray act but deliberate repetitive acts by making hard bargains by dubious methods. It is fallacious to contend that because of legal opinion the contemners thought of entering into such agreements, would not amount to inducting any person in the builidng or would not amount to creation of any right in favour of any third party. This is an intentional act to cheat the public with with an evil design. As on 29.1.1991 the construction on the plot has barely commenced and only a part of the basement had been done. No building was in existence. To preclude the answering respondent from in any manner giving away physicla possession of either the plot or the proposed building (yet to come), the order dated 29.1.1991 was passed.

59. It is submitted that the order passed by this Court dated 29.1.1991 was an order restraint against the deponent not to induct any personnel in the building to create any right in favour of any third party in meantime. It is submitted that the purpose of this injunction was to ensure that the deponent did not alienate the building in favour of a third person to relieve himself from the liability to make payment of the dues and vanish from the scene.

60. The above statement in the affida-

vit of the contemner No. 1, in our considered opinion, is a clear attempt to circumvent the order.

61. It is difficult to appreciate as to how the contemners could contend that they were lulled into the belief that they could enter into the agreements as otherwise the DDA would have moved the court by way of contempt proceedings.

62. It is rather strange that as late as 25.11.92 the following letters should be written by the contemners:

"Mrs. Anjana Khosla,

602, Hemkunnt Tower,

6, Rajendra Place,