This appeal by certificate under Article

132 (1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution is from the judgment

of the Gujarat High Court. The certificate was granted on

October 21, 1972, before coming into force of the Constitu-

tion (Thirtieth Amendment) Act, 1972.

Mr. Dave, learned counsel for the appellant, does not

press before us the challenge to the validity of sections 4,

5A and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

We will now state the facts as will appear from the

statement of case filed on behalf of the appellant.

A notification was issued under section 4(1) of the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 (briefly the Act) on June 7, 1966,

intending to acquire a total area of 13900 sq. yds of land

including 474 sq. yds. of the appellant's land in Ward No

11 of Surat City included in City Survey Nos. 2365 and 2366.

We are informed that only the appellant in raising objection

to the. acquisition and the plan has not yet been implement-

ed on account of the pending litigation. The appellant

submitted his objections under section 5A(1) of the Act to

the Collector who gave him a hearing under sub-section (2)

of section 5A. In due course the Collector submitted his

report to the State Government and after consideration of

the same the Government issued a declaration under section 6

on January 15, 1969 that the land was required for the

public purpose noted in the preliminary notification under

section 4.

The appellant in para 3 of the statement of case while

referring to the notification under section 4(1) of the Act

averred as follows :–

"It was stated in the said notice that

the suit lands were likely to be needed for

fire station, workshop and parking purpose of

the Surat Municipality as indicated in Govern-

ment Notification dated 7-6-1966".

In para 4 of the said statement it was averted "that the

appellant contested the notice by raising an objection that

the respondent No. 3–the Corporation–was not in need of

the suit land for the purpose of the fire station, etc."

After the declaration under section 6 of the Act, .as

stated earlier, a notice under section 9 of the Act was

served on the appellant but he did not submit any claims

with regard to compensation under that section. On Septem-

ber 22, 1970, the appellant filed an application under

Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of

Gujarat challenging the aforesaid notifications under the

Act. The High Court by its order of November 30, 1970,

rejected the petition. The High Court, however, by its

order of October 21, 1972, granted certificate under

Article 133(1)(b) and (c) of the Constitution on the ques-

tion of vires of sections 4, 5A and 6 of the Land Acquisi-

tion Act.

Mr. Dave confines his submissions before us only to, the

following points, which we will deal with seriatim:

First, that in spite of the appellant's request for

furnishing a copy of the report under section 5A the Col-

lector did not grant him a copy. He complains that there

was no proper and adequate heating under section 5A(2) of

the Act. According to the learned counsel a proper hearing

would include furnishing of a copy of the report under

section 5A. We are unable to accept this submission. Al-

though, ordinarily, there should be no difficulty in fur-

nishing a copy of the report under section 5A to an objec-

tor, when he asks for! the same, it is not a correct

proposition that bearing under section 5A is invalid because

of failure to furnish a copy of the report at the conclusion

of the hearing under the said section. Unless there are

weighty reasons, a report in public enquiry like this,

should be available to the persons who take part in the

enquiry. But failure' to furnish a copy of the report of

such an enquiry cannot vitiate the enquiry if it is other-

wise not open to any valid objection. Apart from this

solitary ground, our attention has not been drawn to any

infirmity in the hearing under section 5A. We are, there-

fore unable to hold that the said enquiry under section 5A

was invalid.

The matter would have been different if a second enquiry

were essential under the law at the stage when the State

Government was considering the report under section 5A for

issuing its declaration under section 6 of the Act. We

are, however, clearly of opinion that there is no reason to

hold that a second hearing by the State Government at that

stage is necessary under section 6 of the Act,

(See Abdul Husein Tayabali & Ors. v. State of Gujarat &

Ors.(1) Since that is the position in law, failure to fur-

nish a copy, of the report under section 8A is innocuous.

The matter, again, may be different if there is a proper

allegation of mala fide against the Collector or the

State Government. There is no such allegation in this case.

The first submission of the learned counsel is, therefore,

devoid of substance.

The learned counsel next contends that there was con-

siderable delay between the notification under section 4

which was issued on June 7, 1966, and the declaration under

section 6 made on January 13, 1969. Since numerous dags of

land belonging to a number of persons were the subject

matter of acquisition and individual objections had to. be

heard, we do not think that there has been any inordinate

delay in making the notification. Even. the appellant has

not submitted before the High Court a copy of his written

objection nor is the same produced before us to indicate

when his objections were actually filed and whether he was

not also responsible for some delay in the conclusion of the

enquiry. The delay in this case is only about 21/2 years

and, as we have said, there is not even a clear statement of

the responsibility for delay which may be attributable to

the Government. The second submission of the learned coun-

sel is also of no avail.

Mr. Dave lastly submits that the notification under

section 4 did not contain the public purpose as the require-

ment for "fire station". The notification, says counsel,

mentioned station, workshop and parking purpose. He is

able to make this submission from a copy of the notification

in the Paper Book at page 20 (Ex. A). We are, however,

unable to agree with counsel that the notification under

section 4 did not in fact contain the purpose as fire sta-

tion. Even in the statement of case of the appellant which

we have set out earlier, no objection was ever taken against

the so-called vague description of the requirement in the

notification. On the other hand, it was conceded, therein,

that the purpose was fire station, workshop and parking

purpose and the objection was that the appellant's land was

not "suited for the construction of fire station". There

is, therefore, no substance in this submission.

This Court rather liberally grants prayers for dispens-

ing with statement of case when such requests are made by

parties. Indeed, the form in vogue, in which statements of

case are submitted in this Court, has perhaps outlived

its practical utility in hearings before this Court. If

anything, besides being expensive, it causes delay in

making appeals ready for hearing.

We, however, feel, instead of the usual statements of

case by both the parties, a very succinct statement of case

and a list of dates submitted by the appellant alone. with

material facts necessary for deciding the questions of law

together with the findings of fact

(1) [1968] 1 S.C.R. 597.

of the court below and pinpointing the only legal

issues to be raised in this Court will be of advantage in

expeditious disposal of appeals before this Court.

For once, on occasion, we are able to; say that the state-

ment of case in this appeal is of use to us in visiting the

appellant with the forfeiture of his right to make his last

submission with regard to the vagueness or ambiguity of the

purpose mentioned in the notification under section 4 of the

Act.

All the submissions having failed, the appeal is dismissed.

Having regard to the fact that there was a certificate by

the High Court, we will make no order as to costs.

P.H.P.

Appeal dismissed.