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Messrs B. P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick

Messrs B. P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick

LOK Law Journal

LOK 1987 (3) SC 61

Equivalent citations: AIR 1987 SC 1010 : 1987 (1) JT 665 : 1987 (1) RCR 256 : 1987 (1) RentLR 659 : 1987 (1) Scale 537B : 1987 (2) SCC 407 : 1987 (2) SCR 559 : 1987 (2) UJ 1 : 1987 SCC (2) 407 JT 1987 (1) 665

Court
Supreme Court of India
Bench
S. Natrajan, J.; A.P. Sen, J.*; V. Balakrishna Eradi, J.
Decided on
Case No.
Civil Appeal No. 1262 of From the Judgment and order dated 3.4.1978 of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in Appeal from Appellate Decree No. 1700 of 1972
For petitioner / appellant
S.T. Desai and M.L. Verma, for the Appellants.
For respondent
Govind Mukhoty and R.P. Gupta, for the Respondents. M .N. Krishmani and V. Shekar, for the Intervenor.
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Provisions referred

  • Section 17(2), West Bengal Premises Act, 1956

Cases referred 15

  1. Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narain Gupta LOK 1985 (4) SC 181 : [1985] 3 SCC 53 Referred (Para 1)
  2. Ram Murti v. Bhola Nath and Another [1984] 3 SCR 111 Referred (Para 1)
  3. Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash and Anr. LOK 1980 (4) SC 23 : [1980] 3 SCR 325 Referred (Para 1)
  4. Shyamcharan Sharma v. Dharamdas LOK 1979 (12) SC 43 : [1980] 2 SCR 334 Referred (Para 1)
  5. Dy. Custodian v. Offl. Receiver LOK 1964 (9) SC 31 : [1965] 1 SCR 220 Referred (Para 1)
  6. Ram Prasad v. Bishambhar Singh AIR 1946 All 400 Referred (Para 1)
  7. Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India Referred (Para 1)
  8. Govindal Chhagganlal Patel v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee Referred (Para 1)
  9. Division Bench in Barhu Singh & Ors. v. Kharpattu & Ors. Referred (Para 1)
  10. Samheru v. Dharamraj Pandey & Ors. Referred (Para 1)
  11. Khiali Ram v. Nathu Lal Referred (Para 1)
  12. FB), Barhu Singh v. Kharpattu (supra) Referred (Para 1)
  13. Samharu v. Dharamraj Pandey (supra) Referred (Para 1)
  14. Sir Richard Couch, CJ in Narendra Narayan Roy Chowdhary v. Ishan Chandra Sen Referred (Para 1)
  15. Khiali Ram v. Nathu Lal (supra) Referred (Para 1)

Referred in 2

  1. Gaya Prasad Kar v. Subrata Kumar Banerjee LOK 2005 (10) SC 36 Referred (Para 1)
  2. Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal LOK 2003 (1) SC 286 Referred (Para 1)

Judgment

NATARAJAN, J.; SEN, J.

This Appeal by Special Leave is by a tenant and is directed against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in an Appeal against Appellate decree No. 1700 of 1972. The defence of appellant in the suit filed by the first respondent for eviction was struck out and thereafter a decree for eviction was passed and the said decree was confirmed by the Appellate Court and the High Court and hence this Appeal by Special Leave.

During the pendency of the suit the first respondent had entered into an agreement for sale of his building in which the suit property forms the ground floor to one Ramdir Singh Agarwala but subsequently executed a Sale Deed in favour of one Chidanand Halder. Ramdin Singh Agarwala filed a suit for specific performance in the Court of the Sub Judge, Alipore and obtained a decree. The subsequent purchaser Chidanand Halder has filed an appeal against the judgment and decree in the said suit and the appeal is pending disposal before the High Court. Both the parties, claiming to have acquired title to the building of which the suit property forms a part have filed CMP Nos. 19671 and 32297 of 1986 seeking impleadment in this Appeal.

The first respondent who succeeded to the suit property after the death of his father filed a suit against the appellant and its director the second respondent for eject-ment on the ground of default in payment of the monthly rent of Rs. 550 from March 1965 to July 1966. The appellant filed a written statement denying the default in payment of rent and also filed an application under Section 17(2) of the West Bengal Premises Act, 1956 (for short the Act) to seek the orders of the Court regarding the amount of rent payable to the landlord.

During the pendency of the proceedings the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance No. VI of 1967 (later replaced by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Act 30 of 1969) came to be promulgated with effect from 26.8.67. By Section 2 of the Ordinance Sub-Sections (2A) and (2B) to Section 17 of the Act were inserted. Section 5 of the Ordi-nance gave retrospective effect to the amendments by provid-ing that the amendments made by Section 2 of the Ordinance shall have effect in respect of all suits including Appeals which were pending at the date of commencement of the Ordi-nance. The amendments inter alia enabled tenants who were in default to apply to the Court and pay the arrears of rent in instalments and thereby avert their eviction.

To avail the benefit of the amended provisions the appellant preferred an application on 22.9.67 i.e. within one month from the date of promulgation of the Ordinance under Section 17(2A)(b) praying for payment of the arrears of rent in instalments. By Order No. 39 the trial court fixed the amount of arrears payable at Rs. 13,602 and gave directions for the amount being paid in three instalments. As an error was noticed in the calculation of the rent arrears, the appellant filed a review petition and the Court re-fixed the arrears at Rs.9,752 by Order No. 72. Subse-quentiy this order was also revised and eventually the appellant paid the entire arrears of rent in accordance with the directions of the court by 31.7.70. It may be stated here that the payment covered the period ending with 29.2.1968 i.e. upto the end of the month previous to the date on which Order No. 39 was made, viz. 16.3. 1968.

In the meanwhile the first respondent had filed an application under Section 17(3) for striking out the defence of the appellant against the delivery of possession of the demised premises for noncompliance with the terms of Section 17(1). On 14.3.70 the court allowed the said application and struck out the defence of the appellant, on the ground that in paying the rents for the months of September 1968 and March 1969 there had been a delay of 44 days and 6 days respectively and this was in contravention of Section 17(1) of the Act. Thereafter the suit for eviction was decreed and the said decree came to be confirmed by the Appellate Court and the High Court.

The appellant filed an application on 13.6.70 under Section 148 Civil Procedure Code for extension of time for deposit of amount for the months of September 1968 and March 1969 so as to cover the delays that had occurred in the payment of rent for those two months. This application was dismissed by the Trial Court on 30.7.70. It was thereafter the decree for eviction was passed.

Resisting the application under Section 17(3) filed by the first respondent the appellant contended that since he had paid the arrears of rent as per the orders of the Court under Section 17(2A)(b), the first respondent's suit should be dismissed under Section 17(4) of the Act. The Trial Court rejected the contention and held that in view of the default in depositing the rent for the months of September 1968 and March 1969 within time i.e. before the 15th of the next succeeding month, the appellant had contravened Section 17(1) of the Act and therefore, the appellant was not enti-tled to protection under Section 17(4). The High Court went a step further and held that even the application under Section 17(2A)(b) was not maintainable and hence the appel-lant cannot raise a plea that he had paid the arrears of rent within time and as such the Trial Court should have dismissed the suit under Section 17(4). The High Court's reasoning is as under:-

"In our view, the application under section

17(2A)(b) was not also maintainable. It is

true that section 17 (2A)(b) was made applica-

ble to pending suits by the Ordinance. But

such applicability will be subject to the

limitation imposed by sub-section (2B) of

Section 17, namely, that an application under

sub-section (2A)(b) has to be made before the

expiry of the time specified in sub-section

(1) of Section 17 for the deposit or payment

of the amount due on account of default in

payment of rent. Under sub-section (1) of

Section 17 the time specified is one month

from the service of

the writ of summons on the defendant or where

he appears in the suit or proceeding without

the writ of summons being served on him,

within one month of his appearance. In the

instant case, the summons was served on the

defendants on April 6, 1967. The application

under section 17(2A)(b) having been filed on

September 22, 1967, it was barred by limita-

tion ….. In our view, after the expiry of

one month of the service of summons on the

defendants, they had no right to avail them-

selves of the provisions of section 17(2A).

Sub-section (2B) of section 17 having pre-

scribed a time limit for an application under

sub-section (2A), no other period of limita-

tion can be substituted for the purpose of

making an application for instalments. It is

true that the Act is a remedial statute, but

that fact does not give the Court jurisdiction

to alter the period of limitation as pre-

scribed by the statute for the purpose of

giving relief to the tenant. If the legisla-

ture had intended that the tenant in a pending

suit would be entitled to make an application

under section 17(2A) within one month of the

date of promulgation of the Ordinance, it

would have expressly provided for the same as

it has done in other cases covered by section

17B and 17D."

Having regard to the reasons given by the Trial Court and the High Court for striking out the defence of the appellant and the inapplicability of Section 17(4) to the case, two questions fall for consideration, viz. (1) whether the appellant was not entitled to the benefit of Section 17(2A)(b) of the Act since the application under the subsec-tion had not been filed within one month from the date of service of the writ of summons and (2) whether in any even the delayed payment of rent for the months of September 1968 and March 1969 necessarily warranted the striking out of the defence. Mr. S.T. Desai, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the decisions rendered by the trial court and the High Court are clearly unsustainable. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the first respondent argued that the trial court and the High Court had acted perfectly in ac-cordance with law.

Taking up the first question for consideration we find that the High Court has committed an error in failing to notice the overriding effect of Section 17(2A) and Section 5 of the Ordinance. Section 17(2A) begins with the words "Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) on the application of the tenant, the Court may, by order" and then sets out sub-sections (a), (b) and the Proviso. Then comes the all important Section 5 of the Ordinance which is in the following terms:-

"5. Retrospective effect.–The amendments made

by section 2 shall have effect in respect of

all suits including appeals which are pending

at the date of commencement of this Ordi-

nance".

(Emphasis supplied. )

Since the Ordinance came to be replaced long after by the Act, Section 5 of the Ordinance was not reproduced in the Act because it had served its purpose. What is, however, of significance is that Section 5 of the Ordinance entitled the appellant to file an application under Section 17(2A)(b), in the suit filed by the first respondent which was pending then. Unfortunately, the High Court has looked only into the Act and not the Ordinance and that is how Section 5 of the Ordinance has escaped its notice. When Section 17(2A) and Section 5 of the Ordinance are read con jointly it may be seen that it was the intention of the legislature to extend the benefit of sub-section (2A) to all pending suits and appeals irrespective of the fact whether the time limit of one month prescribed under Section 17(1) had expired or not. No other construction is possible be-cause any other construction would have the effect of ren-dering otiose Section 5 of the Ordinance. It is a well-known rule of interpretation of law that remedial amendments have to be liberally construed so as not to deny its efficacy and it is the duty of the courts to avoid a conflict between two sections. In Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India, AIR S.C. 1971 530 at 576 this Court has held as follows:

"The Court will interpret a statute as far as

possible, agreeably to justice and reason and

that in case of two or more interpretations,

one which is more reasonable and just will be

adopted, for there is always a presumption

against the law-maker intending injustice and

unreason …. A provision in a statute will

not be construed to defeat its mainfest pur-

pose and general values which animate its

structure."

In Dy. Custodian v. Offl. Receiver, [1965] 1 SCR 220 at 225 it was held as follows:-

"If it appears that the obvious aim and object

of the statutory provisions would be frustrat-

ed by accepting the literal construction

suggested by the respondent, then it may be

open to the court to enquire whether an alter-

native construction which would serve the

purpose of achieving the aim and object of the

Act, is reasonably possible."

It was the intention of the Legislature to restrict the benefits given under Section 17(2A) to only those tenants against whom suits had been filed within one month prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance, there was no necessity to give retrospectivity to subsection (2A) under Section 5 of the Ordinance. It has, therefore, to be held that all ten-ants against whom suits or appeals were pending on the date of the promulgation of the Ordinance were entitled to seek the benefit of Section 17(2A) by filing an application within one month from the date of promulgation of the Ordi-nance. The High Court was, therefore, in error in holding that the application under Section 17(2A)(b) was itself not maintainable. If the High Court's view is to be accepted it would then amount to asking the appellant to perform the impossible i.e. asking the appellant to file an application under Section 17(2A)(b) which came into force on 26.8.67 within one month from 6.4.67 when the suit summons was served. Therefore the first question has to be answered in favour of the appellant. The resultant position would then be that in so far as the payment of arrears for the period ending 29.2.68 is concerned, the appellant had complied with the orders of the Court under Section 17(2A)(b) and was therefore entitled to claim the benefit of Section 17(4).

The second question now remains for consideration. The trial court and the High Court have taken the view that the delayed payment of rent for the months of September 1968 and March 1969 attracted the striking out of the defence under Section 17(3) of the Act. Sub-sections (3) and (4) are worded as under:-

"(3) If a tenant fails to deposit, or pay any

amount referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-

section (2) within the time specified therein

or within such extended time as may be allowed

under clause (a) of sub-section (2A), or fails

to deposit or pay any instalment permitted

under clause (b) of sub-section (2A) within

the time fixed therefore, the Court shall

order the defence against delivery of posses-

sion to be struck out and shall proceed with

the hearing of the suit;

(4) If a tenant makes deposit or

payment as required by sub-section (1), sub-

section (2), or sub-section (2A) no decree or

order for delivery of possession of the prem-

ises

to the landlord on the ground of default in

payment of rent by the tenant shall be made by

the Court but the Court may allow such costs

as it may deem fit to the landlord:

Provided that a tenant shall not be

entitled to any relief under this sub-section

if, having obtained such relief once in re-

spect of the premises, he has again made

default in the payment of rent for four months

within a period of twelve months."

Perhaps on a rigid construction of sub-section (3) without reference to sub-section (4) it may be said that the failure to pay the rent for the months of September 1968 and March 1969 by the 15th of the next succeeding month may afford ground for striking out the defence of the appellant. But then sub-section (3) has to be read and understood with reference to sub-section (4) also and in particular its Proviso. Sub-section (4) lays down that when a tenant makes payments as required by sub-sections (1), (2) or (2A) no decree or order for delivery of possession shall be made on the ground of default in payment of rent by the tenant. The Proviso sets out that a tenant who has obtained relief under sub-section (4) is not entitled to seek relief once again under the sub-section if he has again made default in the payment of rent for 4 months within a period of 12 months. (Emphasis supplied. ) The Proviso, therefore, makes it clear that if the subsequent default is for a period less than 4 moths within a period of 12 months the tenant can claim relief under the sub-section once again. In this case the previous arrears related to the period ending with 29.2.1968 and those arrears had been paid in compliance of the Court's order. The appellant was, therefore, entitled to ask for the dismissal of the suit. In so far as the subsequent default is concerned, it is well within the limitations prescribed by the proviso to sub-section (4). The default is only for two months and that too in a period of 13 months. The appel-lant will, therefore, be entitled to the protection of the proviso. The trial court and the appellate court have failed to notice this aspect of the matter.

Even if the proviso is viewed in a limited sense as being attracted only to those cases where there has been full and complete compliance with the provisions of sub-section (1) or (2) or (2A) of Section 17 and will not apply to a case as the one on hand, the appellant cannot be denied relief because the words "shall order the defence against delivery of possession to be struck out" occurring in Sec-tion 17(3) have to be construed as a directory provision and not a mandatory provision as the word "shall" has to be read as "may". Such a canon of construction is warranted because otherwise the intendment of the Legislature will be defeated and the class of tenants for whom the beneficial provisions were made by the Ordi-nance and the amending Act will stand deprived of them. We may only refer to two decisions of this Court on this aspect of the matter. In Govindal Chhagganlal Patel v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Godhra, [1976] 1 SCR 451: [1975] 2 SCC 482, Chandrachud, C.J. speaking for the Court approved the following passage in Crawford on 'Statutory Construc-tion' (Ed. 1940, Art. 261, p. 516): (SCC p. 487, para 13)

"The question as to whether a statute is

mandatory or directory depends upon the intent

of the legislature and not upon the language

in which the intent is clothed. The meaning

and intention of the legislature must govern,

and these are to be ascertained, not only from

the phraseology of the provision, but also

while considering its nature, its design, and

the consequence which would follow construing

it the one way or the other."

In Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narain Gupta, [1985] 3 SCC 53 this Court, dealing with a similar provision for striking out of defence in Section 11A of the Bihar Build-ings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 referred to Govindlal Chhagganlal Patel's case (supra), and held as follows:-

"Applying this well-recognised canon of construction the conclusion is inescapable that the word 'shall' used in the provision is directory and not mandatory and must be read as 'may'."

Once the word "shall" used in Section 17(3) is read as "may" and consequently the provision for striking out of the defence is to be read as directory and not mandatory then it follows that the Court is vested with discretion to order either striking out of the defence or not depending upon the circumstances of the case and the interests of justice. This Court has consistently taken the view that if the Court' has the discretion not to strike out the defence of the tenant committing default in payment or deposit of rent as required by a provision in any Rent Restriction Act, then the Court surely has the further discretion to condone the default and extend the time for payment or deposit and such a discretion is necessary implication of the discretion not to strike out the defence. We may only refer in this connection, to three earlier decisions of this Court. Shyamcharan Sharma v. Dharamdas, [1980] 2 SCR 334 is a case which arose under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash and Anr., [1980] 3 SCR 325 and Ram Murti v. Bhola Nath and Another, [1984] 3 SCR 111 were cases which arose under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The Rent Control Act of Madhya Pradesh as well as the Rent Control Act of Delhi provided that if a tenant failed to make payment or deposit as required by the Section the Controller may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and proceed with the hearing of the application. In all these cases it has been uniformly held that the powers of discretion vested in the Rent Controller give him further right to condone the delay in deposit or payment of rent for the subsequent months.

In this case the default was not one of non-payment of the arrears or the rent for the subsequent period. The default pertained to belated payments of rent for two months and was, therefore, a default in the technical sense than in the real sense and hence of an inconsequential nature. Having regard to the intendment of the Act and the nature of the provisions it can never be said that the defaults were of such a serious nature' as to warrant the court refusing to exercise its discretion and to feel constrained to strike out the defence. Such being the case the answer to the second question has also to be in favour of the appellant. The subordinate courts and the High Court were in error in holding that the delayed payment of rent for the months of September 1968 and March 1969 constituted such defaults as necessarily warranted the striking out of the defence under Section 17.

In the light of our conclusions the appeal succeeds and will accordingly stand allowed. The suit filed by the first respondent will stand dismissed.

In so far as the petitions for impleadment are con-cerned, though we heard the arguments of the counsel for the parties, we do not think their presence is necessary in the appeal and hence both the petitions are dismissed. The parties will pay and bear the respective costs. A.P.J. Appeal allowed and Petitions dismissed.

SEN, J.

The short question involved in this' appeal on certificate is whether a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court was right in following the decision of an earlier Division Bench in Barhu Singh & Ors. v. Kharpattu & Ors., [1956] All LJ 87, which was later reiterated in Samheru v. Dharamraj Pandey & Ors., [1969] All LJ 943 (FB), that a usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding was not valid as a mortgage with all its incidents and subject to the provisions of law relating to usufructuary mortgages, but was valid only to the limited extent that the mortgagee was entitled only to retain possession of the land mortgaged till there was repayment of the mortgage debt.

The question arose in proceedings in a suit under s.202 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1951 for possession on payment of the mortgage money brought by respondent No. 1 Bansi claiming himself to be an heir of the original mortgagors Sheo Balak and Ram Phal, on the ground that the appellants who were the successors-in-interest of the original mortgagee Bhairo Singh, had become asamis and therefore liable to ejectment under s.21(1)(d) of the Act. The suit was resisted by the appellants on the ground inter alia that the usufructuary mortgage deed dated July 21, 1869 having been executed when the Recovery of Rents (Bengal) Act, 1859 was in force, was a valid one and therefore the fight of redemption stood extinguished in the year 1929 as a result of which the mortgagors Sheo Balak and Ram Phal, the predecessors-in-interest of the respondents lost all their right, title and interest in the land and thus the appellants could not be treated as asamis liable to ejectment under s.21(1)(d) of the Act but had indeed become sirdars. That defence of theirs weighed with the Judicial Officer, Varanasi who by his judgment dated May 11, 1960 dismissed the plaintiffs suit. On appeal by the respondents, the Additional Commis-sioner, Varanasi Division, Varanasi by his judgment dated October 10, 1960 decreed the plaintiff's suit holding that the usufructuary mortgage of occupancy rights was valid only in a qualified sense in that the appellants were entitled to retain possession until the mortgage debt was paid. The learned Additional Commissioner observed that no tenancy law fight from the Recovery of Rents (Bengal) Act, 1859 to U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 ever made the occupancy fights transfera-ble. The appellants preferred an appeal to the Board of Revenue but Shri S.N. Mitra, ICS, Judicial Member, Board of Revenue by his judgment and order dated April 25, 1963 dismissed the appeal. The appellants moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution but a learned Single Judge by his judgment dated February 28, 1966 dismissed the writ petition and upheld the order of the Board of Revenue. On appeal, a Division Bench following the decisions in Khiali Ram v. Nathu Lal, ILR (1893) 15 All 219 (FB), Barhu Singh v. Kharpattu (supra) and Samharu v. Dharamraj Pandey (supra) held that the transaction of the present kind was not a mortgage properly so-called but yet was a mortgage within the meaning of s.21(1)(d) of the Act.

Shri Juneja, learned counsel for the appellants, who are successors-in-interest of the original mortgagee Bhairo Singh strenuously assails the correctness of that view and contends that both the Board of Revenue as well as the High Court failed to appreciate that the usufructuary mortgage of the occupancy holding in question was executed by Sheo Balak and Ram Phal, the predecessors-in-interest of the respond-ents, on Asadh Sudi 12 Samvat 1925, corresponding to July 21, 1860 i.e. at a time when the Recovery of Rents (Bengal) Act, 1859 was in force. He presses into service certain observations of Sir Richard Couch, CJ in Narendra Narayan Roy Chowdhary v. Ishan Chandra Sen, [1974] 13 Bengal LR 278 for the submission that a usufructuary mortgage was valid under s.6 of that Act. We find it difficult to accept the contention.

We find that it has been the consistent view of the Allaha-bad High Court that a usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding was not valid as a mortgage with all its incidents and subject to the provisions of law relating to usufructu-ary mortgage but was valid only in a qualified sense i.e. in the sense of subletting with a covenant that the mortgagor will not be entitled to recover possession without payment of the mortgage money, and further that under such a mort-gage there is no transfer of the right of an occupancy tenant and consequently no suit for redemption was maintain-able nor was there any extinguishment of the right of an occupancy tenant upon the expiry of the period of limitation fixed for redemption under Art. 148 of the Limitation Act, 1908. There is a long catena of decisions dealing with the question starting from Khiali Ram v. Nathu Lal (supra) down to Samharu v. Dharamraj Pandey (supra). It follows that it has been the settled law as administered in the then United Provinces that a usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding was invalid and there was no transer of an interest by the occupancy tenant and the mortgage acquired no other right other than the right to retain possession and fall back upon the stipulation in the so-called mortgage bond till his money was paid. As pointed out in the Full Bench decision in Samharu v. Dharamraj Pandey (supra), the view that a usufructuary mortgage by an occupancy tenant was not valid in the eye of law has been accepted by the Legislature in cl.(d) of s.21(1) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, 195 1. The matter stands concluded by the doctrine of stare decisis. If we were to subscribe to the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appel-lants, it would imply not only unsettling the law which has stood the test time for over 100 years but have the effect of reopening transactions past and closed and unsettling titles all over the State.

We also find no substance in the contention advanced. There is nothing in s.6 of the Recovery of Rents (Bengal) Act to suggest that a usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding like the transaction in question was permissible. Sir Richard Couch, CJ in the course of his judgment in Narendra Narayan Roy Chowdhary's case has referred to s.6 of that Act which, in terms, made the holding of an occupancy tenant a non-transferable tenure. After referring to the provision contained in s.6 which provided for conferral of occupancy rights on a ryot who was in cultivating possession of his land for a period of 12 years, the learned Chief Justice unequivocally stated that the occupancy rights were not transferable:

"The ordinary construction of the word appears to me to be, that the right is only to be in the person who has occupied for 12 years, and it was not intended to give any right of property which could be transferred." After holding that the right of occupancy tenant was not transferable under s.6 of the Act, the learned Chief Justice went on to observe that in case of such a transfer, the tenant would be deemed to have abandoned the holding and therefore the right of an occupancy tenant cannot be set up by the purchaser in defence to a suit for ejectment by the zamindar:

"Now, if a ryot having a right of occupancy

endeavours to transfer it to another person,

and, in fact, quits his occupation, and ceases

himself to cultivate or hold the land, it

appears to me that he may be rightly consid-

ered to have abandoned his right, and that

nothing is left in him which would prevent the

zamindar from recovering the possession from

the person who claims under the transfer."

That very eminent Judge explained this in another way:

"(I)f the right which is given by the law is

one which exists only so long as he holds or

cultivates the land, when he ceases to do

that, by selling his supposed right and put-

ting another in his place, his fight is gone

and cannot stand in the way of the landlord's

recovering possession."

We fail to appreciate how these observations can be of any avail to the appellants. The view expressed by Couch, CJ that the right of an occupancy tenant under s.6 of the Recovery of Rents (Bengal) Act does not lay down any con-trary principle. As to the question of abandonment, the relationship of the parties was regulated by the stipula-tions contained in the mortgage bond and under the terms the appellants were entitled to retain possession till the mortgage debt was paid of. we wish to point out that under the U.P. Debt Redemption Act, 1940 all usufructuary mort-gages became self-liquidating mortgages. As held by the High Court in Ram Prasad v. Bishambhar Singh, AIR 1946 All 400, the mortgage money would be deemed to have been paid off. For these reasons, the appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs.

N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.

?601

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