Mohammad Serajuddin v. R. C. Misra

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 158 of 1960.

Appeal from the judgment and order dated July 1, 1960, of the Calcutta High Court in Cr. Revision No. 500 of 1960.

N. C. Chatterjee and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant.

N. S. Bindra and T. M. Sen, for the respondent.

1961. November 24. The Judgment of the Court was deliered by

HIDAYATULLAH, J.-This appeal is by certificate under Art. 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution granted by the High Court of Calcutta against its judgment and other dated July 1, 1960. The appellant, Mohammad Serajuddin is the managing partner of Messrs. Serajuddin and Co., of No. 19A, British Indian Street and of p-16, Bentick Street, Calcutta. The said firm carries on business as exporters of mineral ores, and also possesses some mines. The business of the appellant involved the export of manganese ore. Till April, 1948, there was no export duty on manganese ore. On April 19, 1948, export duty at ad valorem rates was imposed on manganese ore. This was withdrawn in August, 1954, but was re-imposed in September, 1956 and was withdrawn again in November, 1958. During this period, the appellant exported manganese ore, among other mineral ores.

On November 28, 1959, an application was made under s. 172 of the Sea Customs Act to the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta requesting that warrants be issued to search the two premises already mentioned, on the allegation that documents relating to and connected with "illegal exportation of dutiable goods which were actually exported in contravention of the Sea Customs Act" were secreted in the above premises. The Chief Presidency Magistrate issued two warrants returnable on December 5, 1959. Subsequently, time for return was extended to December 15, 1959. It appears that the search was carried with somewhat undue zest, and the Chief Presidency Magistrate, on December 12, 1959, limited the search to documents relating to manganese ore and also fixed the time of the day during which the search could be made. Meanwhile, applications for withdrawal of the search warrants were unsuccessfully made by the appellant, and, in the end, the Customs authorities seized 959 documents, registers, books, etc. The Customs authorities wished to retain these documents in their own custody for the purpose of scrutiny, and on December 15, 1959, an application was made to obtain this permission. On the same day, the appellant also applied for return of documents unconnected with the export of manganese ore and for retention of the remaining documents in the, custody of the Court. The Chief Presidency Magistrate passed an order the same day that the documents would be kept in the custody of the Court and the Customs authorities would be given facilities to inspect them in the Court premises. This inspection commenced on December 17, 1959.

We may now pass over applications made by the appellant for the return of documents unconnected with manganese ore and by the Customs authorities for extension of time and for handing over all the documents to them. Suffice it to say that the Magistrate declined both the requests, and extended time for inspection till April 9, 1960. On February 6, 1960, the Customs authorities filed a last application for getting custody of the documents and for certain facilities for proper inspection in secrecy, if the inspection was to be done in the Court premises. This application was summarily dismissed by the Magistrate the same day.

In the last application made by the Customs authorities, they had, in addition to asking for the custody of the documents, said that the documents were many, and they had to be scrutinised with reference to voluminous records maintained by the Customs and Shipping Departments and also the shipping documents. They also said that certain witnesses and informers had to be questioned, and that it was not possible to complete the work within reasonable time, if the inspection had to be carried on, not only during Court hours but in the presence of the representatives of the appellant. They had, in the alternative, asked for a separate room where the scrutiny and discussions between the Customs Officers could take place in privacy and for facilities for inspection of the records even after Court hours, because during the day, the staff at their disposal was limited. Both these matters, of courses were disposed of summarily; but the learned Magistrate had, in his earlier orders, said that he could give them only such room as he could spare, since he had not unlimited accommodation at his disposal. The Magistrate also observed that he was, in no event, allowing the Customs authorities to take the documents away, which had been seized as a result of warrants issued by him. He claimed that the documents belonged to him, and could be inspected only as, when and where he ordered.

Against the order of the Magistrate, an application for revision was filed by the Customs authorities in the Calcutta High Court. According to the practice of that High Court, the Chief Presidency Magistrate was also called upon to show cause against the application. He showed cause on the same lines. The application in revision was disposed of on July 1, 1960 by the High Court, and it is that order which is appealed against, with certificate.

The High Court, in its order, observed that the Chief Presidency Magistrate had "placed real difficulties in their way of speedily and properly finishing the task of scrutinising the documents" that due consideration was not given by the Chief Presidency Magistrate to this expect of the case, and holding that the Customs authorities under the law were entitled to the custody of the documents seized, ordered that all the documents (bar 63 documents) should at once be handed over to the Customs authorities, with an imperative direction to complete the scrutiny of the documents within three months from the date the order of the High Court reached the Chief Presidency Magistrate.

In this appeal, two questions arise. The first is whether the Customs authorities are entitled to the custody of records seized by them under a search warrant issued under s.172 of the Sea Customs Act, and the Magistrate cannot deny them the right to carry away the documents for their scrutiny. If the answer to this question is in the negative, a second question arises whether the order of the Chief Presidency Magistrate gave inadequate facilities to the Customs authorities for inspection and scrutiny of the documents.

We shall deal with the question of law first. The Customs authorities claim that the documents seized by them can be retained by them for performing their statutory duties. They say that there is no difference between contraband goods and documents relating to contraband goods, and the same procedure should apply. when goods are seized without a warrent, the Customs authorities are not required under the Act to make them over to a Magistrate; when documents or goods are seized on a warrant, they can only enter the premises for effecting a search, armed with the warrant of a Magistrate. According to the Customs authorities, once a Magistrate has issued a warrant, his connection with the search comes to an end, and whatever is seized as a result of the search is to be disposed of by the Customs authorities in the discharge of their duties to adjudicate whether any contraband goods have been brought into the country against the Customs law. It is contended that just as the goods seized by them under the Act are not required to be produced before a Magistrate, so also documents seized under a warrant from a Magistrate need not be produced before him. They concede, however, that a Magistrate has jurisdiction over his warrant, which he can withdraw, annul or modify.

It appears that, in the Calcutta high Court, there is a conflict of opinion on this point, which arises on two exprects of s. 172 of the Sea Customs Act. That section reads:

"Any Magistrate may, on application by a

Customs collector, stating his belief that

dutiable or prohibited goods or any documents

relating to such goods are secreted in any

place within the local limits of the

jurisdiction such Magistrate, issue a warrant

to search for such goods or documents.

Such warrant shall be executed in the

same way, and shall have the same effect, as

a search-warrant issued under the law

relating to Criminal Procedure."

In an unreported case of the Calcutta High Court, Calcutta Motor & Cycle Co. v. Collector of Customs (1), Debabrata Mookerjee, J., has held that search warrants must be issued, when the Customs Officer states his belief etc., and the Magistrate is not required to form his own opinion. He has further held that warrants issued under s. 172 are not impressed with all the characteristics and features of a warrant under s. 96 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and that the form of the warrant prescribed under the Code can be suitably changed under s. 555 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Unfortunately, the judgment of Mookerjee, J., was not produced before us, and the above is a summarry made in the judgment under appeal.

The matter also came before the High Court in two other cases, and the judgments can be read in some unauthorised reports. In Calcutta Motor Cycle Co. v. Collector of Customs (2), Sinha, J., dealt with the matter under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The view of Sinha, J., was upheld by the Division Bench in Collector of Customs v. Calcutta Motor & Cycle Co. (1). It is held in that case that a general seach warrant without specifying the goods or documents is a good warrant, and that the warrant for search implies the power to seize goods and documents. Sinha, J. also observes obiter that the goods or documents seized as a result of the search need not be produced before the Magistrate, and may be retained by the Customs authorities, and, further, that the warrant should be suitably amended enable the Customs authorities not only to search for goods or documents but also to seize them. In S. K. Sribastava v. Gananand (2), Sen, J., dissent from the observations of Sinha, J., and holds that when goods or documents are seized in execution of a search warrant, the ultimate disposal of the books and papers must be unde the Magistrate's order, and that there is nothing in the Sea Customsd Act to show that the Customs-collector is the final authority to dispose of the papers and books. he also does not accept the contention that, as there is no pending proceeding in the Court, the production of the goods and documents seized is not necessary before the Court. He further holds that the Magistrate has the power to insist that the inspection shall be completed within a reasonable time, and papers and books not required for the purpose of the case are returned promptly to the party. At p. 1078, the learned Judge observes:

"After seizure by the police in

execution of the search warrant, the goods

and documents must normally be produced

before the court issuing the search warrant.

That is implied by the issue of a search

warrant by a Magistrate for search of a place

within his jurisdiction and is expressly

provided for in the prescribed forms for

search warrant under sections 96 and 98 of

the Code."

In the judgment under appeal, the view expressed by Sinha, J., has been preferr-ed. The learned Judge has referred to the language of s. 172, and has contrasted it with the language of s. 96 of the Code. He observes that the words "wherein the court has reason to believe" do not occur in s. 172 of the Sea Customs Act, and the Magistrate, therefore, has no discretion but to issue the search warrant in spite of the words "may issue" in that section. He however, goes on to say that the magistrate, in issuing the search warrant, acts judicially, and may examine whether the belief is really entertained by the Customs Officer or not, or whether there is any mala fide action. Except for these two matters, the magistrate has no other discretion. Once the documents have been seized, the second paragraph of s. 172 begins to operate, and the magistrate's responsibility is at an end. He agrees with Debrabata Mookerjee, J., that all the provisions of the Code do not apply, and after seizure, the action of the Customs authorities is independent and uncontrolled by the Code. He, however, concedes that "the ultimate responsibility" of the Magistrate and his "overall control" still remain. But he states that "the immediate control" must remain with the Customs authorities, who need not produce the documents before the Magistrate, because seizure would be meaningless, if they did not have the power to scrutinise and inspect the documents in their own way.

The pendency of a proceeding before a magistrate as a condition precedent to the issue of a warrant is no longer a matter for consideration, after the decision of the Privy Council in Clarke v. Brojendra Kishore Roy Choudhury (1). A Magistrate thus has jurisdiction the moment an application for warrant is made before him, and proceedings on that application can be said to have started under the Code. Section 172 of the Sea Customs Act by its second paragraph brings into operation the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, and, therefore, the Magistrate's jurisdiction is both under s. 172 of the Sea Customs Act and the Criminal Procedure Code. There can be no doubt also that unlike s. 96, the magistrate is to be guided by the belief on the on the Customs authorities, though he may prevent undue harassment in cases, where it can be seen that the belief is not entertained by the Customs officer or his action is mala fide. The Magistrate is certainly entitled to satisfy himself about the belief of the Customs Officer, himself about the belief of the Customs Officer, but is not required to make up his own mind independently of that belief. To this extent only is the matter in the control of the Magistrate, before he issues the warrant. After the warrant' is issued, it is an order of the Magistrate enabling the Customs athorities to take action, for without warrant, they cannot enter any house or premises. The warrant of the Magistrate, so to speak, opens the door for entry into a house or premises, and the authority to do so is based upon the Magistrate's order. The forms prescribed under the Code require that articles seized as a result of the warrant should be brought into Court, and a Magistrate, who issues a search warrant, is entitled to see that his warrant is not abused, and has been properly executed. In a suitable case, of course, a Magistrate may amend the warrant dispensing with the production of the goods or documents before him. That, however, would be in a clear case only; but if the Magistrate so desires, he need not amend the form, and may keep the control of the goods or documents in himself. This he may find necessary to do, so that the warrant issued by him is not abused or made the instrument of harassment. A condition, therefore, in the warrant that the goods or documents should be produced before the Magistrate must be complied with, and once the goods or documents have been produced before the Magistrate, it is for him to decide, in the circumstances of each case, whether he would make them over to the Customs authorities or not. Where the Customs authorities have been somewhat indiscriminate in their seizure, the Magistrate may find it necessary to have the goods or documents serutinised under his control, so that goods or documents not really subject to the Sea Customs Act are not retained for an unduly long period.

The words "ultimate responsibility" and "overall control" used in the judgment under appeal would mean nothing, if they did not imply the power of the Magistrate, to which we have referred. If they mean anything, they mean the power of the Magistrate to see that his own warrant is not used in a manner which he did not contemplate. The second paragraph of s. 172 of the Sea Customs Act, which applies the Criminal Procedure Code, says that the warrant shall be executed in the same way and shall have the same effect as a search warrant issued under the Criminal Procedure Code. The execution of a warrant is one thing, and its effect is another. In talking of the effect, s. 172 of the Sea Customs Act intends to apply not only the Criminal Procedure Code but also the forms prescribed, and if the form says that the goods or documents should be produced before the Magistrate to be dealt with under his direction, then that effect necessarily flows from the words of that section. In our opinion, the view expressed by Sen, J., is correct.

In view of what we have said above, it is clear that the Magistrate's order that the 959 documents, which were seized, should remain in his custody and be scrutinised in his Court, was also correct. No doubt, the documents seized are many, and a still more voluminous record will have to be gone into, to find out the relevance of the documents seized. But that is a matter of detail bearing upon the scrutiny and insepection of the seized documents and not upon their custody. If difficulties arise, (and they must have), they are capable of being removed by a judicious action on the part of the Magistrate and collaboration the part of the Customs authorities. This is a matter of expediency rather than of law. In our opinion, though the learned Magistrate was legally right in retaining control over the documents seized, he was unduly narrow in his view in affording facilities for inspection and scrutiny. Perhaps, his action was some what justified, if one looks only at the inordinate delay and the leisureliness with which the inspection was being made. But Magistrates, even though they may desire expedition, must not frustrate other departments of Government in discharging their legitimate duties under the Act.

On this part of the case, learned counsel for the Costoms authorities was very frank and accommodating. He said that the Customs authorities are not keen on the custody of the documents but only on their proper inspection in privacy, because they have to bring in various documents for comparison and have to examine witnesses and informers. He said that if a separate room in the Court premises were given to the Customs authorities, and they were allowed to have inspection even after Court hours, they would be able to complete the inspection within three to four months time. The difficulties of the Customs anthorities are also many. Their supervisory staff has to deal not only with this case but many others, and in view of the volume of records which they have to go through in connection with this case, it is obvious enough that time would be needed.

In our opinion, we must discharge the order of the learned Judge that the documents be handed over to the Customs authorities. The Magistrate is right in keeping these documents in his immedi-ate custody; but we must direct that due facilities for inspection should be afforded to the Customs authorities in the shape of a separate room and suitable furuiture and time extended beyond the ordinary Court hours. Inspection should be carried on in the presence of a Court official, and adequate privacy for questioning witnesses etc., should be afforded to the Customs authorities, whenever they find it necessary. In our opinion, if these facilities are granted-and we direct that they be granted-a period of four months from the date this order reaches the Magistrate should prove enough. We, therefore, set aside the order for the handing over of the documents to the Customs authorities, and make a direction for the disposal of the records, as stated above. We may add that this order does not apply to the 63 documents, which the Customs authorities have already agreed to return to the party.

Appeal allowed.

GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.

Civil Appeals Nos. 459 and 460 of 1960 are cross appeals and they arise out of an award pronounced by the Industrial Tribunal, Assam, in an industrial dispute referred by the Assam Government for its adjudication. This industrial dispute was raised against the management of the Tocklai Experimental Station (hereafter called the Station) by its workmen. Six out of the demands made by the workmen formed the subject matter of reference. In the present appeals we are concerned with three of them. Demand No. 1 (a) was that the employees' junior staff of the Station should be given pension in lieu of the existing practice of paying gratuity. This demand has been rejected be the tribunal. The other demand made by the employees was No. 3(b) and it had reference to the claim for free housing accommodation or adequate allowance in lieu thereof. This demand has been partially allowed by the tribunal and it has directed that house allowance in each case shall be raised at the flat rate of Rs. 20/- instead of Rs. 101/-. The decision of the tribunal in respect of these two demands did not satisfy the workmen and so by special leave of this Court they have filed Civil Appeal No. 460 of 1960. The demand of the junior staff for bonus which was resisted by the Station has been partially allowed by the tribunal. It has ordered that the Station shall give punja bonus at the same rate as the employees working for the Indian Tea Association at Calcutta are getting. This part of the award is challenged by the Station in its appeal by special leave by Civil Appeal No. 459 of 1960. That is how the two cross-appeals arise.

We will deal first with the Station's Appeal in respect of bonus. The learned Attorney-General contends that in making the demand for bonus the workmen have entirely misconceived the true position of the industrial law on the point, and he argues that the Assam Government was not justified in making the reference in the form it has been made and the tribunal was not justified in making the award in the manner it has done. The workmen made their demand for bonus in these words: "The Union requests the introduction of bonus for the Tocklai Staff on the following grounds". Then follow six grounds. It was urged that the Station is an arm of the tea industry and is maintained by the members of the I.T.A. who give bonus to their employees, that the Station exists and works for the advancement of the tea industry and increasing its profits and thus is an industry, that the I.T.A. employees at Calcutta office are given bonus, that the employees of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce receive bonus, that the employees of Shamshernagar and Tulsipara branches of this very Station used to be given bonus so long as these branches were functioning and that the personnel of the scientific research laboratories attached to many industrial concerns receive bonus, and so the workmen in the present case were entitled to make a claim in that behalf. In appreciating this claim it is necessary to state that the Station is a research institution established by the Indian Tea Association to make research for the purpose of improving the quality of tea and its production and the said Station is managed by the parent Association and is maintained by means of voluntary subscriptions from members of the said Association. Broadly stated the ground on which the workmen claimed bonus was that the employees of the Association were receiving bonus and that the personnel of scientific research laboratories similarly situated in other industrial concerns were also given bonus.

When the Assam Government made the present reference it included within the scope of the reference this claim of bonus along with the other claims made by the workmen. The issue referred for adjudication on this point was thus framed:

"2(a). Whether the demand of the

employees (Junior Staff) for bonus is

justified ? If so, at what rate should the

same be paid ?"

The tribunal considered this demand and partially allowed it by directing that the workmen should be paid puja bonus at the same rate as the employees working in the I.T.A. at Calcutta are getting. In dealing with this question the tribunal has held that the Station is an industry within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act and so it could not resist the demand made by its workmen on the ground that it is an academic body devoted to research and as such outside the purview of the Act. This position is not disputed before us by the Station because it is concluded by a decision of this Court in The Ahmedabad Textile Industry's Research Association v. The State of Bombay (1). The tribunal has, however, found in favour of the Station that it would be inexpedient, if not impossible, to apply the formula which governs the decision of industrial claims for the payment of bonus. "There are obvious difficulties", says the tribunal, "in applying the formula laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court to an experimental station run by the Association"; but it added that "it could not be overlooked that payment of bonus to members of the experimental staff is being made by some companies". Then the tribunal referred to some instances where bonus is paid to workmen who, in the opinion of the tribunal, were similarly situated, and it came to the conclusion that refusing the workmen's claim for bonus against the Station would amount to discrimination. The tribunal then took into account the fact that what is described as puja bonus is paid to members of the staff of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce because it was admitted before it that the junior staff of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce which presumably was also serving the I.T.A. at Calcutta was receiving a fixed annual gratuity characterised as puja bonus. The tribunal conceded that the claim for this kind of bonus "may not directly satisfy the requirements of law", but it added that "the fact that what was described as puja bonus was given at the sub-stations and is also given to the clerical staff working at the I.T.A. at Calcutta, supports the demand to this extent at least that the same treatment may be meted out to them." It is on this reasoning that the tribunal ultimately made the award in favour of the workmen directing the Station to pay puja bonus to its employees.

It would be noticed that the demand originally made by the workmen appears to be in the nature of a demand for bonus which is usually described as industrial profit bonus the payment of which is governed by the application of the well known formula. Such a demand is invariably made, and has to be made, by reference to a particular year because the formula which determines claims for profit bonus postulates the examination of the available surplus in the hands of the employer from which bonus may be directed to be paid to the employees. A claim for profit bonus cannot be validly made unless a specific year for which the claim is made is indicated and it is alleged that there is available surplus in the hands of the employer during that year. It is unfortunate that this elementary aspect was overlooked by the workmen when they made the claim and has not been noticed even by the Assam Government when it made the reference in respect of this claim. This serious infirmity in the claim is present even in the award made by the tribunal because the award does not say for what year the bonus should be paid, and like the claim made by the workmen in very general terms for the introduction of bonus the award also seems to make a direction in similar terms for the payment of bonus. In our opinion, this is a patent infirmity in the award. Profit bonus, it is hardly necessary to emphasise, can be awarded only by reference to a relevant year and a claim for such bonus has, therefore, to be made from year to year and has to be settled either amicably between the parties or, if a reference is made, it has to be determined by industrial adjudication. A general claim for the introduction of profit bonus cannot be made or entertained in the form in which it has been done in the present proceedings.

Besides, the other serious infirmity in the award is that when a claim for profit bonus was made the tribunal has proceeded to grant puja bonus and that too solely on the ground that the refusal to grant the said claim would amount to discrimination. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the tribunal in dealing with this alternative claim for puja bonus which was not made in the demand and which had not been expressly referred to the tribunal is entirely erroneous. The claim for puja bonus proceeds on entirely different considerations. Customary puja bonus undoubtedly prevails in many industries in Bengal but there are certain tests which have to be applied in determining the validity of the claim. The amount by of way of puja bonus, it must be shown, has been consistently paid by the employer to his employees from year to year at the same rate, that it has been paid even in years of loss and that it has no relation to the profit made by the employer during the relevant year. The course of conduct spreading over a reasonably long period between the employer and the employees in the matter of payment of puja bonus is of considerable importance in dealing with the claim of customary puja bonus [Vide: The Graham Trading Co. (India) Ltd. v. Its Workmen (1)]. A claim for puja bonus can also be made in a proper case of the ground that the payment of such bonus is an implied term in the contract of employment [Vide: Messrs. Ispahani Ltd., Calcutta v. Ispahani Employees' Union(2). Such a claim again would necessarily involve the consideration of several relevant facts none of which has been alleged or proved in the present proceedings. Therefore, the decision of the tribunal awarding puja bonus to the workmen cannot be sustained. Indeed, in awarding puja bonus to the workmen the tribunal has failed to consider that it was making out an entirely new and inconsistent case for the workmen and granting the said claim without any proof of the relevant facts which would support such a claim. It is rather surprising that even when the tribunal by its award wanted to grant the demand for puja bonus it did not think it necessary to clarify at what rate the said bonus was to be paid. The award is absolutely vague in that behalf and that is another infirmity in the award. Since that is the only point in Civil Appeal No. 459 of 1960 preferred by the Station we must hold that the appeal succeeds and must set aside the award made by the tribunal under issue No. 1 (a).

Before we part with this appeal, however, we ought to add that after special leave was granted to the Station to prefer its appeal it applied for stay of the award directing the payment of puja bonus and stay was granted by this Court on condition that the amount of puja bonus should be paid by the Station to its employees on their furnishing security to the satisfaction of the management. Accordingly the Station has paid to its workmen puja bonus for three years. We suggested to the learned Attorney General that in case his appeal were to succeed the Station may consider whether it would partially forego its claim to recover the amount already paid by it to its workmen, and the learned Attorney-General, after consulting his client, has stated before us that the Station would forego one-third of the total amount paid by it to its employees under the orders of this Court. This one-third amount, we were told, is in the neighborhood of Rs. 65,000/- The learned Attorney-General also stated that the balance of two-third amount which it would recover from its employees can be paid by each one of them either by easy instalments or at the time when he would receive his gratuity or provident fund; the employee may exercise his option in that behalf. It appears that some of the employees who received the said amount have left the service of the Station and at that time have refunded the amount received by them. The Station would be prepared to give back to such employees one-third of the said amount. In our opinion, the attitude adopted by the Station in this matter is very fair and it would relieve the workmen from their liability to return one-third of the total amount received by them in pursuance of the orders of this Court.

That takes us to Civil Appeal No. 460 of 1960 preferred by the workmen. Mr. S. T. Desai, who argued this appeal, could not seriously press the workmen's case against the refusal of the tribunal to allow their demand for pension in lieu of the existing practice of paying gratuity. On a consideration of the relevant facts the tribunal came to the conclusion that this demand was not justified, and, in our opinion the conclusion of the tribunal is well founded. Then, as regards the other demand which is the subject-matter of the appeal the tribunal has increased the house allowance at a flat rate of Rs. 20/- instead of Rs. 10/- and this increased rate has been paid by the Station as from the date when the award became enforceable. Mr. Desai contends that the tribunal should have made an award granting the demand for accommodation or in the alternative should have awarded larger amount by way of house allowance. We are not impressed by this argument. A demand for the provision of housing accommodation can be reasonably entertained where it appears that the financial position of the employer can bear the burden involved in the said demand. Under the present economic conditions prevailing in the industry the responsibility for providing housing accommodation cannot reasonably be placed solely on the shoulders of the employer. In due course the problem may have to be tackled by the industry in co-operation with the State. The State will have to bear a part of that responsibility [Vide: The Patna Electric Supply Co. Ltd., Patna v. The Patna Electric Supply Workers' Union (1))]. The tribunal has considered the financial position of the Station, the urgency of the damned made by the workmen, and has come to the conclusion that the demand for housing accommodation was not justified and that the ends of social justices would be met in the present case if a flat rate of enhancement of Rs. 20/- is awarded. It is true that the Station gives housing accommodation for members of the senior staff but as the tribunal has pointed out there are special reasons how more favourable terms have to be offered to senior research staff in order to get the services of properly trained and properly equipped personnel. In our opinion, the tribunal was right in refusing to draw an analogy between the requirements of the senior research staff and the junior staff with whose claims the tribunal was dealing. Therefore, we are not satisfied that there is any substance in the grievance made by the workmen against the award passed by the tribunal in respect of house allowance. The result is Civil Appeal No. 460 of 1960 fails and is dismissed.

There would be no order as to costs in both the appeals.

Appeal No. 459 allowed.

Appeal No. 460 dismissed.