This appeal by special leave is directed

against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated June

23, 1971, upholding the conviction of the appellants for

offences under sections 420 and 420/120B of the Penal Code

but reducing their sentences. The charge related to cheat-

ing the passport issuing authority of the Hooghly

district by dishonestly inducing him to issue passports on

the basis of false representations. This Court has limited

the special leave to the question whether the passports were

"property" within the meaning of section 420 of the Penal

Code ?

Speaking broadly, the allegation against the appellants

was that there was a conspiracy between them as a result of

which 1480 applications were filed for the issue of pass-

ports from July, 1956 to April, 1957, by Muslims and Chinese

nationals. These applications were alleged to have been

made by suppressing the real facts about the nationality

and addresses of the applicants, and by making false repre-

sentations in several other respects. The prosecution

alleged that hundreds of passports were thus issued and

delivered to persons who were not entitled to them under the

law. Some of the appellants were alleged to be directly

concerned with those applications, and it was further

alleged that the orders of the Passport Authority were

obtained by dishonest inducement and false representation.

A passport is a document which, by its nature and pur-

pose, is a political document for the benefit of its holder.

It recognises him as a citizen of the country granting it

and is in the nature of a request to the other country for

his free passage there. Its importance was examined by this

Court in Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam(1) with

reference to the provisions of the Indian Passport (Entry

Into India) Act, 1920, (hereinafter referred to as the Act)

and the Rules made thereunder which were in force at the

time when the offences were said to have been committed in

this case. After referring to sections 3 and 4 of the Act,

and rules 4 and 5 of the Rules, this Court observed as

follows,–

" …… possession of passport,

whatever may be its meaning or legal effect,

is a necessary requisite for leaving India

for travelling abroad. The argument that the

Act .does not impose the taking of a passport

as a condition of exit from India, therefore

it does not interfere with the right of a

person to leave India, if we may say so, is

rather hypertechnical and ignores the reali-

ties of the situation. Apart from the fact

that possession of passport is a necessary

condition of travel in the international

community, the prohibition against entry

indirectly prevents the person from leaving

India. The State in fact tells a person living

in India 'you can leave India at your pleasure

without a passport, but you would not be

allowed by foreign countries to enter them

without it and you cannot also come back to

India without it.' No person in India can

possibly travel on those conditions. Indeed

it is impossible for him to do so. That

apart, even that theoretical possibility of

exit is expressly restricted by executive

instructions and by refusal of foreign-ex-

change."'

There can therefore be no doubt that a passport is a docu-

ment of importance for travel abroad and is of considerable

value to its holder.

(1) [1967] 3 S.C.R. 525.

The word "property" has been defined in the Century,

Dictionary, which is an encyclopedic lexicon of the

English language, as follows,–

"the right to the use or enjoyment or

the beneficial fight of disposal of anything

that can be the subject of ownership; owner-

ship; estate; especially, ownership of tangi-

ble things …..: anything that may be

exclusively possessed and enjoyed; …..

possessions."

As has been stated, a passport provides the several bene-

fits mentioned above. It is a tangible thing and is capable

of ownership. There can therefore be no doubt that it is

"property". It is property of the State so long as it is

with the passport issuing authority and has not been issued

to the person concerned and, after issue, it becomes the

property of the person to whom it has.been granted.

Our attention has not been invited to any case where the

question now before us arose for consideration on an earlier

occasion. But a somewhat similar question was considered by

this Court in Abhayanand Mishra v. The State of Bihar (1).

The appellant there applied to the Patna University for

permission to appear at .the M.A. examination as a private

candidate, representing that he was a graduate having ob-

tained the B.A. degree in 1951 and had been teaching in a

school. On that basis, an admission card was despatched for

him to the Headmaster of the school. It was however found

that he was neither a graduate nor a teacher. He was prose-

cuted for the offence 'under section 420 read with section

511 of the Penal Code. He contended that his conviction was

unsustainable because the admission card had no pecuniary

value and was not property. This Court repelled the conten-

tion and held that although the admission card as such had

no pecuniary value, it had immense value to the candidate

appearing in the examination for he could not have appeared

at the examination without it, and that it was therefore

property within the meaning of section 415 of the Penal

Code. While reaching that conclusion, this Court relied on

Queen Empress v. Appasami (2) and Queen Empress v. Sashi

Bhushan.(3) In Appasami's case it was held that the ticket

entitling the accused to enter the examination room was

"property", and in Sashi Bhushan's case it was held that

the term "property" included a written certificate to the

effect that the accused had attended a course of lectures

and had paid up his fees. On a parity of reasoning, we have

no doubt that looking to the importance and characteristics

of a passport, the High Court rightly held that it was

property within the meaning of sections 415 and 420 of the

Penal Code.

We may make a reference to Ishwarlal Girdharlal Parekh

v. State of Maharashtra and others (4) also. There the

question for consideration was whether an order of assess-

ment was "property" within the

(1) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 241. (2) [1889] I.L.R. 12 Mad. 151.

(3) [1893] I.L.R. 15 All. 210. (4) [1969] 1 S.C.R. 193.

meaning of section 420 I.P.C. The charge in that case

was that the appellant dishonestly or fradulently induced

the income-tax authorities and obtainer an assessment order

for less income-tax than due. It was held that .the order

of assessment received by an assessee was "property",

since it was of great importance to the assessee, as con-

taining a computation, of his total assessable income and,

as containtion or his tax liability. This Court

also expressed the view that the word "property" did not

necessarily expressed that the thing, of which delivery

was dishonestly desired by the person who cheats, "must

have a money value or a market value, in the hand of the

person cheated". It was held that "even if the thing has no

money value, in the hand of the person cheated, but becomes

a thing of value, in the hand of the person, who may get

possession of it as a result of the cheating practised by

him, it would still fall within the connotation of the

term 'property' in section 420 I.P.C." This decision also

lends support to the view we have taken for, as has been

stated, a passport is a valuable document.

Our attention has also been invited to In re Packiana-

than(1) and Local Government v. Gangaram.(2) The accused

in Packianathan's case was prosecuted for an offence under

section 419 read with section 511 of the Penal Code. He was

going to Ceylon, and he used the permit which stood in the

name of one Kumarswami, while his own name was J. Packiana-

than. On seeing the permit the Health Officer issued a

health certificate. It was held that the health certificate

was "property" within the meaning of section 415 of the

Penal Code and that if a person dishonestly and fraudulently

induced the Health Officer to deliver it to him, he was

guilty of an offence under section 419 I.P.C. Local Govern-

ment v. Gangaram was a case where the accused obtained a

certificate from the Deputy Inspector of Schools by

stating untruly that he had passed the examination. It was

held that the certificate was 'property' within the meaning

of sections 415 and 420 I.P.C. and that the accused was

guilty of an offence punishable under section 420 I.P.C.

In taking that view the Nagpur High Court relied on Queen

Empress v. Appasami (supra) and Queen Empress v. Sashi

Bhushan (supra) on which reliance was placed by this Court

in Abhayanand Mishra v. The State of Bihar (Supra)

referred to above.

So as passport was a tangible thing, and was a

useful.document, and could be the subject of ownership or

exclusive possession, it was "property" within the meaning

of sections 415 and 420 I.P.C. There is therefore nothing

wrong with the view which has been taken by the High Court

and the appeal is hereby dismissed. The appellants who are

on bail shall surrender to serve out the remaining sentence.

P.H.P. Appeal dismissed.

(1) A.I.R. 3920 Mad. 131 (1)

(2) A.I.R. 1922 Nagpur 229.