R. Hari Babu v. Simy S.
R. Hari Babu v. Simy S.
LOK 2026 (11) Ker. 201
Equivalent citations: 2026:KER:88612
- Court
- High Court of Kerala
- Bench
- Dr. A.K. Jayasankaran Nambiar, J.; Preeta A.K., J.
- Case No.
- W.A. No. 1882 of 2026; W.A. No. 2234 of 2026
- For petitioner / appellant
- P. Ravindran, Senior Advocate; Elvin Peter P.J., Senior Advocate; Lakshmi Ramadas, M.R. Sabu, Aparna Rajan, Sreedhar Ravindran, Fathima Parveen P.S., K.R. Ganesh, Reshma Prakash Kurian, Advocates
- For respondent
- Renjith Thampan, Senior Advocate; Jaishankar V. Nair, Arathi Karunakaran, Cristy Therasa Suresh, Adarsh Babu C.S., Advocates
Provisions referred
- Section 11, Advocates Act, 1961
- Chapter III Rule 8, Bar Council of Kerala Rules, 1979
- Chapter VII Rule 23, Bar Council of Kerala Rules, 1979
- Part I Chapter III Rule 23, Kerala Service Rules
Headnote
Advocates Act, 1961 — Section 11 — Bar Council of Kerala Rules, 1979 — Chapter III Rule 8 and Chapter VII Rule 23 — Kerala Service Rules — Part I Chapter III Rule 23 — Resignation and Withdrawal — Secretary of Bar Council of Kerala — Applicability of Staff Service Rules — Competent Authority to Accept Resignation and Waive Notice Period — Doctrine of Ratification in Statutory Exercise of Power
The 1st respondent, appointed as Secretary of the Bar Council of Kerala on 28.02.2025, tendered a resignation letter on 07.01.2026 during an Executive Committee meeting, which was allegedly endorsed by the Executive Committee Chairman and the Bar Council Chairman on the same day, before she withdrew her resignation on 08.01.2026. By communications dated 21.01.2026, she was informed that the Bar Council of Kerala had ratified the Chairman's acceptance on 20.01.2026 with effect from 07.01.2026, and the appellant in W.A. No. 1882 of 2026 was later appointed to the resultant vacancy subject to the writ petition. A Single Judge allowed her writ petition, holding that she had validly withdrawn her resignation before acceptance by the competent authority and attributing fraudulent conduct to the Bar Council over un-dispatched letters (Exts. R1(c) and R1(e)). Aggrieved, both the Bar Council of Kerala and the newly appointed Secretary filed writ appeals.
Held
- Under Section 11 of the Advocates Act, 1961 read with Chapter VII of the Bar Council of Kerala Rules, 1979, the post of Secretary falls within 'staff', and Rule 23 of Chapter VII requiring one month's notice to the Bar Council governs the Secretary's resignation; thus, the resignation tendered on 07.01.2026 could take effect earlier than 07.02.2026 only if the Bar Council itself consciously waived the notice period. (Paras 8–10)
- Ratification under statutory provisions cannot cure an act that is void ab initio or performed without following mandatory statutory requirements; because neither the Chairmen on 07.01.2026 nor the Bar Council on 20.01.2026 applied their minds to waiving the notice period or accepting the resignation under Rule 23, the resignation stood validly withdrawn on 08.01.2026 prior to any valid acceptance (applying Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan and distinguishing Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta and Maharashtra State Mining Corporation). (Paras 11–13)
- In view of the Bar Council's candid admission in the writ appeal that Exts. R1(c) and R1(e) were drafted on 08.01.2026 but never dispatched and were erroneously produced before the Single Judge by inadvertence, the finding of fraudulent conduct was toned down to negligence/recklessness while affirming all other findings. (Para 14)
- Because the new Secretary's appointment was expressly made subject to the outcome of the writ petition by an unchallenged interim order dated 22.04.2026, he was bound to vacate the post upon the writ petition being allowed; both writ appeals were dismissed save for the limited modification on the finding of fraud. (Para 15)
Cases referred 12
- Delhi Technological University v. B.S. Rawat LOK 2026 (8) SC 46 : 2026 KHC OnLine 6587 : 2026 INSC 797 Relied on (Paras 6, 11–12)
- Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee LOK 2025 (2) SC 410 : 2025 KHC OnLine 6105 Referred (Para 7)
- Gwalior Development Authority v. Subhash Saxena 2022 KHC OnLine 6298 Referred (Para 7)
- Management of Narendra & Company Private Limited v. Workmen of Narendra & Company (2016) 3 SCC 340 Referred (Para 7)
- National Institute of Technology and Another v. Pannalal Choudhury and Another (2015) 11 SCC 669 Distinguished (Para 12)
- Maharashtra State Mining Corporation v. Sunil (2006) 5 SCC 96 Distinguished (Para 12)
- High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh LOK 2003 (1) SC 274 : (2003) 4 SCC 239 Referred (Para 12)
- Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan LOK 1989 (4) SC 134 : (1989) 3 SCC 132 Followed (Para 12)
- Union of India and Others v. Gopal Chandra Misra and Others LOK 1978 (2) SC 151 : (1978) 2 SCC 301 Referred (Para 11)
- Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta v. Union of India LOK 1973 (8) SC 22 : (1973) 2 SCC 543 Distinguished (Para 12)
- Raj Kumar v. Union of India LOK 1968 (4) SC 182 : AIR 1969 SC 180 Referred (Para 6)
- Reichel v. Bishop of Oxford (1889) 14 AC 259 Referred (Para 11)
JUDGMENT
The Bar Council of Kerala and its present Secretary R. Hari Babu are the appellants before us impugning the judgment dated 11.08.2026 of the learned Single Judge that allowed W.P.(C).No.2772 of 2026 filed by the former Secretary of the Bar Council of Kerala, whose services were terminated through an alleged acceptance of a letter of resignation tendered by her.
2. The brief facts necessary for disposal of these Writ Appeals are as follows: The petitioner in W.P.(C).No.2772 of 2026 Smt. Simy S. was appointed as the Secretary of the Bar Council of Kerala vide Ext.P1 appointment order dated 28.02.2025 pursuant to a selection process that comprised of written test and interview. While functioning as such, owing to an incident that took place during the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Bar Council of Kerala, the details of which are not relevant for the disposal of these appeals, the writ petitioner tendered a letter of resignation addressed to the Chairman of the Bar Council of Kerala, who was present virtually at the meeting, and the same was received and accepted by the Chairman of the Executive Committee, who was physically present at the meeting, and who endorsed his acceptance by putting his signature on the resignation letter. The resignation letter was thereafter directed to be placed before the Chairman of the Bar Council of Kerala, which allegedly was done on the same day, and that the Chairman endorsed his acceptance of the resignation letter on the same day. The writ petitioner, however, submitted another letter on the very next day, namely, 08.01.2026, withdrawing her earlier letter and resignation request, and seeking permission to resume duties. In the meanwhile, however, the Special Secretary to the Bar Council of Kerala issued Ext.P5 communication informing the petitioner that the Chairman of the Bar Council of Kerala had directed to inform the petitioner that till a final decision was taken by the Bar Council on the resignation letter submitted by her on 07.01.2026, she had to refrain from attending to the duties of the Secretary with effect from 08.01.2026. Later, by Exts.P6 and P7 communications dated 21.01.2016, the petitioner was informed that the Bar Council of Kerala had, at its meeting on 20.01.2026, accepted the resignation with effect from 07.01.2026 through ratification of the decision of the Chairman of the Bar Council to accept her resignation letter.
3. The writ petition, as originally filed, impugned Exts.P5, P6 and P7 communications, but after perusing the counter affidavit filed by the Bar Council, wherein, certain documents were produced by the latter, the writ petition was amended to challenge the proceedings and resolutions leading to Exts.P5, P6 and P7 as also the proceedings and resolutions pursuant thereto. In the amended writ petition, the appointment of Sri. R.Hari Babu as Secretary of the Bar Council of Kerala in the vacancy resulting from the resignation of the petitioner was also impugned. By an interim order dated 22.04.2026 passed in the writ petition, the appointment of Sri. R.Hari Babu was made subject to the final decision in the writ petition, and it was clarified that if the writ petition was ultimately allowed, he would have to vacate the post.
4. The writ petition was ultimately heard and disposed by the judgment impugned in the appeals. The learned Single Judge, who considered the writ petition, found that (i) there was no valid acceptance of the resignation letter tendered by the writ petitioner before 21.01.2026, the date of Ext.P6 communication, and hence, the letter withdrawing the resignation had to be given full effect and the request for resignation seen as withdrawn before its acceptance by the competent authority; (ii) going by the provisions of Rule 23 Chapter III Part I of the Kerala Service Rules and the Government decision thereunder, the resignation could be seen as accepted by the competent authority only when it was accepted by the Bar Council of Kerala and the writ petitioner relieved of her duties pursuant thereto. In the instant case, those events had not occurred prior to the receipt by the Bar Council of the letter withdrawing the resignation; (iii) the Chairman of the Bar Council of Kerala was not competent to accept the resignation letter since he was not the appointing authority of the writ petitioner; (iv) the Bar Council of Kerala, while purportedly ratifying the acceptance of the resignation by the Chairman, did not independently apply its mind to the issue of whether the resignation should be accepted, and hence, there was no considered decision to accept the resignation of the petitioner; (v) a perusal of the inward and outward registers maintained by the Bar Council of Kerala clearly revealed that there had been no transmission of the resignation letter of the petitioner to the Chairman of the Bar Council of Kerala, who was at Chavakkad on 07.01.2026, and this cast serious doubts on the veracity of the endorsement allegedly made by the Chairman on the resignation letter dated 07.01.2026; (vi) the Bar Council of Kerala had created fraudulent documents to make room for a contention that a decision had been taken by it to accept the resignation tendered by the petitioner, and that therefore, they did not have to consider the subsequent letter of withdrawal of the resignation submitted by the petitioner; (vii) since the petitioner had withdrawn the letter of resignation prior to its acceptance, she had to be seen as continuing in service, and consequently, the 5th respondent, whose appointment was subject to the outcome of the writ petition, had to vacate his post based on the interim order dated 22.04.2026 passed in the writ petition.
5. In the appeals, we have heard Sri. P. Ravindran, the learned senior counsel, Smt. Lakshmi Ramadas, the learned counsel, Sri. Elvin Peter, the learned senior counsel and Sri. K.R. Ganesh, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in both the writ appeals and Sri. Renjith Thampan, the learned senior counsel and Sri.Jaishankar V. Nair, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the 1st respondent in both the writ appeals.
6. The arguments of Sri. P. Ravindran, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of Sri. Hari Babu, the appellant in W.A.No.1882 of 2026 and Sri. Elvin Peter, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Bar Council of Kerala, the appellant in W.A.No.2234 of 2026, briefly stated, are as follows:
- The letter of resignation tendered by the writ petitioner on 07.01.2026
during the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Bar Council of Kerala was accepted by the Chairman of the Executive Committee on the directions of the Chairman of the Bar Council of Kerala, who was present virtually at the meeting. The former then put his signature on the resignation letter in token of having accepted it and then directed that it be placed before the Chairman, Bar Council of Kerala. The latter received the resignation letter at Chavakkad later that evening and he put his signature on the resignation letter in token of having received and accepted the same and then returned the letter to the office of the Bar Council of Kerala through the same staff member who had brought it to him. These facts were averred in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents as well. There was therefore no misrepresentation of material facts by the respondents before the Writ Court.
- The Chairman of the Bar Council of Kerala was obliged under Rule 8 of
Chapter III of the Bar Council of Kerala Rules, 1979 to exercise a general control and supervision over all matters of the Bar Council and this took within its scope the obligation to receive and accept the letter of resignation tendered by the petitioner. Although, as per the statutory rules, the resignation letter had to be accepted by the Bar Council of Kerala, in view of the subsequent ratification by the Bar Council of Kerala, of the act of acceptance of the resignation letter by the Chairman of the Bar Council of Kerala, the acceptance by the latter had to be seen as undertaken on behalf of the Bar Council and as authorised by it. The finding of the learned Single Judge that the Chairman did not have the authority to accept the resignation letter cannot therefore be legally sustained. Reliance is placed on the decision in Delhi Technological University v. B. S. Rawat – [2026 KHC OnLine 6587 : 2026 INSC 797].
- The finding of the learned Single Judge at paragraphs 31 and 32 of the
impugned judgment that suggest that the Bar Council of Kerala had fraudulently created documents for the purpose of making room to raise a contention that a decision had been taken by it to accept the resignation and therefore they need not consider the letter of withdrawal of resignation submitted by the writ petitioner, were rendered in the backdrop of a finding that Exts.R1(c) and R1(e) communications dated 08.01.2026, although stated to have been sent to the writ petitioner, there was no entry in Ext.P11 outward register to prove the dispatch of those communications on 08.01.2026. As a matter of fact, communications in the nature of internal correspondence are not entered in outward registers, and there was no movement register maintained that would have shown the movement of internal correspondence. Further, the Bar Council of Kerala has since clarified that Exts.R1(c) and R1(e) communications were never sent, and that communications of that nature were actually sent only on 21.01.2026 through Exts.P6 and P7 documents. The mistaken submission made in respect of Exts.R1(c) and R1(e) cannot be a reason to doubt the fact of acceptance of the letter of resignation having taken place through the signature and endorsements made by the Chairman of the Bar Council of Kerala on 07.01.2026 itself, the movement of which document would not be recorded in the outward register. There was therefore no willful suppression of material facts that justified a finding by the learned Single Judge of fraudulent conduct on the part of the Bar Council of Kerala.
- That even otherwise, the Chairman of the Bar Council having been
present virtually at the meeting of the Executive Committee on 07.01.2026, and having authorized the Chairman of the Executive Committee to accept the resignation letter on his behalf, there was a valid acceptance of the resignation letter because the statutory rules do not mandate that an acceptance of a resignation letter must necessarily be in writing. The factum of acceptance can be established by conduct as was evident in this case.
- The resignation became effective immediately on its acceptance by the
Chairman of the Bar Council on 07.01.2026 and not when the Bar Council met to ratify the decision of the Chairman. There was also no requirement to issue formal orders relieving the writ petitioner of her duties as found by the learned Single Judge, relying on the Government decision No.1(d) under Rule 23 Chapter III of Part I of the Kerala Service Rules. Reliance is placed on Raj Kumar v. Union of India – [AIR 1969 SC 180] and Delhi Technological University v. B. S. Rawat – [2026 KHC OnLine 6587 : 2026 INSC 797].
- Although there was a prayer in the writ petition seeking to quash the
proceedings leading to the appointment of Sri. Hari Babu as Secretary in the vacancy resulting from the resignation of the writ petitioner, there was no order quashing the appointment order issued to Hari Babu in the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge. That apart, if the resignation of the writ petitioner is seen validly accepted before the letter of withdrawal of resignation reached the Bar Council of Kerala, then she cannot independently maintain a challenge to the appointment of Sri. Hari Babu as Secretary because she admittedly did not participate in the selection process for that appointment, and therefore, did not have the locus standi to challenge the said appointment under those circumstances.
- The finding of the learned Single Judge that the Bar Council of Kerala,
which was the competent authority to accept the resignation tendered by the writ petitioner, did not apply its mind as to whether or not the resignation should be accepted is legally unsustainable because it is trite that the ratification of the decision of the Chairman to accept the resignation of the writ petitioner, signifies agreement by the Bar Council of Kerala with the decision of the Chairman.
7. Per contra, the arguments of Sri.Renjith Thampan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the 1st respondent/writ petitioner, briefly stated, are as follows:
- The factual findings of the learned Single Judge in the impugned
judgment as regards the fraudulent conduct of the Bar Council of Kerala ought not to be lightly interfered with by the appellate court in the absence of any material that would suggest that the said findings are perverse. Reliance is placed on Management of Narendra & Company Private Limited v. Workmen of Narendra & Company – [(2016) 3 SCC 340] and Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee – [2025 KHC OnLine 6105 (SC)].
- The learned Single Judge, in the impugned judgment, found that the
mere averments regarding acceptance of the resignation letter by the Chairman, Bar Council of Kerala, without any material produced to evidence the same, could not be relied upon especially when the averments in the affidavits filed by the Bar Council of Kerala regarding communication of Exts.R1(c) and R1(e) documents dated 08.01.2026 to the writ petitioner was found to be factually incorrect. The said aspect gains more significance when one notices that the Bar Council of Kerala had maintained throughout the proceedings before the learned Single Judge that the said communications have actually been sent and has only now, in the writ appeal, admitted that the communications were never sent to the writ petitioner. The findings of the learned Single Judge attributing fraudulent conduct to the Bar Council of Kerala was thus justified in view of the established misstatements of the Bar Council before the writ court.
- At any rate, the Chairman of the Bar Council did not have the authority
to accept the resignation tendered by the writ petitioner since that power was vested only in the Bar Council of Kerala. Since the acceptance of the resignation letter by the Chairman was an ultra vires and illegal act, it could not have been ratified by the Bar Council of Kerala either. As for the Bar Council of Kerala itself, it did not independently apply its mind to decide whether or not the resignation letter should be accepted, and hence, there was no effective acceptance of the resignation letter by the Bar Council of Kerala at any stage. The letter of the writ petitioner, withdrawing the resignation letter, had therefore to be given full effect, and the writ petitioner had to be treated as continuing in service.
- The general power of supervision and control conferred on the
Chairman, Bar Council of Kerala, by Rule 8 of Chapter III of the Bar Council of Kerala Rules, does not extend to the power to control the service of an employee of the Bar Council of Kerala [Gwalior Development Authority v. Subhash Saxena – [2022 KHC OnLine 6298 (SC)]]. Thus, even if the Chairman, Bar Council of Kerala had accepted the resignation letter of the writ petitioner, he had to be seen as acting ultra vires Rule 8 which, in turn, rendered his action illegal and void. Such acts could not have been ratified by the Bar Council of Kerala either.
8. We have considered the rival contentions and also the pleadings before us. We have also gone through the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge. At the very outset, we notice that the issue of whether or not the resignation letter dated 07.01.2026 tendered by the 1st respondent/writ petitioner was accepted by the competent authority on the same day was examined by the writ court without noticing the specific provisions of Rule 23 under Chapter VII of the Bar Council of Kerala Rules, 1979, which reads as follows:
CHAPTER VII
SERVICE RULES
(RULES REGARDING THE STAFF OF THE BAR COUNCIL OF KERALA) xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
23. Any member of the staff intending to leave the service may do so after giving a month’s notice of the said intention to the Bar Council. Provided however no member of the staff against whom disciplinary proceedings are pending shall be entitled to leave before the termination of such proceedings. Provided further that the Council shall be entitled to continue the Disciplinary Proceedings even after he leaves on retirement.”
9. The above rule was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge by either of the parties. Since even in the writ appeal this point was not adverted to, while bringing the statutory provision to the notice of the learned counsel at the time of hearing the writ appeals, we also permitted them to advance arguments on the effect of the said provision on the legality of the alleged acceptance of the resignation letter. The learned senior counsel then contended that (a) a perusal of Section 11 of the Advocates Act read with Chapter VII of the Bar Council of Kerala Rules would reveal that the Secretary and other staff of the Bar Council of Kerala were to be treated as forming distinct classes and therefore Rule 23 under Chapter VII of the Rules would have application only in relation to the staff other than the Secretary; and (b) Rule 23 merely envisaged that the resignation would take effect only with effect from a prospective date (after the expiry of the notice period) unless the competent authority had accepted the resignation letter, by waiving the notice period, before expiry of the notice period. It was pointed out that in the instant case, the subsequent ratification by the Bar Council, of the decision of the Chairman of the Bar Council to accept the resignation letter, was on 21.01.2026, well prior to the expiry of the notice period and hence the provisions of Rule 23 referred above did not really have any bearing on the legality of the decision taken by the Bar Council of Kerala.
10. We find ourselves unable to accept the said submissions of the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants. The Secretary and other staff of the Bar Council of Kerala are appointed based on the authority granted to the Bar Council under Section 11 of the Advocates Act, 1961. When the phraseology used in Section 11 is “the Secretary….. and such number of other persons on its staff” the necessary inference that must be drawn is that the post of Secretary is also included in the Phrase “Staff” for the purposes of the Act and Rules. This is further apparent when one peruses Chapter VII of the Bar Council of Kerala Rules that deals with “Rules regarding the Staff of the Bar Council of Kerala”. No doubt, there are separate Rules under the said Chapter dealing with specific aspects regarding qualification, term of office, remuneration and duties of the Secretary, but that does not mean that in relation to other service conditions, such as in the matter of resignation, the Secretary is not governed by the Rules that govern the service conditions of Staff members. We are therefore of the view that Rule 23 under Chapter VII of the Rules would apply to govern the resignation of a Secretary as well. Accordingly, going by the statutory rule noticed above, the 1st respondent/writ petitioner could not have sought an immediate relief from her service as the Secretary, and the resignation letter tendered by her on 07.01.2026 would ordinarily take effect only with effect from 07.02.2026 unless accepted by the competent authority, namely, the Bar Council of Kerala on an earlier date by taking a conscious decision to waive the said notice period mandated under the rule. The competent authority, in the instant case, was the Bar Council of Kerala, which was the appointing authority of the writ petitioner as is evident from Ext.P1 appointment order produced in the writ petition. Rule 23 above also mandates that the resignation request has to be made to the Bar Council of Kerala. Admittedly, the decision of the competent authority viz. the Bar Council of Kerala to accept her resignation was taken only on 21.01.2026, as is evident from Exts.P6 and P7 communications. Since the writ petitioner had admittedly withdrawn her resignation request on 08.01.2026, in the absence of any material to suggest that there was a decision taken at the instance of the Bar Council of Kerala to accept her resignation on 07.01.2026 itself, we would have to uphold the finding of the learned Single Judge that as on 21.01.2026, there was no letter of resignation of the writ petitioner that the Bar Council of Kerala could have validly accepted.
11. The appellants, however, contend, as they did before the learned Single Judge, that the acceptance of the resignation letter by the Chairman of the Bar Council of Kerala on 07.01.2026 had to be seen as authorised by the Bar Council of Kerala based on the statutory provisions read with the principle of ratification that is recognized in law. Before we consider the said contention, we might briefly notice the settled legal position with regard to the principle of ratification. In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Delhi Technological University v. B. S. Rawat – [2026 KHC OnLine 6587 : 2026 INSC 797], while considering the question as to whether the acceptance of resignation by an unauthorised officer stood validated through subsequent ratification by the competent authority, the Supreme Court culled out the following legal principles governing the doctrine of ratification from earlier precedents that held the field. The principles were enumerated as follows:
i) Ratification means making a previously invalid act valid. It is the subsequent approval of an act that was initially done without authority.
(ii) A subsequent ratification is equivalent to prior authority. Once the competent authority ratifies an act, the law treats it as though the authority had existed from the beginning. This is based on the maxim ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur.
(iii) Ratification operates retrospectively. It relates back to the date on which the original act was performed and cures the defect arising from the absence of prior authority.
(iv) Only the competent authority can ratify an invalid act. The authority which is legally empowered to perform the act must itself approve or adopt the earlier unauthorised action.
(v) Express approval of the earlier action is sufficient. It is not necessary for the competent authority to pass a fresh order. A resolution or decision approving the earlier unauthorised act amounts to valid ratification.
(vi) Ratification cures defects of authority, not acts that are inherently illegal. The doctrine applies where the act could have been validly performed by the competent authority in the first place. It cannot validate an act that is void because it is prohibited by law or beyond the power of the authority.
Thereafter, the exceptional situations where irrevocability of a letter of resignation would result, de hors the doctrine of curative ratification, was taken note of and explained as follows:
“20. Another principle which arises for consideration in these appeals may be stated. A resignation, even where accepted in the first instance by one not clothed with authority to accept it, may nonetheless become a consummated and irrevocable transaction where both sides have, by their conduct, treated it as final and altered their positions upon that footing. In such a case, an employee is precluded, not by any doctrine of curative ratification, but by the ordinary principle against approbation and reprobation, from later impugning the very transaction he brought about and from which he has already taken the entire benefit.
21. This principle finds support in a decision of the House of Lords (Reichel v. Bishop of Oxford, (1889) 14 AC 259) which is noted in a decision of this Court (Union of India & Ors. v. Gopal Chandra Misra & Ors., (1978) 2 SCC 301). There, a resignation tendered on the footing that formal acceptance would follow at a later date was held incapable of unilateral withdrawal, the resigner having, in Lord Halsbury’s words, already consummated the arrangement by his own conduct before he purported to revoke. Lord Watson likewise held that a resigner who has done all that lay in his power to complete a transaction cannot later be permitted to upset it merely because formal acceptance was still awaited.”
From a reading of the above, what we gather is that in the absence of any material to suggest that the 1st respondent/writ petitioner had submitted her resignation letter on 07.01.2026 so as to avoid any disciplinary proceedings, or that she had obtained any benefit on account of the acceptance of her resignation letter by the Chairman of the Bar Council Kerala on 07.01.2026, the letter of resignation did not become irrevocable immediately on its being tendered to the Chairman of the Bar Council of Kerala. The only other question to be considered then is whether the acceptance of the said letter by the Chairman of the Bar Council of Kerala can be seen as one that could be ratified by the Bar Council of Kerala – the competent authority under the statutory rules.
12. As already noticed by the Supreme Court in Delhi Technological University (supra), ratification cures the defects of authority and not acts that are inherently illegal. The doctrine applies where the act could have been validly performed by the competent authority in the first place and cannot validate an act that was void because it was prohibited by law or beyond the powers of the authority. On the facts before us, we are of the view that if the Chairman of the Bar Council of Kerala had, while purportedly accepting the letter of resignation tendered by the writ petitioner, followed the procedure envisaged under the statutory scheme and indicated that a conscious decision had been taken by him to waive the notice period and also to accept the request for resignation for reasons stated at the time of acceptance, then perhaps it could have been contented that a decision had been taken in accordance with the statutory provisions albeit by a person without authority, and hence, that decision could be ratified subsequently by the competent authority under the Statute. In other words, while the decision to be ratified may have been taken by one who did not have the authority to take it, the decision itself had to be one that complied with the requirements of the statutory provisions. It is in this respect that the decisions in Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta v. Union of India – [(1973) 2 SCC 543], Maharashtra State Mining Corporation v. Sunil – [(2006) 5 SCC 96] and National Institute of Technology and Another v. Pannalal Choudhury and Another – [(2015) 11 SCC 669] relied upon by the appellants are distinguishable from the facts and circumstances arising in the instant case. The facts in Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta (supra) and Maharashtra State Mining Corporation (supra) were noticed by the Court in National Institute of Technology and Another (supra) and followed in that case. Paragraphs 31 to 33 of the judgment in National Institute of Technology and Another (supra) read as follows:
“31. The law of ratification was applied by this Court in Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta v. Union of India – [(1973) 2 SCC 543]. In that case, the Chairman of the Board of Directors had terminated the services of the General Manager of a Company pursuant to a resolution taken by the Board at a meeting. It was not in dispute that the meeting had been improperly held and consequently the resolution passed in the said meeting terminating the services of General Manager was invalid. However, the Board of Directors then convened subsequent meeting and in this meeting affirmed the earlier resolution, which had been passed in improper meeting. On these facts, the Court held : (SCC pp. 546-47, para 14) “14. …. Even if it be assumed that the telegram and the letter terminating the services of the appellant by the Chairman was in pursuance of the invalid resolution of the Board of Directors passed on 16-12-1953 to terminate his services, it would not follow that the action of the Chairman could not be ratified in a regularly convened meeting of the Board of Directors. The point is that even assuming that the Chairman was not legally authorised to terminate the services of the appellant, he was acting on behalf of the Company in doing so, because, he purported to act in pursuance of the invalid resolution. Therefore, it was open to a regularly constituted meeting of the Board of Directors to ratify that action which, though unauthorised, was done on behalf of the Company. Ratification would always relate back to the date of the act ratified and so it must be held that the services of the appellant were validly terminated on 17-12-1953.” This view was approved by this Court in High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan v. P.P. Singh – [(2003) 4 SCC 239].
32. The aforesaid principle of law of ratification was again applied by this Court in Maharashtra State Mining Corpn. v. Sunil – [(2006) 5 SCC 96]. In this case, the respondent was an employee of the appellant Corporation. Consequent to a departmental enquiry, he was dismissed by the Managing Director of the appellant. The respondent then filed a writ petition before the High Court. During the pendency of the writ petition, the Board of Directors of the appellant Corporation passed a resolution ratifying the impugned action of the Managing Director and also empowering him to take decision in respect of the officers and staff in the grade of pay the maximum of which did not exceed Rs.4700 p.m. Earlier, the Managing Director had powers only in respect of those posts where the maximum pay did not exceed Rs.1900 p.m. The respondent at the relevant time was drawing more than Rs.1800 p.m. Therefore, at the relevant time, the Managing Director was incompetent to dismiss the respondent. Accordingly, the High Court held the order of dismissal to be invalid. The High Court further held that the said defect could not be rectified subsequently by the resolution of the Board of Directors. The High Court set aside the dismissal order and granted consequential relief. The appellant then filed the appeal in this Court by special leave. Ruma Pal, J. speaking for three-Judge Bench, while allowing the appeal and setting aside of the Court held as under: (Maharashtra State Mining Corpn. v. Sunil – [(2006) 5 SCC 96] pp. 96g-h & 97a-b) “The High Court rightly held that an act by a legally incompetent authority is invalid. But it was entirely wrong in holding that such an invalid act could not be subsequently ‘rectified’ by ratification of the competent authority. Ratification by definition means the making valid of an act already done. The principle is derived from the Latin maxim ratihabitio mandato aequiparatur, namely, ‘a subsequent ratification of an act is equivalent to a prior authority to perform such act.’ Therefore, ratification assumes an invalid act which is retrospectively validated.”
* * *
In the present case, the Managing Director’s order dismissing the respondent from service was admittedly ratified by the Board of Directors unquestionably had the power to terminate the services of the respondent. Since the order of the Managing Director had been ratified by the Board of Directors such ratification related back to the date of the order and validated it.”
33. Applying the aforementioned law of ratification to the facts at hand, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the order of dismissal dated 16-8-1996 was passed by the Principal and Secretary who had neither any authority to pass such order under the Rules nor was there any authorization given by the BoG in his favour to pass such order yet in our considered view when the BoG in their meeting held on 22-8-1996 approved the previous actions of the Principal and Secretary in passing the respondent’s dismissal order dated 16-8-1996, all the irregularities complained of by the respondent in the proceedings including the authority exercised by the Principal and Secretary to dismiss him stood ratified by the Competent Authority (Board of Governors) themselves with retrospective effect from 16-8-1996 thereby making an invalid act a lawful one in conformity with the procedure prescribed in Rules.”
As against the said precedents, a distinction was drawn in Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan – [(1989) 3 SCC 132] between ratification of decisions taken by companies and societies and those taken in exercise of powers conferred under statutory provisions. Referring to the latter situation, it was held that the principles of ratification have no application with regard to exercise of powers conferred under statutory provisions. This is because the statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity because it is ab initio void and cannot be ratified.
13. In the instant case, the endorsements allegedly made on the resignation letter dated 07.01.2026 tendered by the writ petitioner, by the Chairman of the Executive Committee and Chairman of the Bar Council of Kerala, do not reveal any application of mind by them on the aspect of waiver of notice period or indicate the reasons that weighed with them for accepting the resignation. In our view that was the requirement for a valid acceptance of resignation under the statutory Rules. As against that, the endorsements made on the resignation letter, and the subsequent correspondence in this regard, namely, Exts.P5, P6 and P7 only suggest that the resignation letter was received by the said persons solely for the purposes of forwarding the same to the competent authority, who in turn was to apply its mind to both the aspects referred above. As a matter of fact, even the competent authority, namely, the Bar Council of Kerala, did not apply its mind to the above aspects at any stage. We therefore find ourselves in complete agreement with the findings of the learned Single Judge on this issue, and hold that there was in fact no considered decision taken by the Bar Council of Kerala, either by itself or through ratification, to accept the resignation of the 1st respondent/writ petitioner. We are also of the view that going by the statutory scheme discernible from the Bar Council of Kerala Rules, the decision to accept a resignation tendered by a member of the Bar Council of Kerala’s staff, by waiving the prescribed notice period, is one that has to be taken by the Bar Council of Kerala itself and is not one that can be delegated to any other person. To permit such a decision to be taken at first instance by a person without authority, and the ratification of that decision thereafter would tantamount to permitting the Bar Council of Kerala to indirectly do what it cannot do directly under the statutory provisions.
14. As for the observations and findings of the learned Single Judge regarding the fraudulent conduct of the Bar Council of Kerala in creating documents to make room for a contention that a decision had been taken by it to accept the resignation tendered by the petitioner, and that therefore, they did not have to consider the subsequent letter of withdrawal of the resignation submitted by the petitioner, we find that the said observations and findings were rendered in the backdrop of the finding that the Bar Council had repeatedly maintained before the writ court that they had sent Exts.R1(c) and R1(e) documents to the respondent writ petitioner. This was notwithstanding that the writ petitioner had disputed the correctness of the said averments in the counter affidavit of the Bar Council, through the reply affidavit and amended writ petition filed by them. In fact, the Bar Council re-iterated their stand in this regard even in the additional affidavit filed by them before the writ court and at the time of final arguments. On finding that there were no documents produced to establish their stand regarding dispatch of the said documents to the writ petitioner, the learned Judge thought it fit not to give them the benefit of doubt even with regard to their contention that the letter of resignation tendered by the writ petitioner had been received and accepted by the Chairman of the Bar Council at Chavakkad on the same day, i.e., 07.01.2026 and returned to the office of the Bar Council of Kerala through the messenger who carried it to Chavakkad. In the writ appeal filed by them, the Bar Council now admits that Exts.R1(c) and R1(e) documents were never sent to the writ petitioner and that the averments in that regard in the affidavits filed before the writ court were factually incorrect. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of their writ appeal reads as follows:
“4. The appellants herein filed detailed counter-affidavit and additional counter-affidavit rebutting the contentions in the writ petition. In the counter affidavit filed by the appellants due to inadvertence and oversight in the instructions given, Ext.R1(c) and Ext.R1(e) was produced in the counter affidavit stating that it was on the basis of Ext.R1(c) communication the 1st respondent was relieved of her duties and it was also averred in the counter affidavit by mistake that intimation regarding the fact that the resignation letter submitted by the 1st respondent was accepted by the Chairman, Bar Council of Kerala on 07.01.2026, the same day itself and it was communicated to the 1st respondent as per Ext.R1(e). The said averment in the counter affidavit is not correct and the same happened to be made due to inadvertence and oversight. Ext.R1(c) and Ext.R1(e) was letters drafted by the Chairman on 08.01.2026 itself for communication to the 1st respondent, upon considering the fact that the Bar Council had not met for considering the above issue, hence directed that the communication of Ext.R1(c) and Ext.R1(e) to the 1st respondent be deferred till a decision is taken by the Bar Council.
5. As stated above though Ext.R1(c) and Ext.R1(e) was drafted for communication to the 1st respondent, and immediately thereafter decided to hold the said letters pending decision/ratification by the Bar Council. Thereafter, the Bar Council in its meeting held ratified the decision of the Chairman accepted the resignation submitted by the 1st respondent and also ratified the decision taken to reject the letter for withdrawal of the resignation submitted by the 1st respondent. The same is evident from Ext.R1(g) and Ext.R1(h) minutes of the meeting of the Executive Committee and the Bar Council. Subsequently it was decided to communicate Ext.R1(c) and Ext.R1(e) and the same was entrusted to the Office Assistant for communication. The Office Assistant on receipt of the same assigned separate numbers namely 317 and 318 to Ext.R1(c) and Ext.R1(e) respectively, and before entering the same in the register it was found that the letter was dated 08.01.2026. When the above fact was brought to the notice of the Chairman, by the Office Assistant separate letters namely Ext.P6 and P7 was drafted and after affixing the signature and seal, the Chairman entrusted Exts.P6 and P7 to the Office Assistant for communication. The Office Assistant on receipt of Exts.P6 and P7 assigned numbers 317 and 318 to Ext.P6 and P7 and after entering the same in the register communicated Ext.P6 and P7 to the 1st respondent. Hence, Ext.R1(c) and Ext.R1(e) though was numbered, since the date of the said letters were 08.01.2026, it was not sent and never entered in the outward register. Thus as per Exts.P6 and P7 alone were communicated to the 1st respondent. Since Ext.P6 and P7 was actually sent to the 1st respondent, it has been numbered as No. KBC 317/2026 and 318/2026, which happened to be the same number given to Ext.R1(c) and R1(e) respectively, in the circumstances stated above. The fact that Ext.P6 and P7 letters was sent actually from the office of the Bar Council of Kerala has been admitted by the 1st respondent since she has received the same and the fact that the said numbers assigned to Ext.P6 and P7 has been entered in the outward register maintained in the office of the Bar Council of Kerala is evident from Ext.P11 produced by the 1st respondent herself along with reply affidavit, which is the extract of the outward register maintained in the office of the Bar Council of Kerala. From the facts stated above, it is clear that Ext.R1(c) and Ext.R1(e) though was given a number it was not entered in the outward register, since it was not sent from the office of the Bar Council of Kerala. Since Ext.R1(c) and Ext.R1(e) were kept in the files, it was by mistake produced along with the counter affidavit. Hence, nothing turns on the above communications. The mistake committed in producing the above documents namely Ext.R1(c) and Ext.R1(e) happened due to inadvertence as stated above and the inconvenience caused to this Hon’ble Court is deeply regretted. The fact that the resignation was accepted on 07.01.2026, the date on which it was submitted by the 1st respondent has been endorsed at the foot of Ext.R1(b), which is a copy of the original resignation letter submitted by the 1st respondent and the fact that the letter submitted by the 1st respondent requesting to withdraw the resignation letter was rejected has also been endorsed in the letter itself which can be seen from the foot of Ext.R1(d), which is the copy of the original of the letter for withdrawal of the resignation submitted by the 1st respondent.”
Noble though the intentions of the Bar Council of Kerala may be, in offering this explanation for their conduct before the writ court, we are of the view that their subsequent clarification of facts can at best come to their aid in dislodging only a finding of dishonest or fraudulent conduct. Their conduct would still qualify as negligent or reckless, taking note of the responsibility that is expected of them as a statutory regulatory body of members of the legal profession in Kerala. Solely based on the assurance given by the learned senior counsel Sri. Elvin Peter, that there was no dishonest intention behind the stand taken by the Bar Council before the writ court, we tone down the observations and findings of the learned Single Judge that attribute fraudulent conduct on the part of the Bar Council of Kerala, and modify the same to read as attributing negligence/recklessness to the Bar Council of Kerala while defending proceedings before the writ court. Save for this limited modification of the findings, we affirm the rest of the findings of the learned Single Judge on this issue.
15. Before parting with these appeals, we might also deal with the argument of learned senior counsel Sri. P. Ravindran that the impugned judgment had not separately quashed the appointment order issued to the appellant in W.A.No.1882 of 2026. We do not find force in the contention that in the absence of a specific finding that the appointment order issued to Sri. Hari Babu stands quashed, his appointment as Secretary in the vacancy that resulted from the wrongful termination of the service of the writ petitioner would remain unaffected. As rightly noticed by the learned Single Judge, the appointment of Sri. Hari Babu as Secretary had been challenged by the writ petitioner, and the writ court had, by an interim order dated 22.04.2026, made his appointment subject to the final decision in the writ petition. By way of abundant clarification, the interim order also made it clear that if the writ petition was ultimately allowed, he would have to vacate the post. In the absence of any challenge to the said interim order, at the instance of the appellant herein, we cannot find it in ourselves to accept his contention that his appointment remained unaffected by the declarations of the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment.
The upshot of the above discussions is that we dismiss the writ appeals as devoid of merit, save for the limited modification effected to the findings of the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment in relation to W.A.No.2234 of 2026.
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