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State of Maharashtra v. Hans Raj Depar

State of Maharashtra v. Hans Raj Depar

LOK Law Journal

LOK 1977 (2) SC 254

Equivalent citations: 1977 CAR 113 : 1977 (83) CriLJ 833 : 1977 CrLR(SC) 148 : 1977 (2) SCC 216 : 1977 SCC(Cr) 319 : 1977 (3) SCR 78

Court
Supreme Court of India
Case No.
No
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Judgment

These four appeals arise out of four

prosecutions which were disposed of by a common judgment by

the learned Presidence Magistrate, 25th Court, Mazgaon,

Bombay. The facts leading to the prosecution are not in

all respects identical in the four

cases but it is obvious from the judgments under considera-

tion that the cases were heard and disposed of on the basis

that the variation in the facts would not make difference to

the result. The four respondents in these appeals are

shopkeepers in Bombay–some run grocery shops while some

deal only in oils of different varieties. The charge

against the respondents .is that they failed to display

prices of 'vanaspati' which they were selling in their shops

in tinned and loose form.

Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 10 of 1955,

empoWers the Central Government, by order, to provide for

regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distri-

bution or trade and commerce in any-essential commodity

for the purposes mentioned in sub-s. (1) thereof. Sub-

section (2) of s.3 specifies various matters in regard to

which the Central Government may pass orders contemplated by

sub-s.(1). The power conferred by s.3 was delegated by the

Central Government to the State Governments in pursuance of

the provision contained in s. 5. Section 7 provides for

punishment for contravention of an order made under s. 3.

In exercise of the powers conferred by s. 3 read with s.

5 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 the Government of

Maharashtra issued the Maharashtra Scheduled Articles

(Display and Marking of Prices) Order, 1966". Clause 3(a)

of that order provides that every dealer shall, in respect

of the articles specified in Schedule I display a list of

prices in the form prescribed in that schedule. We are

concerned with items 15 and 16 of the Schedule which read:

"15. Vanaspati, Tinned" and "16. Vanaspati, Loose."

Stated broadly, the defence of the respondents to the

charge is that they were selling hydrogenated oils or vege-

table ghee or vegetable oils and not vanaspati'.

The learned Magistrate acquitted the respondents in all

the four cases holding that even if the word 'vanaspati' may

have acquired a local meaning, it could not be said that the

order used the word 'vanaspati' to include hydrogenated

oils. Since the respondents, according to the learned Magis-

trate, could not be expected to know that they were bound to

disclose the prices of hydrogenated oils also and since

hydrogenated oils were not included in Schedule I the

charge was unsustainable.

The appeals filed by the State of Maharashtra against

the orders of acquittal were heard and disposed of by a

common judgment dated March 3, 1971 by a learned Single

Judge of the High Court. Observing that there was considera-

ble force in the contention of the State Government that

'vanaspati' would include hydrogenated oils also, the

learned Judge felt that it was unnecessary to go into that

question since the prosecution was not maintainable for

another reason. That reason, according to the learned

Judge, was that legislative draftsmen always made a distinc-

tion between 'contravention' of law and 'failure to comply

or non-compliance' with it. If the Court is called upon to

decide, says the learned Judge, whether a particular contra-

vention is

an offence, it was bound to enquire whether mere non-com-

pliance was also intended to be punished. Guided by that

principle, the learned Judge came to the conclusion that

the duty to display prices was "a subsidiary matter to the

prohibition which is contained in clause 4 which prohibits

a dealer from selling an article at a price higher than the

price displayed or from refusing to sell or from withholding

from sale such articles at the price displayed or marked."

The substance of the order was thus thought to be-contained

in. clause. 4 and accordingly, the judgment proceeds; "Mere

non-compliance of clause 3 cannot be an offence punishable

as contravention unless there is a contravention of clause

4. " Since the intention was said to be to punish contraven-

tion of clause 4 and not of clause 3 simpIiciter, the

learned Judge held that the prosecution was not maintainable

and the accused were entitled to an acquittal. These

appeals by special leave are directed against the correct-

ness of the High Court's judgment.

It is necessary in the larger public interest to dispel

the misunderstanding regarding the true meaning and intend-

ment of clauses 3 and 4 of the 1966 Order. We will there-

fore deal first with the reasoning of the High Court that a

mere contravention of clause 3 without the contravention of

clause 4 is not contravention within the meaning of s. 7 of

the Essential Commodities Act 1955 and cannot therefore be

punished. As stated earlier, clause 3(a) of the Order of

1966 imposes an obligation on every dealer to display a list

of prices of the article specified in Schedule I. Clause 4

of the Order provides that no dealer shah (a) sell or agree

or offer for sale any article at a price higher than the

price displayed or (b) refuse to sell or withhold from sale

such articles to any person at the price displayed or

marked. We find ourselves totally unable to appreciate that

there can be no contravention of clause 3(a) unless there is

a contravention of clause 4 also. The two clauses deal with

different matters because whereas clause 3 imposes an obli-

gation on a dealer to display the prices of articles speci-

fied in Schedule I, clause 4 prohibits him from selling an

article at a price higher than the one displayed or from

refusing to sell it at the price displayed. A contravention

of clause 3(a) is full and complete by mere reason of the

fact that the dealer has failed to display the prices of

articles specified in Schedule I. That contravention does

not depend on the consideration whether he has charged a

higher price than the price marked or whether he has refused

to sell an article at the price displayed. In other words,

the first step which a dealer has to take is to display the

prices of articles specified in Schedule I; if he fails to

do that, he is guilty of contravention of clause 3(a) which

is punishable under s. 7(1) of the Essential Commodities

Act. 1955. The additional obligation which the dealer has

to discharge is to be ready and willing to sell the articles

at ,the prices disp1ayed; failure to do so is a different

and distinct contravention which also attracts the applica-

tion of s. 7(1). We find it impossible to subscribe to the

view that clauses 3 and 4 of the Order of 1966 are so

interlinked that the legislature did not intend to punish

the contravention of the former unless such contravention

was accompanied by a contravention of the latter provision.

The wedding of

the two clauses in this _fashion is entirely unwarranted.

The ground. on which the High Court has acquitted the re-

spondents iS therefore untenable and we reject the reasoning

in that behalf as unsustainable. Were we satisfied that the

respondents were selling `vanaspati', tinned or loose, we

would have had no hesitation in setting aside the order of

acquittal and in convicting the respondents, since the non-

display of prices is admitted.

That raises the question whether there is evidence to

hold that the respondents were dealing in 'vanaspati'. The

evidence on this question is woefully inadequate and we

regret to notice that no serious attempt was made by the

prosecution to establish the charge. The articles of which

the prices were not displayed were not properly inventoried,

which makes it difficult to predicate that the articles bore

any particular description. Panchanamas were made of the

articles but except in one case, where the panchanama was

exhibited by consent, the panchas were not examined with the

result that the panchanama's remained unproved and therefore

unexhibited. In none of the cases was even a sample taken

of the articles displayed for sale. If that were done, the

nature, quality and components of the goods could easily

have been proved by analysing the sample chemically. One

could then have' said with easy facility that what was being

sold was 'vanaspati'. Instead of doing what .was easy and

necessary to do, the prosecution offered, as a substitute

for its plain duty, the vague recollections of a Rationing

Inspector and a Sub Inspector of Police as .to what was

being sold by the respondents in their shops.

For illustrating how cavalierly the prosecution ap-

proached its task, we will take the facts of appeal No. 156

of 1973 in which the respondent is one Hansraj Depar. The

charge framed by the learned Magistrate alleges that the

respondent had failed to display the price list of 'vanas-

pati ghee'. The charge should have been not in respect of

any type of ghee but in respect of 'vanaspati' which is the

item mentioned in Schedule I. The Rationing Inspector, K.N.

Joshi (P.W. 1), stated in his evidence that the respondent

had not exhibited the price of 'vanaspati ghee' which again

is beside the point. Nothing at all, not even a sample of

the articles alleged as vanaspati, was taken charge of from

the shop and the witness admitted that he did not remember

what variety of articles were sold in the shop and as to how

many tins of what is said to be vanaspati ghee were found

therein. The other witness, Sub Inspector Kurdur (P.W. 2)

does say that the respondent was selling vanaspati as also

oil and that there were in his shop "3 K.O. tins of Ravi

Vanaspati, 2 K.O. tins of prabhat Vanaspati and one loose

tin of Malali Vanaspati". In view of the challenge that

what was being sold was not vanaspati and that the tins did

not contain vanaspati within the meaning of items 15 and 16

of Schedule I, the prosecution should have led evidence to

show that the tins in fact contained vanaspati in the sense

in which that expression is used in the Scheduled. The ipsc

dixit of the Sub Inspector who had merely assisted the

Rationing Inspector in effecting. the raid cannot establish

the charge which involves a punishment of as long

a term as seven years and normally of not less than three

months, as provided in s. 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential

Commodities Act, 1955.

The prosecution did not make any attempt to establish as

to what is the true ,meaning and connotation of the expres-

sion 'vanaspati' and what kind 'of articles or goods are

comprehended within the scope of that expression. The

witnesses did not even say in their evidence, perfunctory as

it is, that the' word had acquired a popular meaning and was

understood locally in a certain sense. Neither the Act of

1955 nor the Order of 1966 defines the expression 'vanas-

pati' and it was beside the point to say that 'vanaspati' is

defined in the Bombay Sales Tax Act and the Prevention of

Food Adulteration Rules, 1965 to include hydrogenated oil.

The purpose of the Sales Tax Act is to bring within the tax

not as large a number of articles as possible, that. of the

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Rules thereunder

is to ensure that the health of the community is not endan-

gered by adulterated or spurious articles of food while

that of the Essential Commodities 'Act with which we are

concerned in the instant case is to ensure the. availability

of essential goods to the community at a proper price.

This last Act was passed in order "to provide, in the inter-

ests of the general public, for the control of the: produc-

tion, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in,

certain commodities". Sub Inspector Kurdur is no expert for

the purposes, of this Act and we cannot, without more,

accept the dogmatic assertion made by him in one of these

cases that vanaspati and hydrogenated oil "mean the same

thing." Hydrogenation is a specialised process and is

described in Encyclopaedia Britannica (1951 ed., Vol 11, p.

978) as "the treatment of a substance with hydrogen so that

this combines directly with the substance treated. The term

has, however, developed a more technical and restricted

sense. It is. now generally used to mean the treatment of

an "unsaturated" organic compound with hydrogen, so as to

convert it by direct addition to a "saturated" compound."

The witness, excusably, seems unaware of this scientific

sidelight and greater the ignorance, greater the dogma. If

the witness were right, it is difficult to understand why

"groundnut oil, Safflower oil, Sesamen oil and Mustard seed

oil" and "coconut oil" find a separate and distinct place in

Schedule 1 at items 5 and 6., Perhaps what the witness

guessed, science may show to be true but that has' to be

shown, not guessed.

In State of Bihar v. Bhagirath Sharma(1) a question

arose whether motor car tyres were included within the

meaning of the expression component parts and accessories of

automobiles' used in a similar order issued in 1967 by the

Bihar Government under the Essential Commodities Act. It

was held by this Court that it was not enough that from a

broad point of view the tyres and tubes of motor cars may be

considered to be covered.by the particular expression.

After considering and comparing the various items in the

particular schedule it was held' by this Court that motor

car tyres were not comprehended within the expression. It

is apposite for our purpose to call at-

(1) [|973] 3 S.C.R. 937.

tention to what the Court said in that case, namely, that

according to the fundamental principle of criminal jurispru-

dence which reflects fair play, a dealer must know with

reasonable certainty and must have a fair warning as .to

what his obligation is, and what act of commission or omis-

sion on. his part would constitute a criminal offence.

Bearing in mind this principle the State Government ought to

have expressed its intention c]early and unambiguously by

including hydrogenated oils within items 15 and 16 which

refer to `vanaspati'. If that were done, a type of predica-

ment which arises in this case could easily have been avoid-

ed, and with profit to the community. We hope this lacuna

in the schedule will be rectified expeditiously.

It is to be regretted but we are left with no option save

to confirm the acquittal, though for entirely different

reasons. Therefore, while setting aside the reasoning of

the High Court that there can be no contravention of clause

3 unless there is also a contravention of clause 4 of the

order of 1966, we dismiss. the appeals and confirm the

orders of acquittal on the ground of total lack of evidence

showing that the respondents are dealers in 'vanaspati' and

that they had kept 'vanaspati' for sale in their shops.

S.R. Appeals dis-

missed.

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