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Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd. v. Gram

Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd. v. Gram

LOK Law Journal

LOK 1976 (8) SC 235

Equivalent citations: AIR 1976 SC 2463 : 1976 (4) SCC 177 : 1977 (1) SCR 306

Court
Supreme Court of India
Bench
A.N. Ray, CJI; M. Hameedullah Beg, J.; Jaswant Singh, J.
Decided on
Case No.
No
WhatsApp
Print

Provisions referred

Cases referred 3

  1. Ramavtar v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer Referred (Para 1952)
  2. Wimbledon v. Hastings (supra). Under Referred (Para 1952)
  3. See Ravenseft Properties v. London Referred (Para 1952)

Referred in 1

  1. P.Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology LOK 1995 (3) SC 242 Referred (Para 20)

Judgment

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.

2238 of 1969.

(From the Judgment and order dated 8-9-1969 of the Bombay

High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1270/69).

M.C. Bhandare, J.B. Dadachanji, O.C. Mathur, K.J. John

and Shri Narain for the Appellant.

B.D. Bal, M.S. Narasimhan and R.B. Ds, tar for the Respond-

ent.

RAY, C.J.–This appeal by certificate turns on the

meaning of the expression "house" as used in section 89 of

the Bombay Village. Panchayat Act, 1933 (hereinafter re-

ferred to as the Act).

The respondent is a village Panchayat constituted under

the provisions of the Act. In exercise of powers conferred

on it for imposition of taxes on houses under section 89 of

the .Act, the respondent by a resolution dated 24 February,

1952 imposed tax on houses within its jurisdiction. The

resolution of 24 February, 1952 decided to levy a tax on

house at the rate of Annas -/4/- for every Rs. 100. The

resolution further decided that the basis for valuation for

a room of old house would be Rs. 100/-, for a room of new

house Rs. 125/and for Verandah (Padvi) Rs. 25/-.

By another resolution dated 10 August, 1964 the

respondent revised the tax on house at the rate of 40 nP.

for Rs. 100/- The resolution further said that for facto-

ries as a concession the tax would be 25 nP for Rs. 100/- on

capital value.

The appellant has factory buildings. The respondent by

a notice dated 10 January, 1969 made a demand of taxes on

the factory building of the appellant for the years 1967-68

and 1968-69. The respondent charged at the rate of 25 nP for

Rs. 100/-. The respondent did not charge the appellant at

the rate of 40 nP for Rs. 100/- which was the increased rate

pursuant to the resolution dated 10 August, 1964. The re-

spondent thereafter made a demand in the year 1969-70. The

aggregate tax involved in this appeal comes to Rs.

1,34,763/- for the years 1967-68, 1968-69 and 1969-70.

The appellant contended that in 1952 when the resolu-

tion was passed by the respondent levying taxes on houses

the respondent was not empowered to tax factory buildings.

The principal reason advanced by the appellant is that only

in 1954 the word "building" was substituted for the word

"house", and, therefore, the respondent would have no power

to impose taxes on the factory buildings by me resolution in

1952.

The other contention on behalf of the appellant is that

if the resolution dated 24 February, 1952 be held to be

valid levying a tax on factory praises the resolution was

replaced by the resolution of 10 August, 1964. Here the

contention of the appellant is that the resolution of 1964

is not valid because it was not passed in accordance with

the Act and the Rules. The appellant, therefore, contends

that the resolution in 1964 is void the resolution in 1952

would not be operative to support the tax.

The provisions contained in section 89 of the Act are as

follows:–

"Levy of taxes and fees by Panchayat: (1) Every Panchayat

shall levy in such manner and at such rates as may be pre-

scribed such of the taxes or fees specified in sub-section

(2) as may be necessary for the proper discharge by the

Panchayat of its duties under this Act.

(2) Taxes or fees which are leviable by a Panchayat under

sub-section (1) are:–

(i) a tax upon the owners or occupiers of houses and

lands within the limits of the village;

(ii) a pilgrim tax;

(iii) a tax on fairs and festivals,

(iv) a tax on sales of goods;

(v) octroi;

(vi) a tax on marriages, adoptions and feasts;

(vii) any other tax which may have been approved by the

district local board and sanctioned by Government."

Section 89 of the Act was amended by Amendment Act No.

of 1939 as follows :–

("a) For sub-section (1) the following shall be substituted,

namely:–

(1) Every panchayat shall levy a tax upon the owners or

occupiers of houses and lands which are not subject to

payment of agricultural assessment within the limits of the

village in such manner and at such rates as may be pre-

scribed. The rules made for the levy of such tax may provide

that the payment of such tax may be made either in cash or

by the rendering of work and labour."

Sub-section (2) was amended as follows :.

"It shall be competent t0 a panchayat to, levy all or any of

the taxes or fees at such rates and in such manner as may be

prescribed, namely, clause (i) shall be deleted."

In 1945 section 89 was amended as follows:

Sub-section (1) of section 89 was substituted by the follow-

ing

'(1) Every panchayat, other than a panchayat, in the dis-

tricts of Kolaba, Ratnagiri and Canara, shall levy a tax

upon the owners or occupiers of houses .and lands which are

not subject to payment of agricultural assessment within

the limits of the village m such manner and at such rates as

may be prescribed.

(1A) Every panchayat in the districts of Kolaba, Ratnagiri

and Kanara shall levy a tax upon the owners or occupiers of

houses including farm buildings whether or not subject t0

payment of agricultural assessment and of lands which are

not subject to payment of agricultural assessment, within

the limits of the village in such manner and at such rates

as may be prescribed.

(1B) The rules made for .the levy of the, tax specified in

subsection (1 )and (1 A) may provide that the payment of

such tax may be made either in cash or by the rendering of

work and labour."

In 1947 section 89 was amended as follows :–

"(1) Every panchayat shall levy a tax upon the owners or

occupiers of houses including farm buildings Whether or not

subject to payment of agricultural assessment and of land

which are not subject to payment of agriculural assessment,

within the limits of the village, in such manner, at such

rates and subject to such exemptions as may be prescribed.

(1A) Where an owner of a house or land has left the village

or cannot otherwise be found, any person to whom such house

or land has been transferred shall be liable for the tax

leviable under sub-section (1 ) from such owner.

(lB) The rules made for the levy of the tax specified in

sub-section (1) may provide that the payment of such tax may

be made either in cash or by rendering of work and labour."

Again, in 1947 in sub-section (2) after clause (vi) the

following new clause was inserted:

"(vi) (a) a tax on shops and hotels".

In 1952 section 89(2)(vi)(b) was amended as follows :–

"a tax on premises where machinery is run by steam, oil,

electric power or manual labour for any trade or busineess

and not for an agricultural or domestic purpose."

In 1954 section 89 was amended and the word "buildings"

was substituted for the words "houses including farm build-

ings" in subsection (1) thereof. Again in sub-section (IA)

of section 89 for the word "house" wherever it occurred the

word "building" was substituted. In subsection (2) of

section 89 for clauses (vi) (a) and (b) the following

clause was substituted :–

"(vi) (a) subject to the provisions of Article 276 of the

Constitution, a tax on the following professions, trades and

calling, namely :-

(a) shop keeping and hotel keeping;

(b) any trade or calling (other than agriculture

which is carried on with the help of machinery run by steam,

oil, electric power or manual labour."

In 1959 the Act was repealed. The Bombay Village

Panchayats Act, 1958 being Act No. III of 1959 came into

existence. The

relevant section of the 1959 Act necessary for the purpose

of the present appeal is section 186(8) which is as follows

:–

"186. Notwithstanding the repeal of the said laws

and the foregoing provisions of this Act:

(8) any appointment, notification, notice, tax,

fee, order, scheme, licence, permission, rule, by-

law, or form made, issued, imposed, or granted in

respect of the said villages and in force on the

date of the commencement of this Act shall in so

far as they are not inconsistent be deemed to have

been made, issued, imposed or granted under this

Act in respect of the village and shall continue in

force until it is superseded or modified by any

appointment, notification, notice, tax, fee, order,

scheme, licence, permission, rule, by-law or form

made, issued, imposed or granted under this Act".

There is no dispute that the resolution of 1952 was

validly passed in exercise of powers conferred on the re-

spondent by section 89(1) of the Act. The principal conten-

tion of the appellant is that the word "house" means dwell-

ing house. The appellant relied on the decision in Wimble-

don Urban District Council v. Hastings(1) and Lewin v.

End(2) in support of the proposition that the expression

"house" means a dwelling house. The appellant sought to

support the contention by reference to the fact that the

word "house" which occurred in section 89 of the Act was

substituted by the word "building" in 195, indicating that

factory buildings would not be within the meaning of the

word "house".

The word "house" is not defined in the Act. This Court

in Ramavtar v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola(a) said

that the correct approach is to construe the word in that

sense which people conversant with the subject matter with

which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. Counsel

for the respondent rightly contended that the word "house"

would in its ordinary sense include any building irrespec-

tive of its user. To ascertain the meaning of the word

"house" one must understand the subject matter with respect

to which it is used in order to arrive at the sense in which

it is employed in a statute. Formerly, houses were built

that each house occupied a separate site. In modern times a

practice has grown up of putting separate houses one above

the other. They are built in separate flats or storeys. For

legal and ordinary purposes they are separate houses. Each

is separately let and separately occupied. One has no con-

nection with those above or below, except in so far as it

may derive support from those below instead of from the

ground as in the case of ordinary houses (See Yorkshire

Insurance v Clayton(4) and Grant v. Langston(5).

It may be stated generally that the word "house" is a

structure of a permanent character. It is structurally

severed from other tenements. It is not necessary that a

house if adapted for residential purposes should be actually

dwelt in [See Daniel v. Coulsting(6)]. A building in

(1) 87 Law Times Reports 118. (2) [1906] A.C. 299.

(3) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 279. (4) 8 Q.B.D. 424.

(5) [1900] A.C. 383. (6) 14 L.J.C.P. 70.

Convent Garden had formerly been a dwelling house but was

converted into a fruit store warehouse and offices in which

no one slept and was held to be a "house" as regards assess-

ment to the rector's rate within the provisions of the

relevant statute.

The idea of the varieties of meanings can be had from

the subject matter of the statute. A consecrated church was

treated as a house as regard the Building Line which a local

authority has a right to prescribe. [See Folkestone v.

Woodward(2)]. Under the Public Health Act, 1875 "house" was

not limited to an ordinary dwelling house and included a day

school having no boarders and where none of the staff resid-

ed. See Wimbledon v. Hastings (supra). Under the compulsory

Purchase Act, 1965 "house" has been extended to a building

which is used for business purposes and is not restricted to

mere dwelling houses (See Ravenseft Properties v. London

Borough of Hillingdon(2).

The weight of judicial opinion is conclusively in favour

of the view that the word "house" extends to a building

which is used for business and should not be restricted to a

mere dwelling house (See Land Law, Cases and Materials by

R.H. Mandsley and E.H. Burn Third Edition, p. 832).

In Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 41 page 364 it is said that in

a legal sense, the word "house" is more comprehensive, but

it is not limited to a structure designed for human habita-

tion, and may mean a building or shed intended or used as a

habitation or shelter for animals of any kind, a building in

the ordinary sense or any building, edifice, or structure

inclosed with walls and covered, regardless of the fact of

human habitation. Again in Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 41 it is said that under particular circumstances,

the term has been held equivalent to and interchangeable or

synonymous with "building", "dwelling" and "dwelling house"

and sometimes "premises".

The 1952 resolution of the Gram Panchayat in the present

case is to be understood in the background of the provisions

contained in section 89 of the Act and the rules framed

under section 108 of the Act. The rules were placed before

the legislature for approval. The rules framed in 2934 used

the words "lands and buildings" instead of the words "lands

and houses". The rules are a legitimate aid to construction

of the statute as Contemporanea Expositio (See Craies on

Statute Law 6th Edition p. 157).

The rules flamed in 1943 defined "house" as any building

or set of buildings within the same enclosure. In the Amend-

ing Act of 1945 the expressions "farm buildings" and

"houses" are used without distinction. The Act in 1933

conferred power upon the Panchayat to levy tax upon owners

or occupiers of houses and lands. This expression "houses

and lands" continued unchanged till the year 1952. It is

significant that the tax is not on houses alone but on lands

as well. It is unsound to hold that a land which is admit-

tedly taxable would be intended to be exempt when a building

housing a. factory is built upon it. The Act as initially

(1) L.R. 15 Eq. 159. (2) [19691 20 P & C.R. 483.

enacted conferred power upon the Panchayat to levy any one

of the taxes enumerated in sub-section (2). The first of

these was tax on houses and lands. Section 89 (1) of the

Act as it stood did not mention any particular tax. The

1939 Amendment changed the scheme. Section 89(1) of the Act

made it obligatory on Panchayats to levy tax on houses and

lands. In 1933 section 89(1) of the Act conferred optional

power on Panchayats to levy taxes. In 1939 section 89(1) of

the Act made it compulsory for Panchayats to levy tax on

owners or occupiers of houses and lands which are not sub-

ject to payment of agricultural assessment. The six other

taxes mentioned in section 89 (2) of the Act starting from

clauses (ii) to (vii) namely, a pilgrim tax, a tax on fairs

and festivals; a tax on sales of goods, octroi; a tax on

marriages, adoptions and feasts; and any other tax which may

have been approved by the district local board and sanc-

tioned by Government were made optional. A tax upon owners

or occupiers on houses and lands which figures in clause (i)

of section 89(2) of the Act was deleted, by the Amendment

Act of 1939 inasmuch as taxes on houses and lands became a

compulsory power of taxation under section 89( 1 ) of the

Act.

Reference may be made to the addition of clause (vi)(a)

in section 89(2) of the Act which was introduced in 1947 as

conferring power on Panchayats to levy tax on shops and

hotels. This indicates that the tax was on the business of

shops and the business of hotel. The tax was not on the

houses where such business was run. Section 124 of the 1959

Act which came in place of section 89 of the Act shows that

"shop keeping" and "hotel keeping" are considered to be

trades and callings.

The amendment of the year 1945 shows that a separate

provision was made for taxing farm buildings in three dis-

tricts of Colaba, Ratnagin and Kanara, where farm buildings

were constructed on agricultural land. The idea was to bring

such farm buildings within the province of assessment.

The amendment in 1952 added a tax on premises where

machinery is run by steam, oil, electric power or manual

labour in trade or business and not for agricultural or

domestic purposes. This addition of clause (vi) (b) to

section 89(2) of the Act illustrates one more kind of

optional tax as different from obligatory tax on houses and

lands within section 89 ( 1 ) of the Act.

The amendment of 1954 where the word "building" was

substituted for the word "house" does not help the appellant

to suggest that factories will be included only within

buildings and not within houses. The appellant referred to

statement of objects and reasons which said that the village

panchayat could not levy a tax on buildings, and, therefore,

the word "buildings" was substituted for the word "houses".

The statement of objects and reasons is ordinarily not used

as aid to construction of a statute. A statement is some-

times referred to for the limited purposes of finding the

object of the legislature in enacting the statute where all

other methods of interpretation fail.

The words "houses and lands" as used in section 89 of

the Act mean all buildings, and factory buildings would be

included within that meaning. The use of the expression

"buildings" in place of the words "houses including farm

buildings" made explicit what was, implicit in the statute.

Having regard to the nature of the word "houses" as used in

taxing legislations and municipal legislation and the nature

and purposes of the statute in the present case it is mani-

fest that the legislature used the word "house" so that the

village panchayat would be in a position to levy taxes on

all buildings situated in the village. The rule makers made

no distinction between the dwelling houses and buildings.

The second contention of the appellant is unacceptable.

The resolution of 10 August, 1964 did not supersede or

modify the resolution of 24 February, 1952. No levy was

actually imposed pursuant to the resolution of 10 August,

1964. Further the bills served on the appellant were pursu-

ant to the levies imposed under the resolution of 24 Febru-

ary 1952. In 1964 a tax on factory buildings was not raised.

The tax on houses was raised. Even if the resolution of 10

August, 1964 be invalid the demands made by the respondent

under the 1952 resolution are valid and legal for two rea-

sons. First, the resolution of 1952 has never been super-

seded; and second, section 186(8) of the 1959 Act indicates

that any tax imposed shall in so far as they are not incon-

sistent be deemed to have been made under the 1959 Act shall

continue in force until they are superseded or modified.

There is nothing to show that the tax is inconsistent with

the 1959 Act, nor was it argued to be so.

For these reasons the contentions of the appellant fail.

The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

V.P.S. Appeal dis-

missed.

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