Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd. v. Gram
Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd. v. Gram
LOK 1976 (8) SC 235
Equivalent citations: AIR 1976 SC 2463 : 1976 (4) SCC 177 : 1977 (1) SCR 306
- Court
- Supreme Court of India
- Bench
- A.N. Ray, CJI; M. Hameedullah Beg, J.; Jaswant Singh, J.
- Case No.
- No
Provisions referred
Cases referred 3
- Ramavtar v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer Referred (Para 1952)
- Wimbledon v. Hastings (supra). Under Referred (Para 1952)
- See Ravenseft Properties v. London Referred (Para 1952)
Referred in 1
- P.Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology LOK 1995 (3) SC 242 Referred (Para 20)
Judgment
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.
2238 of 1969.
(From the Judgment and order dated 8-9-1969 of the Bombay
High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1270/69).
M.C. Bhandare, J.B. Dadachanji, O.C. Mathur, K.J. John
and Shri Narain for the Appellant.
B.D. Bal, M.S. Narasimhan and R.B. Ds, tar for the Respond-
ent.
RAY, C.J.–This appeal by certificate turns on the
meaning of the expression "house" as used in section 89 of
the Bombay Village. Panchayat Act, 1933 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Act).
The respondent is a village Panchayat constituted under
the provisions of the Act. In exercise of powers conferred
on it for imposition of taxes on houses under section 89 of
the .Act, the respondent by a resolution dated 24 February,
1952 imposed tax on houses within its jurisdiction. The
resolution of 24 February, 1952 decided to levy a tax on
house at the rate of Annas -/4/- for every Rs. 100. The
resolution further decided that the basis for valuation for
a room of old house would be Rs. 100/-, for a room of new
house Rs. 125/and for Verandah (Padvi) Rs. 25/-.
By another resolution dated 10 August, 1964 the
respondent revised the tax on house at the rate of 40 nP.
for Rs. 100/- The resolution further said that for facto-
ries as a concession the tax would be 25 nP for Rs. 100/- on
capital value.
The appellant has factory buildings. The respondent by
a notice dated 10 January, 1969 made a demand of taxes on
the factory building of the appellant for the years 1967-68
and 1968-69. The respondent charged at the rate of 25 nP for
Rs. 100/-. The respondent did not charge the appellant at
the rate of 40 nP for Rs. 100/- which was the increased rate
pursuant to the resolution dated 10 August, 1964. The re-
spondent thereafter made a demand in the year 1969-70. The
aggregate tax involved in this appeal comes to Rs.
1,34,763/- for the years 1967-68, 1968-69 and 1969-70.
The appellant contended that in 1952 when the resolu-
tion was passed by the respondent levying taxes on houses
the respondent was not empowered to tax factory buildings.
The principal reason advanced by the appellant is that only
in 1954 the word "building" was substituted for the word
"house", and, therefore, the respondent would have no power
to impose taxes on the factory buildings by me resolution in
1952.
The other contention on behalf of the appellant is that
if the resolution dated 24 February, 1952 be held to be
valid levying a tax on factory praises the resolution was
replaced by the resolution of 10 August, 1964. Here the
contention of the appellant is that the resolution of 1964
is not valid because it was not passed in accordance with
the Act and the Rules. The appellant, therefore, contends
that the resolution in 1964 is void the resolution in 1952
would not be operative to support the tax.
The provisions contained in section 89 of the Act are as
follows:–
"Levy of taxes and fees by Panchayat: (1) Every Panchayat
shall levy in such manner and at such rates as may be pre-
scribed such of the taxes or fees specified in sub-section
(2) as may be necessary for the proper discharge by the
Panchayat of its duties under this Act.
(2) Taxes or fees which are leviable by a Panchayat under
sub-section (1) are:–
(i) a tax upon the owners or occupiers of houses and
lands within the limits of the village;
(ii) a pilgrim tax;
(iii) a tax on fairs and festivals,
(iv) a tax on sales of goods;
(v) octroi;
(vi) a tax on marriages, adoptions and feasts;
(vii) any other tax which may have been approved by the
district local board and sanctioned by Government."
Section 89 of the Act was amended by Amendment Act No.
of 1939 as follows :–
("a) For sub-section (1) the following shall be substituted,
namely:–
(1) Every panchayat shall levy a tax upon the owners or
occupiers of houses and lands which are not subject to
payment of agricultural assessment within the limits of the
village in such manner and at such rates as may be pre-
scribed. The rules made for the levy of such tax may provide
that the payment of such tax may be made either in cash or
by the rendering of work and labour."
Sub-section (2) was amended as follows :.
"It shall be competent t0 a panchayat to, levy all or any of
the taxes or fees at such rates and in such manner as may be
prescribed, namely, clause (i) shall be deleted."
In 1945 section 89 was amended as follows:
Sub-section (1) of section 89 was substituted by the follow-
ing
'(1) Every panchayat, other than a panchayat, in the dis-
tricts of Kolaba, Ratnagiri and Canara, shall levy a tax
upon the owners or occupiers of houses .and lands which are
not subject to payment of agricultural assessment within
the limits of the village m such manner and at such rates as
may be prescribed.
(1A) Every panchayat in the districts of Kolaba, Ratnagiri
and Kanara shall levy a tax upon the owners or occupiers of
houses including farm buildings whether or not subject t0
payment of agricultural assessment and of lands which are
not subject to payment of agricultural assessment, within
the limits of the village in such manner and at such rates
as may be prescribed.
(1B) The rules made for .the levy of the, tax specified in
subsection (1 )and (1 A) may provide that the payment of
such tax may be made either in cash or by the rendering of
work and labour."
In 1947 section 89 was amended as follows :–
"(1) Every panchayat shall levy a tax upon the owners or
occupiers of houses including farm buildings Whether or not
subject to payment of agricultural assessment and of land
which are not subject to payment of agriculural assessment,
within the limits of the village, in such manner, at such
rates and subject to such exemptions as may be prescribed.
(1A) Where an owner of a house or land has left the village
or cannot otherwise be found, any person to whom such house
or land has been transferred shall be liable for the tax
leviable under sub-section (1 ) from such owner.
(lB) The rules made for the levy of the tax specified in
sub-section (1) may provide that the payment of such tax may
be made either in cash or by rendering of work and labour."
Again, in 1947 in sub-section (2) after clause (vi) the
following new clause was inserted:
"(vi) (a) a tax on shops and hotels".
In 1952 section 89(2)(vi)(b) was amended as follows :–
"a tax on premises where machinery is run by steam, oil,
electric power or manual labour for any trade or busineess
and not for an agricultural or domestic purpose."
In 1954 section 89 was amended and the word "buildings"
was substituted for the words "houses including farm build-
ings" in subsection (1) thereof. Again in sub-section (IA)
of section 89 for the word "house" wherever it occurred the
word "building" was substituted. In subsection (2) of
section 89 for clauses (vi) (a) and (b) the following
clause was substituted :–
"(vi) (a) subject to the provisions of Article 276 of the
Constitution, a tax on the following professions, trades and
calling, namely :-
(a) shop keeping and hotel keeping;
(b) any trade or calling (other than agriculture
which is carried on with the help of machinery run by steam,
oil, electric power or manual labour."
In 1959 the Act was repealed. The Bombay Village
Panchayats Act, 1958 being Act No. III of 1959 came into
existence. The
relevant section of the 1959 Act necessary for the purpose
of the present appeal is section 186(8) which is as follows
:–
"186. Notwithstanding the repeal of the said laws
and the foregoing provisions of this Act:
(8) any appointment, notification, notice, tax,
fee, order, scheme, licence, permission, rule, by-
law, or form made, issued, imposed, or granted in
respect of the said villages and in force on the
date of the commencement of this Act shall in so
far as they are not inconsistent be deemed to have
been made, issued, imposed or granted under this
Act in respect of the village and shall continue in
force until it is superseded or modified by any
appointment, notification, notice, tax, fee, order,
scheme, licence, permission, rule, by-law or form
made, issued, imposed or granted under this Act".
There is no dispute that the resolution of 1952 was
validly passed in exercise of powers conferred on the re-
spondent by section 89(1) of the Act. The principal conten-
tion of the appellant is that the word "house" means dwell-
ing house. The appellant relied on the decision in Wimble-
don Urban District Council v. Hastings(1) and Lewin v.
End(2) in support of the proposition that the expression
"house" means a dwelling house. The appellant sought to
support the contention by reference to the fact that the
word "house" which occurred in section 89 of the Act was
substituted by the word "building" in 195, indicating that
factory buildings would not be within the meaning of the
word "house".
The word "house" is not defined in the Act. This Court
in Ramavtar v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola(a) said
that the correct approach is to construe the word in that
sense which people conversant with the subject matter with
which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. Counsel
for the respondent rightly contended that the word "house"
would in its ordinary sense include any building irrespec-
tive of its user. To ascertain the meaning of the word
"house" one must understand the subject matter with respect
to which it is used in order to arrive at the sense in which
it is employed in a statute. Formerly, houses were built
that each house occupied a separate site. In modern times a
practice has grown up of putting separate houses one above
the other. They are built in separate flats or storeys. For
legal and ordinary purposes they are separate houses. Each
is separately let and separately occupied. One has no con-
nection with those above or below, except in so far as it
may derive support from those below instead of from the
ground as in the case of ordinary houses (See Yorkshire
Insurance v Clayton(4) and Grant v. Langston(5).
It may be stated generally that the word "house" is a
structure of a permanent character. It is structurally
severed from other tenements. It is not necessary that a
house if adapted for residential purposes should be actually
dwelt in [See Daniel v. Coulsting(6)]. A building in
(1) 87 Law Times Reports 118. (2) [1906] A.C. 299.
(3) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 279. (4) 8 Q.B.D. 424.
(5) [1900] A.C. 383. (6) 14 L.J.C.P. 70.
Convent Garden had formerly been a dwelling house but was
converted into a fruit store warehouse and offices in which
no one slept and was held to be a "house" as regards assess-
ment to the rector's rate within the provisions of the
relevant statute.
The idea of the varieties of meanings can be had from
the subject matter of the statute. A consecrated church was
treated as a house as regard the Building Line which a local
authority has a right to prescribe. [See Folkestone v.
Woodward(2)]. Under the Public Health Act, 1875 "house" was
not limited to an ordinary dwelling house and included a day
school having no boarders and where none of the staff resid-
ed. See Wimbledon v. Hastings (supra). Under the compulsory
Purchase Act, 1965 "house" has been extended to a building
which is used for business purposes and is not restricted to
mere dwelling houses (See Ravenseft Properties v. London
Borough of Hillingdon(2).
The weight of judicial opinion is conclusively in favour
of the view that the word "house" extends to a building
which is used for business and should not be restricted to a
mere dwelling house (See Land Law, Cases and Materials by
R.H. Mandsley and E.H. Burn Third Edition, p. 832).
In Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 41 page 364 it is said that in
a legal sense, the word "house" is more comprehensive, but
it is not limited to a structure designed for human habita-
tion, and may mean a building or shed intended or used as a
habitation or shelter for animals of any kind, a building in
the ordinary sense or any building, edifice, or structure
inclosed with walls and covered, regardless of the fact of
human habitation. Again in Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 41 it is said that under particular circumstances,
the term has been held equivalent to and interchangeable or
synonymous with "building", "dwelling" and "dwelling house"
and sometimes "premises".
The 1952 resolution of the Gram Panchayat in the present
case is to be understood in the background of the provisions
contained in section 89 of the Act and the rules framed
under section 108 of the Act. The rules were placed before
the legislature for approval. The rules framed in 2934 used
the words "lands and buildings" instead of the words "lands
and houses". The rules are a legitimate aid to construction
of the statute as Contemporanea Expositio (See Craies on
Statute Law 6th Edition p. 157).
The rules flamed in 1943 defined "house" as any building
or set of buildings within the same enclosure. In the Amend-
ing Act of 1945 the expressions "farm buildings" and
"houses" are used without distinction. The Act in 1933
conferred power upon the Panchayat to levy tax upon owners
or occupiers of houses and lands. This expression "houses
and lands" continued unchanged till the year 1952. It is
significant that the tax is not on houses alone but on lands
as well. It is unsound to hold that a land which is admit-
tedly taxable would be intended to be exempt when a building
housing a. factory is built upon it. The Act as initially
(1) L.R. 15 Eq. 159. (2) [19691 20 P & C.R. 483.
enacted conferred power upon the Panchayat to levy any one
of the taxes enumerated in sub-section (2). The first of
these was tax on houses and lands. Section 89 (1) of the
Act as it stood did not mention any particular tax. The
1939 Amendment changed the scheme. Section 89(1) of the Act
made it obligatory on Panchayats to levy tax on houses and
lands. In 1933 section 89(1) of the Act conferred optional
power on Panchayats to levy taxes. In 1939 section 89(1) of
the Act made it compulsory for Panchayats to levy tax on
owners or occupiers of houses and lands which are not sub-
ject to payment of agricultural assessment. The six other
taxes mentioned in section 89 (2) of the Act starting from
clauses (ii) to (vii) namely, a pilgrim tax, a tax on fairs
and festivals; a tax on sales of goods, octroi; a tax on
marriages, adoptions and feasts; and any other tax which may
have been approved by the district local board and sanc-
tioned by Government were made optional. A tax upon owners
or occupiers on houses and lands which figures in clause (i)
of section 89(2) of the Act was deleted, by the Amendment
Act of 1939 inasmuch as taxes on houses and lands became a
compulsory power of taxation under section 89( 1 ) of the
Act.
Reference may be made to the addition of clause (vi)(a)
in section 89(2) of the Act which was introduced in 1947 as
conferring power on Panchayats to levy tax on shops and
hotels. This indicates that the tax was on the business of
shops and the business of hotel. The tax was not on the
houses where such business was run. Section 124 of the 1959
Act which came in place of section 89 of the Act shows that
"shop keeping" and "hotel keeping" are considered to be
trades and callings.
The amendment of the year 1945 shows that a separate
provision was made for taxing farm buildings in three dis-
tricts of Colaba, Ratnagin and Kanara, where farm buildings
were constructed on agricultural land. The idea was to bring
such farm buildings within the province of assessment.
The amendment in 1952 added a tax on premises where
machinery is run by steam, oil, electric power or manual
labour in trade or business and not for agricultural or
domestic purposes. This addition of clause (vi) (b) to
section 89(2) of the Act illustrates one more kind of
optional tax as different from obligatory tax on houses and
lands within section 89 ( 1 ) of the Act.
The amendment of 1954 where the word "building" was
substituted for the word "house" does not help the appellant
to suggest that factories will be included only within
buildings and not within houses. The appellant referred to
statement of objects and reasons which said that the village
panchayat could not levy a tax on buildings, and, therefore,
the word "buildings" was substituted for the word "houses".
The statement of objects and reasons is ordinarily not used
as aid to construction of a statute. A statement is some-
times referred to for the limited purposes of finding the
object of the legislature in enacting the statute where all
other methods of interpretation fail.
The words "houses and lands" as used in section 89 of
the Act mean all buildings, and factory buildings would be
included within that meaning. The use of the expression
"buildings" in place of the words "houses including farm
buildings" made explicit what was, implicit in the statute.
Having regard to the nature of the word "houses" as used in
taxing legislations and municipal legislation and the nature
and purposes of the statute in the present case it is mani-
fest that the legislature used the word "house" so that the
village panchayat would be in a position to levy taxes on
all buildings situated in the village. The rule makers made
no distinction between the dwelling houses and buildings.
The second contention of the appellant is unacceptable.
The resolution of 10 August, 1964 did not supersede or
modify the resolution of 24 February, 1952. No levy was
actually imposed pursuant to the resolution of 10 August,
1964. Further the bills served on the appellant were pursu-
ant to the levies imposed under the resolution of 24 Febru-
ary 1952. In 1964 a tax on factory buildings was not raised.
The tax on houses was raised. Even if the resolution of 10
August, 1964 be invalid the demands made by the respondent
under the 1952 resolution are valid and legal for two rea-
sons. First, the resolution of 1952 has never been super-
seded; and second, section 186(8) of the 1959 Act indicates
that any tax imposed shall in so far as they are not incon-
sistent be deemed to have been made under the 1959 Act shall
continue in force until they are superseded or modified.
There is nothing to show that the tax is inconsistent with
the 1959 Act, nor was it argued to be so.
For these reasons the contentions of the appellant fail.
The appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
V.P.S. Appeal dis-
missed.
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