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Union of India v. Parma Nanda

Union of India v. Parma Nanda

LOK Law Journal

LOK 1989 (3) SC 143

Equivalent citations: 1989 (10) ATC 30 : AIR 1989 SC 1185 : 1989 (42) ELT 320 : 1989 (58) FLR 934 : 1989 (75) FJR 168 : 1989 (2) JT 132 : 1989 LIC 1338 : 1989 (2) LLJ 57 : 1989 (1) LLN 800 : 1989 (2) SLR 410 : 1989 (1) Scale 606 : 1989 (2) SCC 177 : 1989 (2) SCR 19 : 1989 (2) UJ 97 : AIR 1989 SC 1899 : 1989 SCC(L&,S) 303 : 1989 LabIC 1338 : 1989 (2) CLR 1 : 1989 SCC (2) 177 JT 1989 (2) 132

Court
Supreme Court of India
Bench
K.J. Shetty, J.*; A.M. Ahmadi, J.; Kuldip Singh, J.
Decided on
Case No.
Civil Appeal No. 1709 of 1988
For petitioner / appellant
WITH (SLP (Civil) No. 6998 of 1988) V.C. Mahajan, Mrs. Indu Goswami, C.V. Subba Rao, P. Parmeshwaran, for the Appellant. in C.A. No. 1709 of 1988. M.K.D. Namboodary, for the Petitioner.
For respondent
in SLP (Civil) N o. 6998 of 1988. S.M. Ashri and Mahabir Singh, for the Respondents.
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Print

Provisions referred

Cases referred 11

  1. Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel LOK 1985 (7) SC 111 : [1985] 3 SCC 398 Referred (Para 583)
  2. Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh LOK 1983 (1) SC 241 : [1983] 2 SCC 44 Referred (Para 583)
  3. Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur LOK 1971 (10) SC 281 : [1972] 2 SCR 218 Referred (Para 583)
  4. Zora Singh v. J.M. Tandon LOK 1970 (9) SC 93 : AIR 1971 SC 1537 Referred (Para 583)
  5. State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra LOK 1962 (10) SC 191 Referred (Para 583)
  6. Act in S.P. Sampat Kumar v. Union Referred (Para 1)
  7. State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Referred (Para 1)
  8. Dhirajlal Girdharilal v. Commissioner of Income-ta Referred (Para 1)
  9. State of Maharashtra v. B.K. Takkamore & Ors. Referred (Para 1)
  10. Railway Board v. Niranjan Sing Referred (Para 583)
  11. Shankar Dass v. Union of India Referred (Para 583)

Referred in 5

  1. V K Naswa v. Home Secretary U O I LOK 2012 (1) SC 91 Referred (Para 9)
  2. Management of Coimbatore District Central Co-Operative Bank v. Secretary, Coimbatore District Central Co-Operative Bank Employees Association & Anr. LOK 2007 (4) SC 233 Referred (Para 486)
  3. M/s. Obette Pvt. Ltd. v. Mohd. Shafiq Khan LOK 2005 (9) SC 232 Referred (Para 1)
  4. Cellular Operators Association of India v. Unio LOK 2002 (12) SC 1712 Referred (Para 1)
  5. Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra LOK 1999 (1) SC 202 Referred (Para 1)

Judgment

K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J.

The civil appeal, by speci al

leave, and the connected SLP raise an important issue as to

the power of the Central Administration Tribun al

("Tribunal") to examine the adequacy of penalty awarded by

the competent authority to a Government servant in discipl i-

nary proceedings.

Short factual background is this:

Parmanand–Respondent in the appeal was a Time Keeper in

Beas Sutlej Link Project, Sundernagar. He was incharge of

preparing the pay bills and other bills of the work charg ed

employees of the project. It was alleged that he maSte r-

minded and prepared the pay roll pertaining to 'T' Token of

Central Survey Division, Sundernagar for the month of M ay

1969 and entered the name of one Shri Ashok Kumar, Token N o.

59-T at serial No. 10 on page 2 of the relevant pay roll. He

made this entry with ulterior motive to withdraw the pay of

Ashok Kumar for the month of May 1969, even though Ash ok

Kumar was not working in that Division. A bogus identi ty

card in the name of Ashok Kumar T.No. 59-T with the sign a-

tures of the issuing officer was also prepared by the r e-

spondent although it was not his duty to prepare the ident i-

ty card. The said fictitious identity card was used by o ne

Suraj Singh, cleaner T. No. 210-K of Beggi Tunnelling Div i-

sion for the purpose of withdrawing the pay of Ashok Kuma r.

While Suraj Singh by impersonation was receiving the pay of

Ashok Kumar, he was recognised by the Cashier since he kn ew

him personally. There then started an enquiry followed by

departmental proceedings against three persons includi ng

the respondent herein. The Personnel Officer of the

BSL Project was appointed as Inquiry Officer. The enqui ry

was conducted under the Punjab Government Servants Condu ct

Rules, 1966.

The Inquiry Officer framed charge against the responde nt

in the following terms:

"That the said Shri Parma Nand, while working as

Time Keeper in Time Keeping Sub-Division of Beas Sutlej Li nk

Project, Sundernagar during the month of May 1969 failed to

maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty in as mu ch

as he falsely marked the attendance of Shri Ashok Kuma r,

Token No. 59-T in the Pay Roll of Control Survey Divisi on

for the month of May 1969, which resulted in fictitio us

drawal of Rs.238-90 as pay of the said Shri Ashok Kumar. He

also prepared a bogus identity card in the name of the abo ve

Shri Ashok Kumar and initiated it below the signatures of

issuing officer and this identity card Was used by Sh ri

Suraj Singh, Cleaner (Token No. 210-K), Boggi Tunnelli ng

Division, at the time of attempting to receive the pay of

Shri Ashok Kumar from the Cashier."

After a detailed enquiry against the respondent and t wo

others, the Inquiry Officer found all the three guilty of

the charge framed against each of them. The report of e n-

quiry was forwarded to the competent authority who aft er

giving an opportunity of being heard dismissed the respon d-

ent from service. The other two persons were let off wi th

minor punishments of withholding two or three future incr e-

ments in their pay scales.

The respondent moved the High Court of Himachal Prade sh

under Article 226 challenging the findings of Inquiry off i-

cer as well as the order of dismissal passed by the comp e-

tent authority. During the pendency of the writ petition, a

Bench of the Central Tribunal at Chandigarh was constitut ed

under the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985. Consequentl y,

the said writ petition stood transferred to the Tribunal by

operation of S. 29 of that Act.

The Tribunal upon consideration of the matter agre ed

with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer that t he

respondent was the master mind behind the scheme to defra ud

the project. The Tribunal observed:

"Since the applicant had. access to the records which

were fabricated at the relevant time the Inquiry Officer h ad

come to the conclusion that the applicant was the mast er

mind behind the scheme to defraud the Project.

In view of the foregoing, it cannot be termed th at

the finding returned by the Inquiry Officer is without a ny

evidence. "

It was also observed that there was no denial of a

reasonable opportunity for the respondent to set up prop er

defence. After reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal pr o-

ceeded to examine the adequacy of penalty awarded to t he

respondent. This is how the Tribunal dealt with that que s-

tion:

"Lastly, it was argued on behalf of the applicant that t he

punishment awarded to him is disproportionate to the gravi ty

of the charge proved against him and is in stark contrast to

the punishment awarded to his other three colleagues in

whose cases, only future increments were stopped, the max i-

mum being for three years in respect of Shri Sain Ditt a,

Clerk. The finding regarding the applicant being t he

master-mind behind the attempt to defraud the Project a p-

pears to have weighed. with the disciplinary authority whi le

dismissing the applicant from service. An appreciation of

the evidence, as done in the preceding pages, would sh ow

that the applicant had entered the name of Shri Ashok Kum ar

in the pay roll for May 1969 and so far as other eviden ce

against him is concerned, it is mostly of a circumstanti al

nature. There is no direct or expert evidence that it was he

who had marked the attendance of Shri Ashok Kumar in the p ay

roll for May 1969 or that it was he who had initiated t he

identity card. The evidence against him is circumstantial in

as much as the pay roll was under his custody and he cou ld

have access to the identity cards. Under these circu m-

stances, the evidence that the applicant was the only mast er

mind who sought to defraud the project of the funds cann ot

be termed to be direct."

The Tribunal concluded:

"As such it is a case where the applicant shou ld

not be measured with a different yardstick than the other s,

who have been punished along with applicant. In the intere st

of

justice, it is necessary to modify the punishment awarded to

the applicant. We, therefore, direct that the punishment of

dismissal awarded to the applicant be reduced to that of

stopping of his five increments which he had earned for a

period of five years, in terms of clause (iv) of Rule 11 of

the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control a nd

Appeal) Rules, 1965. There will be no order as to costs. T he

respondents shah comply with this order within four mont hs

from its receipt and pay all consequential benefits to t he

applicant."

The Tribunal seems to suggest that the respondent w as

not the only master mind to commit the fraudulent act a nd

there were others too, and as such, he should not be mea s-

ured with a different yardstick. The Tribunal however, h as

held that the respondent was guilty of entering the name of

Ashok Kumar in the pay roll of May 4969. Yet it modified t he

punishment to fall in line with that of others whose pa rt

inthe fraudulent act was evidently not similar in nature.

Being aggrieved by the reduction of penalty, the Uni on

of India has preferred the Civil Appeal No. 1709 of 198 8.

Parma Nanda seeking a complete exoneration from the char ge

has preferred the SLP No. 6998 of 1988.

The question which has to be decided, therefore, is

whether the Tribunal has power to modify the penalty award ed

to the respondent when the findings recorded as to h is

misdemeanour is supported by legal evidence. To put in oth er

words, whether the Tribunal could interfere with the penal ty

awarded by the Competent authority on the ground that it is

excessive or disproportionate to the misconduct proved? T he

answer to the question cannot be determined without refe r-

ence to the scope of judicial review in the pre-Tribun al

period. It is also necessary to remember the purpose f or

which the Tribunal came to be established. Before the Trib u-

nal was constituted, the Courts were exercising judici al

review of administrative decisions in public services. Th is

judicial review was sought to be taken awary by the Const i-

tution (42nd Amendment Act, 1976). By this amendment, Art i-

cles 323A and 323B were introduced in the Constitutio n,

thereby opening altogether a new chapter in our Administr a-

tive law. Article 323A(1) which is relevant for our purpo se

is confined to matters relating to the public services. It

provides power to Parliament to enact law for establishme nt

of Administrative Tribunals for adjudication of disput es

with regard to service matters. The service matters are of

persons appointed to the public service and posts. T he

public service and posts may be in connection with t he

affairs of the union or of any State. The law to be enact ed

by Parliament may also cover persons appointed in the loc al

or other authority or of any corporation owned or controll ed

by the Government. There should be only one Tribunal for t he

Union of India and one for each State or for two or mo re

States put together. The law cannot provide for hierarchy of

Tribunals. In pursuance of Articles 323A(1) the Parliame nt

enacted the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 ("The Act").

We may briefly examine the statutory framework. Secti on

4 of the Act provides for establishment of Central Admini s-

trative Tribunal as well as State Administrative Tribuna l.

It also provides power to constitute Benches of the Centr al

Administrative Tribunal. Sections 5 to 11 deal with t he

composition of Tribunals and Benches thereof and terms of

office of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other member s.

Section 14 provides powers and authority to the Centr al

Administrative Tribunal. Section 15 deals with the simil ar

power and authority of the State Administrative Tribuna l.

Section 16 refers to the powers of a Joint Administrati ve

Tribunal. Section 22 states that the Tribunal shall not be

bound by the procedure laid down in Code of Civil Procedur e,

1908, but shall be guided by the principles of natur al

justice and subject to other provisions of the Act and of

any Rules made thereunder. The Tribunal could also regula te

its own procedure including the fixing of places and time of

enquiry and deciding whether to sit in public or in privat e.

Sub-section 2 of sec. 22 requires the Tribunal to deci de

every application made to it as expeditiously as possibl e.

Ordinarily, the Tribunal shall decide every application on a

perusal of documents and written representations and aft er

heating such oral arguments as may be advanced. Section

provides for execution of orders. Section 28 excludes t he

jurisdiction of all Courts except the Supreme Court. Secti on

29 directs transfer of cases pending in courts to the Trib u-

nal for adjudication.

In pursuance of the provisions of the Act, the Centr al

Government has established the Central Administrative Trib u-

nal with a Bench at Chandigarh whose order has been cha l-

lenged before us.

It is now necessary to examine in detail the amplitu de

of powers of the Tribunal. Section 14, so far materia l,

provides:

"14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of t he

Central Administrative Tribunal:

(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in th is

Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal shall exercise, on

and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers a nd

authority exercisable immediately before that day by a ll

courts (except Supreme Court) in relation to:

(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recrui t-

ment, to any All-India Service or to any civil service of

the Union or a civil post under the Union or to a po st

connected with defence or in the defence services, being in

either case, a post filled by a civilian;

(b) all service matters concerning–

Similar are the powers and authority of the State Ser v-

ice Tribunal under sec. 15 and Joint Administrative Tribun al

under sec. 16.'

The expression "all courts" in this connection includ es

civil courts and High Court but not the Supreme Court. T he

powers of the Supreme Court for obvious reasons have be en

expressly kept undisturbed. The powers of the High Cour ts

under Article 226, in so far as they are exercisable in

relation to service matters stand conferred on the Tribun al

established under the Act. The powers of other ordina ry

civil courts in relation to service matters to try all sui ts

of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizan ce

either expressly or impliedly barred also stand conferred on

the Tribunal.

This position becomes further clear by secs. 27, 28 a nd

29 of the Act. Section 27 provides for finality of t he

orders of the Tribunal. Section 28 excludes the jurisdicti on

of courts except the Supreme Court, or any Industrial Trib u-

nal, Labour Court, concerning service matters. Section

provides for automatic transfer of all pending proceedin gs

in the High Court under Articles 226 and 227, relating to

service matters (except appeals) to the Tribunal for adjud i-

cation. Likewise, suits and other proceedings pending befo re

a Court or other authority relating to service matters al so

stand transferred to the Tribunal for determination.

The Act thus excludes the jurisdiction, power and a u-

thority of all Courts except the Supreme Court and confe rs

the same on the Tribunal in relation to recruitment a nd

service matters. Section 3(2)

comprehensively defines 'service matters' to mean all ma t-

ters relating to conditions of service including the disc i-

plinary matters.

From an analysis of secs. 14, 15, 16, 27, 28 and 29, it

becomes apparent that in the case of proceedings transferr ed

to the Tribunal from a civil court or High Court, the Trib u-

nal has the jurisdiction to exercise all the powers whi ch

the civil court could in a suit or the High Court in a wr it

proceeding could have respectively exercised. In an origin al

proceedings instituted before the Tribunal under sec. 1 9,

the Tribunal can exercise any of the powers of a civ il

court, or High Court. The Tribunal thus could exercise on ly

such powers which the Civil Court or the High Court cou ld

have exercised by way of judicial review. It is neither le ss

nor more. Because, the Tribunal is just a substitute to t he

civil court and High Court. That has been put beyond t he

pale of controversy by this Court while upholding constit u-

tional validity of the Act in S.P. Sampat Kumar v. Union of

India & Ors., [1987] 1 SCC 124.

In this backdrop, we may consider the main question th at

we have set out at the beginning of the judgment. Mr. Mah a-

jan, learned counsel for the Central Government urged th at

the Tribunal has no powers to interfere with the punishme nt

imposed by the disciplinary authority on the ground that it

is disproportionate to the proved misdemeanour. He al so

urged that if the enquiry held against the delinquent off i-

cer was proper with the findings supported by evidence the n,

the Tribunal cannot substitute its own judgment to modi fy

the punishment awarded. Mr. Ashri, learned counsel for t he

respondent, however, justified the discretion exercised by

the Tribunal in awarding the lesser punishment. We do n ot

think that we could accept so bold a submission made for t he

respondent, nor can it be sustained by other consideratio n.

Indeed, the contention for the respondent is unsustainab le

in view of the decisions of this Court.

In State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan, [1963] Suppl 1 S CR

648 the enquiry was conducted against the petitioner on

several charges and eventually he was dismissed from ser v-

ice. The Orissa High Court found that the findings on two of

the charges were bad being in violation of the principles of

natural justice. The findings on the remaining charges we re

however, found to be justified. The High Court remitted t he

matter to the Government for fresh consideration for awar d-

ing a proper punishment. The High Court observed:

"That the findings in respect of charges l(a) and l(e)

should be set aside as being opposed to the rules of natur al

justice, but the findings in respect of charges l(c) a nd

l(d) and charge 2 need not be disturbed. It will be th en

left to Government to decide whether, on the basis of the se

charges, the punishment of dismissal should be maintain ed

'or else whether a lesser punishment would suffice."

The Supreme Court reversed this order on the ground th at

if the dismissal could be supported on any finding as to

substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment cou ld

lawfully be imposed, it was not for the. Court to consid er

whether that ground alone would have weighed with the a u-

thority dismissing the public servant. Shah, J. observed ( at

665-666):

" ….. in our view the High Court had no pow er

to direct the Governor of Orissa to reconsider the order of

dismissal. The constitutional guarantee afforded to a publ ic

servant is that he shall not be dismissed or removed by an

authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed, a nd

that he shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in ra nk

until he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showi ng

cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to

him. The reasonable opportunity contemplated has manifest ly

to be in accordance with the rules framed under Article 3

of the Constitution. But the Court in a case in which an

order of dismissal of a public servant is impugned, is n ot

concerned to decide whether the sentence imposed, provid ed

it is justified by the rules, is appropriate having rega rd

to the gravity of misdemeanour established. The reaso ns

which induce the punishing authority, if there has been an

enquiry consistent with the prescribed rules, is not just i-

fiable; nor is the penalty open to review by the court. If

the High Court is satisfied that if some but not all of t he

findings of the Tribunal were "unreasonable", the order of

the Governor on whose powers by the rules no restrictions in

determining the appropriate punishment are placed, w as

final, and the High Court had no jursidiction to direct t he

Governor to review the penalty, for as we have alrea dy

observed the order of dismissal passed by a competent a u-

thority on a public servant, if the conditions of the co n-

stitutional protection have been complied with, is n ot

justifiable. Therefore if the order may be supported on a ny

finding as to substantial misdemeanour for which the

punishment can lawfully be imposed, it is not for the cou rt

to consider whether that ground alone would have weigh ed

with the authority in dismissing the public servant. T he

court has no jurisdiction if the findings of the enqui ry

officer or the Tribunal prima facie make out a case of

misdemeanour, to direct the authority to reconsider th at

order because in respect of some of the findings but not a ll

it appears that there had been violation of the rules of

natural justice. The High Court was, in our judgment, in

error in directing the Governor of Orissa to reconsider t he

question."

In Dhirajlal Girdharilal v. Commissioner of Income-ta x,

AIR 1956 SC 271, Mehar Chand Mahajan, C.J., while deali ng

with a reference application against an order of Income T ax

Tribunal under the Indian Income Tax Act had struck slight ly

a different note (at 273):

"The learned Attorney General frankly conced ed

that it could not be denied that to a certain extent t he

Tribunal had drawn upon its own imagination and had made u se

of a number of surmises and conjectures in reaching i ts

result. He however, contended that eliminating the irrel e-

vant material employed by the Tribunal in arriving at i ts

conclusion, there was sufficient material on which t he

finding of fact could be supported. In our opinion, th is

contention is not well founded. It is well established th at

when a court of facts acts on material, partly relevant a nd

partly irrelevant, it is impossible to say to what exte nt

the mind of the court was affected by the irrelevant mater i-

al used by it in arriving at its finding. Such a finding is

vitiated because of the use of inadmissible material a nd

thereby an issue of law arises."

This proposition in Dhirajlal's case was explained a nd

the statement of law in Bidyabhushan's case was affirmed in

State of Maharashtra v. B.K. Takkamore & Ors., [1967] 2 S CR

583. It was case of supersession of the Corporation. T he

show cause notice issued to the corporation mentioned t wo

grounds for supersession. One of the grounds was held to be

irrelevant. This Court, however, upheld the order of supe r-

session stating that the order cannot be set aside f or

reason that one of the grounds is found to be non-existe nt

or irrelevant if another ground by itself was serious enou gh

to supersede the Corporation. Bachawat, J., said (at 594):

"The principle underlying these decisions appea rs

to be this. An administrative or quasi-judicial order bas ed

on several grounds, all taken together, cannot be sustain ed

if it be found that some of the grounds are non-existent or

irrelevant, and there is nothing to show that the authori ty

would have passed the order on the basis of the other rel e-

vant and existing grounds. On the other hand, an order bas ed

on several grounds some of which are found to be non-exis t-

ent or irrelevant, can be sustained if the court is sati s-

fied that the authority would have passed the order on t he

basis of the other relevant and existing grounds, and t he

exclusion of the irrelevant or non-existent grounds cou ld

not have affected the ultimate opinion or decision."

This principle again receives support from the decisi on

of in Zora Singh v. J.M. Tandon, AIR 1971 SC 1537. The re

the Chief Settlement Commissioner cancelled the allotment of

land made to a person but the High Court allowed the wr it

petition quashing the order of the Chief Settlement Commi s-

sioner and directing him to proceed to decide the case on

merits. The Commissioner re-heard the entire case as direc t-

ed by the Court but came to the same conclusion as befo re

and reaffirmed his earlier decision canceling the allotmen t.

The person unsuccessfully moved the High Court with a wr it

petition challenging the order of the Commissioner a nd

finally appealed to the Supreme Court. In dismissing th at

appeal, Shalat, J., made inter alia, the following observ a-

tions (at 1540):

"The High Court was right in holding that even if

there were amongst the reasons given by the Commissione r,

some which were extraneous, if the rest were relevant a nd

could be considered sufficient, the Commissioner's concl u-

sions would not be vitiated. The principle that if some of

the reasons relied on by a Tribunal for its conclusion tu rn

out to be extraneous or otherwise unsustainable, its dec i-

sion would be vitiated, applies to cases in which the co n-

clusion is arived at not on assessment of objective sati s-

faction. The reason is that whereas in cases where t he

decision is based on subjective satisfaction if some of t he

reasons turn out to be irrelevant or invalid, it would be

impossible for a superior court to find out which of t he

reasons, relevant or irrelevant, valid or invalid, h ad

brought about such satisfaction. But in a case where t he

conclusion is based on objective facts and evidence, such a

difficult

would not arise. If it is found that there was legal ev i-

dence before the Tribunal even if some of it was irrelevan t,

a superior court would not interfere if the finding can be

sustained on the rest of the evidence. The reason is that in

a writ petition for certiorari, the superior court does n ot

sit in appeal, but exercises only supervisory jurisdictio n,

and therefore, does not enter into the question of suff i-

ciency of evidence. There was, in our view, legal eviden ce

before the Commissioner upon which he was entitled to re st

his finding that the copies relied on by the appellant we re

not genuine."

The view taken in Bidyabhushan case has been repeated ly

affirmed and reiterated in Railway Board v. Niranjan Sing h,

[1969] 3 SCR 548 at 552; O.P. Gupta case AIR 1970 SC 679 a nd

Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, [1972] 2 SCR 218. A ny

doubts as to the incapacity of the Court to review t he

merits of the penalty must vanish when we read the remar ks

of Mathew, J., in Sardar Bahadur's case (at 225):

"A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal tria l.

The standard of proof required is that of preponderance of

probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If t he

inference that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have off i-

cial dealings, with the respondent was one which reasonab le

person would draw from the proved facts of the case, t he

High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decisi on

based on it. Where there are some relevant materials whi ch

the authority has accepted and which materials may reason a-

bly support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is

not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdi c-

tion under Art. 226 to review the materials and to arrive at

an independent finding on the materials. If the enquiry h as

been properly held the question of adequacy or reliabili ty

of the evidence cannot be convassed before the High Court. "

The learned Judge also said (at 227):

"Now it is settled by the decision of this Court in

State of Orissa v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra, that if the ord er

of a punishing authority can be supported on any finding as

to substantial misdemeanour for which the punishment can be

imposed, it is not for the Court to consider whether the

charge proved alone would have weighed with the authority in

imposing the punishment. The Court is not concerned to

decide whether the punishment imposed, provided it is just i-

fied by the rules, is appropriate having regard to t he

misdemeanour established."

So much is, we think, established law on the scope of

jurisdiction and the amplitude of powers of the Tribuna l.

However, of late we have been receiving a large number of

appeals from the orders of Tribunals–Central a nd

States–complaining about the interference with the penal ty

awarded in the disciplinary proceedings. The Tribunals se em

to take it within their discretion to interfere with t he

penalty on the ground that it is not commensurate with t he

delinquency of the official. The law already declared by

this Court, which we reiterate, makes it clear that t he

Tribunals have no such discretion or power.

We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of t he

Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or

punishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdictio n.

The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of t he

Inquiry Officer or competent authority where they are n ot

arbitrary or utterly perverse. It is appropriate to rememb er

that the power to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is

conferred on the competent authority either by an Act of

legislature or rules made under the provisoto Article 309

of the Constitution. If there has been an enquiry consiste nt

with the rules and in accordance with principles of natur al

justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice is a

matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the compete nt

authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is

imposed on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no pow er

to substitute its own discretion for that of the authorit y.

The adequacy of penalty unless it is malafide is certain ly

not a matter for the Tribunal to concern with. The Tribun al

also cannot interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of

the Inquiry Officer or the competent authority is based on

evidence even if some of it is found to be irrelevant or

extraneous to the matter.

Our attention was drawn to the decision of this Court in

Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, [1983] 2 SCC 44 2.

We do not consider that this decision is of any assistan ce

to support the contention urged for the respondent. The re

the facts found were entirely different. This Court, aft er

considering the matter was of opinion that the appella nt

therein was not offered a reasonable opportunity to defe nd

himself and accordingly the enquiry and consequential ord er

of

removal from service were found to be bad. Ordinarily, whe re

the disciplinary enquiry is shown to have been held in

violation of principles of natural justice, the enqui ry

would be vitiated and the order based on such enquiry wou ld

be quashed with liberty to hold fresh enquiry. But th at

procedure was not adopted by this Court since the char ge

against appellant was found to be a very minor infraction of

duty in checking hammer-marks of trees. That negligence, if

any, caused no loss to the Government, for, the man w ho

resorted unauthorised felling of trees, had compensated t he

Department. The appellant was a low paid class IV Governme nt

servant. Considering all these facts this Court felt that it

would not be fair to direct a low paid class IV employee to

face the hazards of a fresh enquiry. This Court in t he

interest of justice and fair play thought that a min or

penalty would be sufficient. Accordingly, two incremen ts

with future effect, of the appellant were ordered to be

withheld. This decision is, therefore, no authority for t he

proposition that the High Court or the Tribunal has juri s-

diction to impose any punishment to meet the ends of ju s-

tice. It may be noted that this Court exercised the equit a-

ble jurisdiction under Article 136 and the High Court or

Tribunal has no such power or jurisdiction.

We may however, carve out one exception to this propos i-

tion. There may be cases where the penalty is imposed und er

clause (a) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of t he

Constitution. Where the person, without enquiry is di s-

missed, removed or reduced in rank solely on the basis of

conviction by a criminal court, the Tribunal may examine t he

adequacy of the penalty imposed in the light of the convi c-

tion and sentence inflicted on the person. If the penal ty

impugned is apparently unreasonable or uncalled for, havi ng

regard to the nature of the criminal charge, the Tribun al

may step in to render substantial justice. The Tribunal m ay

remit the matter to the competent authority for reconsider a-

tion or by itself substitute one of the penalties provid ed

under clause (a). This power has been conceded to the cou rt

in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, [1985] 3 SCC 398 whe re

Madon, J., observed (at 501-502):

"Where a disciplinary authority comes to know th at

a government servant has been convicted on a crimin al

charge, it must consider whether his conduct which has l ed

to his conviction was such as warrants the imposition of a

penalty and, if so, what that penalty should be …..

"The disciplinary authority must, however, bear in mind th at

a conviction on a criminal charge does not automatical ly

entail dismissal, removed or reduction in rank of the co n-

cerned government servant. Having decided which of the se

three penalties is required to be imposed, he has to pa ss

the requisite order. A government servant who is aggriev ed

by the penalty imposed can agitate in appeal, revision or

review, as the case may be, that the penalty was too seve re

or excessive and not warranted by the facts and circu m-

stances of the case. If it is his case that he is not t he

government servant who has been in fact convicted, he c an

also agitate this question in appeal, revision or review. If

he fails in the departmental remedies and still wants to

pursue the matter, he can invoke the court's power of jud i-

cial review subject to the court permitting it. If the cou rt

finds that he was not in fact the person convicted, it wi ll

strike down the impugned order and order him to be reinsta t-

ed in service. Where the court finds that the penalty i m-

posed by the impugned order is arbitrary or grossly exce s-

sive or out of all proportion to the offence committed or

not warranted by the facts and circumstances of the case or

the requirements of that particular government service t he

court will also strike down the impugned order. Thus, in

Shankar Dass v. Union of India this Court set aside t he

impugned order of penalty on the ground that the penalty of

dismissal from service imposed upon the appellant was whi m-

sical and ordered his reinstatement in service with fu ll

back wages. It is, however, not necessary that the cou rt

should always order reinstatement. The court can inste ad

substitute a penalty which in its opinion would be just a nd

proper in the circumstances of the case."

The last contention that the respondent fails into t he

category of a workman and the Tribunal could exercise t he

powers of an industrial court for giving appropriate reli ef

is unavailable in this case, since the respondent had ma de

his choice of forum and was even otherwise dealt with und er

the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules which are undispu t-

edly applicable to him.

In the light of the principles to which we have call ed

attention and in view of the aforesaid discussion, the ord er

of the Tribunal imposing a lesser penalty on the responde nt

cannot, therefore, be sustained. He was found guilty of t he

charge framed against him. He

was a party to the fraudulent act for self aggrandisemen t.

He prepared bogus documents for withdrawal of salary in t he

name of Ashok Kumar who was not working in his Division. He

has thus proved himself unbecoming and unworthy to hold a ny

post. Any sympathy or charitable view on such officials wi ll

not be conducive to keep the streams of administration pu re

which is so vital for the success of our democrary.

In the result, we allow the appeal and set aside t he

order of the Tribunal. Consequently, the SLP of the respon d-

ent is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case howeve r,

we make no order as to costs.

T.N.A. Appeal allowed and Petition dismissed.

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