In Re: Sant Ram

SlNHA-. C. J.-This matter was placed before the

Constitution Bench by an order of the Chamber Judge dated

August 14, 1959, as it involved the vires of the rules

framed under Art. 145 of the Constitution with particular

reference to Rule 24 of Order IV-A of the Supreme Court

Rules (as Amended).

It appears that on receipt of a letter dated April 28, 1959,

from the Supreme Court Bar Association forwarding a copy of

a resolution which had been passed by the Executive

Committee of that Association, the Registrar initiated

proceedings and held an enquiry under R. 24(2) of Chap. IV-

A. The enquiry was made against two persons named Sant Ram

and Budh Dev Sharma on a complaint made by the Honorary

Secretary of the Supreme Court Bar Association. The

complaint against those persons was to the effect that they

were " continuing their undesirable activities " and were

seen every day in the Court premises and

in the verandah in front of the Bar Association "accosting

clients". On receipt of the Secretary's letter the

Registrar caused notices to be issued to the two persons

aforesaid to show cause why their names should not be

included in the " list of touts " to be kept hung up on the

Court notice board according to R. 24 aforesaid. The

Registrar fixed a date for holding the enquiry and called

upon those persons to appear before him and to adduce such

evidence as they may be advised, in showing cause against

the inclusion of their names in such a list. The notice

further called upon them to file their replies, if any, to

the complaint on or before May 6, 1959, and to be ready with

all their evidence and witnesses, if any, at the hearing on

May 9, 1959. Copies of the complaint and other relevant

papers were also sent to the Secretary of the Supreme Court

Bar Association inviting him to take such part in the

proceedings as the Association may be advised and requesting

him to furnish particulars of the evidence in support of the

complaint and to be ready with the evidence. In pursuance

of the notice aforesaid Budh Dev Sharma alias B. D. Pathak

filed his reply oil May 6, 1959, annexing thereto certain

documents and praying that he may be allowed to continue

earning his livelihood. He also prayed that his employer

Shri Dharam Bhushan, Advocate, may be accorded permission to

have his name registered as a clerk in the Registry and also

in the Bar Association. On May 8, 1959, Sant Ram filed his

reply to the said notice annexing thereto a certificate of

Mr. M. G. Bhimasena Rao, Advocate, and praying that the

notice against him may be discharged and that he be "

allowed to make both ends meet in the service of his present

employer ", meaning thereby Mr. Bhimasena Rao, Advocate.

The proceedings before the Registrar commenced on May 9,

1959, and were concluded on May 11, when evidence was

recorded.

A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the persons

proceeded against that the rules framed by the Supreme Court

under which the proceedings had been initiated against them

were ultra vires the powers of the Court conferred by Art.

145 of the Constitution.

It was contended on their behalf that the Registrar had no

jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings against them. The

learned Registrar overruled the preliminary objection and

held that it was not competent for him to go behind the

rules and that he must follow them, though he indicated that

if he had the competence to decide the preliminary objection

on its merits, he would have no difficulty in holding that

the objection was wholly unfounded.

After considering the evidence adduced before him the

learned Registrar by his order dated May 16, 1959, recorded

the finding that it had been proved to his satisfaction that

both those persons had been habitually frequenting the

precincts of the Court for the purpose of procuring business

for certain advocates in their profession, for remuneration,

over a period of years right up to the time the show cause

notice had been served upon them. He directed accordingly

that a list of touts be published forthwith in accordance

with R. 24(1), 0. IV-A, of the Supreme Court Rules, showing

the names of the two persons aforesaid in that list which

shall be kept hung up on the Court notice board.

Against this order of the Registrar only Sant Ram appealed

to the Chamber Judge. As already indicated, the learned

Chamber Judge directed the matter to be placed before the

Constitution Bench in view of the constitutional question

raised by the appellant challenging the vires of the rules

aforesaid.

Though other points were also raised in support of the

appeal before us, the most important question that falls to

be determined is whether this Court had the jurisdiction

under Art. 145 of the Constitution to frame the rules

impugned in this case. Before the rules which were amended

in the present form and which came into force with effect

from April 15, 1959, there was no provision in the rules of

this Court containing the definition of the word " tout " or

laying down the procedure for dealing with persons who were

alleged to have been acting as such. Order IV-A was

therefore added. It was headed: " Professional or Other

Misconduct ". It contains rules relating to the suspension

or removal of advocates from the roll of

advocates of this Court including the procedure to be

followed in proceedings started against an advocate of the

Court. Rules 23 and 24 which are the relevant rules are in

these terms:-

"23. Any Advocate, who accepts an engagement in any legal

business through a person included in the list of touts

published as provided in the next following Rule, shall be

deemed guilty of professional misconduct.

Explanation:-

" Tout " means a person who procures, in consideration of

any remuneration moving from any Advocate or from any person

on his behalf, the employment of such Advocate in any legal

business, or who proposes to any Advocate to procure, in

consideration of any remuneration moving from such Advocate

or from any person on his behalf, the employment of the

Advocate in such business, or who for purposes of such

procurement frequents the precincts of the Court."

24. (1) " The Registrar shall publish lists of persons

proved to his satisfaction, by evidence of general repute or

otherwise, habitually to act as touts, to be known as I

lists of touts' and may, from time to time, alter and amend

such lists.

A copy of every list of touts shall be kept hung upon the

Court Notice Board.

Explanation:-

The passing of a resolution by the Supreme Court Bar

Association declaring any person to be a tout shall be

evidence of general repute of such person for purpose of

this Rule.

(2) No person shall be included in the list of touts unless

he has been given an opportunity to show cause against his

inclusion in such list. Any person may appeal to the

Chamber Judge against the order of the Registrar including

his name in such list.

(3) The Registrar may, by general or special order, exclude

from the precincts of the Court all such persons whose names

are included in the list of touts."

The question is whether these rules are within the rule-

making power of this Court conferred by

Art. 146(1)(a) :'of the Constitution which is in these

terms:-

" 145(1) Subject to the provisions of any law made by

Parliament, the Supreme Court may from time to time, with

the approval of the President, make rules for regulating

generally the practice and procedure of the Court including-

(a) rules as to the persons practising before the Court :

It has been contended that the power of this Court to frame

rules is confined to making rules for regulating the "

practice and procedure " do not include rules to declare a

person a tout and the procedure leading up to such a

declaration. In our opinion there is no force in this

contention. It has not been, and it cannot be, contended

that this Court is incompetent to frame rules regulating

conduct in and out of Court bearing on the professional

activities of an advocate of this Court. This Court has the

inherent jurisdiction to regulate its proceedings relating

to conduct of persons appearing before it, in and out of

Court, in so far as such conduct has a bearing oil their

professional relations and ethics, apart from the

constitutional provisions of Art. 145 set out above. This

Court must in the very nature of things have the fullest

power to lay down rules with a view to ensuring honest and

efficient discharge of their duties by officers of the

Court, including legal practitioners admitted to the roll of

advocates of the Court. This Court has, subject to such

legislation as may be made by Parliament, the responsibility

vested in it of maintaining proper discipline in Court and

of insisting upon proper standards being observed by legal

practitioners who have the privilege of appearing, acting

and pleading in this Court. This Court must, therefore, in

the proper discharge of its duties as the highest Court in

the land make such rules as would ensure sound ad-

ministration of justice and proper conduct on the part of

those whose duty it is to help the Court in the discharge of

its responsibilities. Apart from the inherent jurisdiction

of this Court, the Constitution itself has

authorised the Court to make rules for regulating generally

the practice and procedure of the Court. The expression, "

the practice and procedure of the Court " must be construed

in its fullest amplitude and must include regulating the

conduct of all persons, appearing before the Court, in

relation to the business of the Court. Thus the conduct of

advocates and their assistants in relation to the business

of the court must form the subject matter of regulation by

the rules of the Court.

Once it is held that this Court has the authority to frame

rules relating to the conduct of persons practising in this

Court, it follows that this Court has the power to prescribe

a code of conduct for advocates, regulating their relations

with their clients and their conduct in Court as officers of

the Court. When this Court, as in R. 23, provides that an

advocate shall be guilty of professional misconduct if he

accepts an engagement in any legal business through a person

included in the list of touts, such a rule cannot be said to

be beyond the rule-making powers of this Court. It follows

that with a view to enforcing that rule, a " tout " has to

be defined, which is done by the explanation to R. 23. It

is equally clear that R. 24, which lays down the procedure

for publishing lists of touts and for holding an enquiry to

determine whether or not a particular person should be

included in such a list must be equally within the purview

of of the rule-making power of this Court. In our opinion,

therefore, it is futile to contend that R. 24 in question is

ultra vires the rule-making power of this Court.

It is next contended that Art. 14 of the Constitution has

been infringed by the provisions contained in R. 24 It was

difficult for the appellant to indicate in what way the

alleged discrimination occurs. It was faintly suggested

that there was some difference between the provisions now

impugned and those of s. 36 of the Legal Practitioners' Act

(Act XVIII of 1879). Assuming that there is some difference

between the two provisions, it cannot be said that ipso

facto there is discrimination. All persons who frequent the

precincts of this Court shall be dealt with under the same

rules, if and when the occasion arises. All persons who are

included in the list of touts under R. 24 will be liable to

be dealt with in the same way irrespective of any other

considerations. Hence there is no room for any

discrimination so far as the precincts of this Court are

concerned.

It is also contended that the impugned rule infringes Arts.

19 and 21 of the Constitution, because it has the effect of

excluding him from the precinct,-, of the Court, and of

carrying on his occupation and that it has a tendency to

deprive him of his livelihood. The rule, as already

indicated, has been made with a view to ensuring the purity

and soundness of the profession of law so far as the

advocates of this Court are concerned. It cannot,

therefore, be said that it is not in the interest of the

general public to exclude touts from the precincts of this

Court. If the appellant has been rightly declared to be a

tout, he cannot justly complain that he is being deprived of

the right to carry oil his occupation, an occupation which

is regarded as having a corrupting influence. A tout as

such cannot claim any rights in relation to the business of

the Court and it is incumbent on every Court where legal

practitioners are allowed to appear and plead to see that

toutism is completely eliminated.

With reference to the terms of Art. 21, it was also argued

by the appellant himself, after he had been permitted by the

Court to dispense with the services of his advocate, that

life must include livelihood. The argument that the word

"life" in Art. 21 of the Constitution includes " livelihood

" has only to be stated to be rejected. The question of

livelihood has not in terms been dealt with by Art. 21 of

the Constitution. That question is included in the freedoms

enumerated in Art. 19, particularly cl.(g), or even in Art.

16 in a limited sense, but the language of Art. 21 cannot be

pressed into aid of the argument that the word "life" in

Art. 21 includes "livelihood" also. Even if this extreme

proposition were to be accepted as well founded, the

appellant will have to be kept out of the precincts of the

Court only after the procedure established by the rules of

this Court has been observed. We have already held that the

rule in

question is not ultra vires. That being so, the only

question that remains to be considered is whether the

procedure laid down by the rule has not been followed as

contended by the appellant. It has already been stated that

the appellant had been properly served with the notice to

show cause why his name should not be included in the list

of touts. He put in his show cause petition and he was

given time to adduce such evidence as he may have been

advised in support of his case. The appellant has not

contended that the procedure laid down in the rule has not

been followed, but his contention was that as the Registrar

did not grant further time arid did not issue summons to his

witnesses he had been deprived of his right to adduce

evidence. In our opinion, there is no substance in this

contention. The enquiry was a summary one. The matter was

dealt with by the Registrar on two dates. If the lawyers

whom the appellant wished to examine on his behalf did not

turn up on the date fixed, it may be due to the fact that

they were not willing to support his case. It is a little

difficult to appreciate what those advocates, even if they

had appeared before the ]Registrar, could prove. They could

not prove the negative. It was for the complainant to

adduce evidence in support of the allegation that the

appellant is a tout. The whole question, therefore, which

the Registrar had to determine was whether or not the

evidence adduced in support of the complainant's case was

sufficient to make out that complaint. The Registrar has

come to a distinct finding that it had been established to

his satisfaction by evidence of repute that the appellant is

a tout. It appears that the appellant started coming to

this Court as a litigant after his conviction under s. 409

of the Indian Penal Code. He said he worked as clerk with a

lawyer who had taken up his cause, but he appears to have

changed his masters rather too frequently and pretended to

have worked as an advocate's clerk without his name being

shown in the register of clerks maintained by the Bar

Association. His case that a number of advocates of this

Court had started a false propaganda against him and some

others, because they felt that their clients were being

misled into

engaging other advocates, has not been accepted by the

Registrar. It appears to have been the case that not being

a registered clerk, he could not do any job permissible for

such a clerk. Naturally, therefore, he was found wandering

about in the corridors in circumstances which led to the

genuine belief that be had no other business in Court than

that of touting for such legal practitioners as would engage

him. for that nefarious activity. We cannot, therefore,

accede to the argument that the appellant has been a victim

of mere suspicion. The evidence of general repute against

him, in our opinion, was sufficient to brand him as a " tout

".

It follows that there is no merit in this appeal, which is

hereby dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.